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37

THE CONDUCT OF ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS IN MALAYA


FEDERATION OF
MALAYA
AND
SINGAPORE
THAILAND
PERLIS
ALOR STAR
KEDAH
KOTA BHARU
SOUTH CHINA SEA
GEORGE TOWN
PENANG
PROV WELLESLEY
PERAK
KELANTAN
TRENGGANU
TRENGGANU
TAIPING
IPOH
KUALA LIPIS
KUANTAN
PAHANG
STRAITS OF MALACCA
SELANGOR
KUALA LUMPUR
NEGRI SEMBILAN
SEREMBAN
MALACCA
MALACCA
JOHORE
JOHORE BAHRU
SINGAPORE
SUMATRA
Miles
20 0 20 40 60 80
International Boundary
Interstate Boundary
Railways

O.C. R.H.Q. SQUADRON,
11th HUSSARS. P.A.O.

THE CONDUCT

OF

ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS

IN

MALAYA

Second Edition

RESTRICTED

The information given in this document is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the Press or to any person not authorized to receive it.

Prepared under the direction of
H.Q. MALAYA COMMAND
KUALA LUMPUR
1954

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FOREWORD TO FIRST EDITION

SINCE ASSUMING my appointment as High Commissioner and Director of Operations in the Federation of Malaya, I have been impressed by the wealth of jungle fighting experience available on different levels in Malaya and among different categories of persons. At the same time, I have been disturbed by the fact that this great mass of detailed knowledge has not been properly collated or presented to those whose knowledge and experience is not so great. This vast store of knowledge must be pooled. Hence this book.

I wish to impress the following four points:—

Firstly, the absolute necessity for the adoption of the immediate action drills laid down in this book. All battle experience shows the very great value to be obtained from such drills and the saving of casualties which they bring about.

Secondly, the vital importance of accurate and quick shooting, particularly with single shot weapons. If only we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.


Thirdly, the need for offensive action, both in planning on whatever level it may be, and also in minor tactical engagements. It is the automatic offensive action taught and practised by many units in Malaya that has brought such outstanding results.

And fourthly, the necessity in operations of this nature of discipline and all that it stands for. It is the vehicle load of men belonging to a unit which does not demand a sufficiently high standard of vehicle discipline which eventually gets caught out; it is the same thing with the foot patrol of the same unit.

The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist terrorists in Malaya. This book shows in a clear and easily readable form the proven principles by which this can be done. The book is by no means perfect. Criticisms and improvements are invited by GOC Malaya, who will produce a revised edition in six months' time.

In the meantime, the methods described are to be adopted not only by the Army, but also by the Federal Jungle Companies, the Jungle Squads and the Area Security Squads of the Federal Police. Many of the methods laid down for the movement of vehicles and convoys are also applicable to the Police.

In the compilation of this book, the accumulated knowledge of the Farelf Training Centre organised and run by Commander-in-Chief, Far East Land Forces, has been drawn upon in full. We in the Federation are very grateful for what that school has achieved.




High Commissioner and Director of Operation,
Federation of Malaya.

FOREWORD TO SECOND EDITION

SINCE THIS BOOK was produced by General Templer in 1952 much progress has been made in the fight against the Malayan Communist Party. But although the terrorists have mostly been forced back into the jungle the Emergency, after 6 years, is still with us. Many units of the Army and of the Federal Police have followed the principles and jungle drills laid down in the First Edition and have gained much thereby. But Army units are constantly changing and Police personnel being changed over. Hence the need to keep our ideas right up-to-date and hence this Second Edition. Recent experience underlines the supreme importance of quick, accurate shooting. As General Templer said 'if only we can double the ratio of kills per contact we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.' Therefore all individuals and units while training and fighting in Malaya must keep in view a double aim:—

First—Stick to the tactics and drills in this book.

Second—Practise constantly to improve their shooting.



Director of Operations,
Federation of Malaya.

ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used in this pamphlet which are NOT contained in Appendix *C* to Staff Duties in the Field:—

AOP	=	Air Observation Post.
ASU	=	Area Security Units (Police Special Constabulary).
BCM	=	Branch Committee Member (MCP).
CCP	=	Chinese Communist Party.
CEP	=	Captured Enemy Personnel.
CECM	=	Central Executive Committee Member (MCP).
CIS	=	Combined Intelligence Staff.
CPO	=	Chief Police Officer (State or Settlement).
CT	=	Communist Terrorist(s).
CW	=	Continuous Wave (Wireless).
DCM	=	District Committee Member (MCP).
DIS	=	Director of Information Services.
D of O	=	Director of Operations.
DWEC	=	District War Executive Committee.
IA	=	Immediate Action.
JOC	=	Joint Operations Centre (Army/RAF HQ MALAYA Command.
MCP	=	Malayan Communist Party.
MPAJA	=	Malayan Peoples Anti Japanese Army.
MRLA	=	Malayan Races Liberation Army.
NMB	=	North Malayan Bureau (MCP).
OCPD	=	Officer(s) Commanding Police District(s).
OSPC	=	Officer(s) Superintending Police Circle(s).
PCS	=	Paragon Control Staff.
PLM	=	Polsten Light Machine (LMG mounting on Daimler Scout Car).
PW	=	Psychological Warfare (NOT Prisoner of War).
SB	=	Special Branch.
SCM	=	State Committee Member (MCP).
SEP	=	Surrendered Enemy Personnel.
SF	=	Security Forces.
SMB	=	South Malayan Bureau (MCP).
SMIS	=	Special Military Intelligence Staff.
SWEC	=	State or Settlement War Executive Committee.

DEFINITIONS

1. **Introduction.**—Frequent reference is made in this pamphlet to the following expressions which are defined below:—

2. **A contact.**—A "contact" is made when the SF meet the CT and the SF open fire first. It should be noted that when the SF meet the CT and the CT open first, the encounter is referred to as an "incident".

3. **An Incident.**—There are two types of incidents which are classified as:—

(*a*) *Major Incident.*—A major incident is one, caused by CT, which results in loss of life, serious injury or considerable damage to property.

(*b*) *Minor Incident.*—All other CT caused incidents.

(*c*) Major and Minor incidents are further subdivided as Type A or B:—

(i) *Type A.*—Those which are the result of careful CT planning, showing aggressiveness by the CT, and which involve a degree of risk to CT.

(ii) *Type B.*—All other incidents.

4. **Clearance.**—

(This definition should be read in conjunction with Chapter III, Section 5.)

Police clearance, when given, means that the Police believe to the best of their knowledge that no loss or injury to innocent civilians will result from SF action in the particular area for which Police Clearance has been given.

5. **CT.**—Those who in any way actively further the subversive Communist campaign for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Federation by restoring to or instigating violence and who:—

(*a*) By the use of any fire-arm, explosive or ammunition act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or to the maintenance of public order.

(*b*) Incite to violence or counsel disobedience to the law or to any lawful order by the use of any firearm, explosive or ammunition.

(*c*) Carry or have in their possession or under their control any firearm without lawful authority therefor.

(*d*) Carry or have in their possession or under their control any ammunition or explosive without authority therefor.

(*e*) Adhere to the CT gangs as couriers or camp followers.

6. **SEP.**—(Surrendered Enemy Personnel). These are CT who willingly surrender to the Forces of Law and Order at a time when they could otherwise without difficulty have made good their escape. Two conditions must be fulfilled for such persons to come within this category:—

(*a*) They must leave or desert the CT organisation and,

(*b*) Must give themselves up at the earliest opportunity.

7. **CEP.**—(Captured Enemy Personnel). These are CT who come into our hands otherwise than as SEPs.

8. **Min Yuen.**—The term "Min Yuen" is short for "MIN CHONG YUEN TONG" meaning "The People's Movement". It covers all activities by the Masses, and the Masses leaders, in aid of the Party. It follows therefore that a Min Yuen worker can be a Party sympathiser living in the jungle but engaged in controlling the Min Yuen Organisation. The term Min Yuen is adjectival and is not a noun.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Introduction

Where it is necessary to draw attention of the reader to some particular document, instruction or other reference, a star symbol with a letter of the alphabet is shown in the text. This symbol refers the reader to the respective item in the Bibliography below. It will thus be possible to amend or add to this Bibliography, as regulations and instructions change, without defacing the pamphlet itself.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Serial	Starred item	Chapter and Section	Reference
(*a*)	(*b*)	(*c*)	(*d*)
1	(*a*)	Chapter III, Section 2, para 1 (*a*)	See D of O instruction No 36.
2	(*b*)	Chapter III, Section 10, para 7	See Chapter XVII, Section 10, leaflet dropping.
3	(*c*)	Chapter V. Section 4, para 1	See D of O instruction No 34 for full details.
4	(*d*)	Chapter X, Section 3, para 16 (*d*)	See Pt III of HQ MALAYA Weekly Int Summary No 207/54.
5	(*e*)	Chapter XII, Section 1, para 1 Chapter II, Section 11, para 4	Paper written by CT (their ref. HQ Ref. OFA/1/57) "Outline on Security and Defence of the Base." (Not issued to Fmns and units). See also Pt. III HQ MALAYA Weekly Int Summary No 216/54.
6	(*f*)	Chapter XIII, Section 1, para 2	See HQ MALAYA Weekly Int Summary No 204/54.
7	(*g*)	Chapter XV, Section 3, para 8	See HQ MALAYA Training Instruction No 3 CRM/ 1310/1/G (Trg) of 15th October, 1952.
8	(*h*)	Chapter XVII, Section 8, para 6 (*d*)	Abseil Equipment. For details see Appendix *A* to FETW/ 5112/3/Air (Trg) of 28th April, 1954.
9	(*j*)	Chapter XIX, Section 3, para 1	See D of O instructions No 37 of 26th January, 1953 and No 31 of 7th December, 1953.

10	(*k*)	Chapter XIX, Section 4, para 3	Method of payment laid down in HQ MALAYA CRM/6204/Q (Maint) of 3rd October, 1950 and HQ MALAYA CRM/6204/Q (Maint) of 24th July, 1951.
11	(*l*)	Chapter XXII, Section 2, para 1	Instructions on anti-malarial precautions, contained in GRO 323/54 Section 70.
12	(*m*)	Chapter VII, Section 5, para 1 Chapter XIV, Appendix *D*.	This Appendix is issued separately in MALAY to MALAY battalions.
13	(*n*)	Chapter XIV, Section 3, para 5	See CP instruction No 3.
14	(*o*)	Chapter XIV, Section 3, para 8	See D of O instruction No 34.
15	(*p*)	Chapter XIV, Section 3, para 21	See D of O instruction No 22.
16	(*q*)	Chapter XIV, Section 3, para 25	See D of O instructions Nos 13, 25 and 27.
17	(*r*)	Chapter III, Section 3, para 2	Composition increased in D of Op.
18	(*s*)	Chapter XVII, Section 5, para 1	See Appx 'M' to Chapter XVII.
19	(*t*)	Chapter XVII, Section 4, para 14	See MCRO 469/54.

THE CONDUCT OF ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS IN MALAYA

PART ONE

GENERAL

DISTRIBUTION

BRITISH BATTALIONS		SCALE *F*
MALAY FEDERATION GURKHA KAR FIJI	BATTALIONS	SPECIAL SCALE

CHAPTER I

MALAYA

Section 1.—THE COUNTRY

1. Malaya is a peninsula stretching for 400 miles from the border of Thailand south-east to the Indonesian Archipelago. Its greatest width is 200 miles. In area—53, 240 square miles—it is a little larger than England without Wales.

2. The peninsula has a backbone of jungle-covered mountains, rising to a height of 7,000 feet. From the mountains fast rivers run west to the Straits of Malacca and east to the South China Sea. Four-fifths of the land is trackless evergreen forest and under-growth. A hundred feet above the ground the trees make a solid roof of green, shutting out the sky. From their branches curtains of vine and creeper join the under-growth to make a jungle so dense that a standing man is invisible at twenty-five yards. The remaining one-fifth of the country is rubber plantations, rice fields, tin mines, native villages and towns.

3. At the south-eastern tip of the peninsula is the island of Singapore, separated from the mainland by the Straits of Johore. Across the Straits there runs a road and rail causeway three-quarters of a mile long.

Section 2.—CLIMATE

1. The average noon temperature is 90°F, but there is little temperature variation throughout the year; winds are generally light, and rainfall is often heavy. The diurnal variation of weather is the predominant feature; it produces strong contrasts of rain and cloud between day and night although the weather of one day does not necessarily repeat that of the day before.

2. Four seasons can be distinguished:—

(*a*) *North-East Monsoon.*—Late October to the end of March. North-easterly winds blow strongly over the sea and the East coast, but lightly elsewhere. Much heavy rain and low cloud occur on the East side of the mountains —less elsewhere.

(*b*) *South-West Monsoon.*—End of May or beginning of June to September. Intermittent rain in the south-west.

(*c*) *The Transitional seasons.*—April to May, and October. Winds are generally light and variable. Thunderstorms are frequent and rainfall is very heavy.

3. The nights are usually clear and quiet and reasonably cool. Towards morning mists may form in valleys and sheets of cloud mantle the slopes of the mountains, although the summits are usually cloudless. Soon after sunrise, however, the contours of distant mountains become less distinct and after an hour or two shimmer blurs their outline, the sun's heat increases, the sheets of cloud dissolve, and for a short time the sky becomes cloudless. By noon cumulus cloud frequently begins to form and the heat grows intense. During the late afternoon the cumulus clouds often increase to large drifting thunder-clouds, and thunder storms occur. These may last only for about 15 or 30 minutes, but they are very heavy. During the early part of the night the thunder-clouds tend to flatten out, and by morning the sheets of stratocumulus over the mountain slopes and the mists over the valleys have returned.

4. The effects of topography on the weather and climate of Malaya are well marked. The windward sides of the mountains are apt to get heavier showers than the lee sides, sometimes even continuous rain. During strong winds the rugged nature of the country produces very uncomfortable turbulence with down-currents on the lee sides of the hills. Even during quiet weather the broken country gives rise to local wind currents and cloud, and over the bare worked-out mining land the heat sets up vertical currents.

Section 3.—VEGETATION

1. For operational purposes the vegetation of Malaya can be classified under four headings:—

(*a*) Rubber.

(*b*) Primary Jungle.

(*c*) Secondary Jungle.

(*d*) Swamp.

2. Interspersed with these is found open ground covered in belukar (low scrub and bushes), lallang (long grass), or cultivated land and padi.

3. **Rubber.—**

(*a*) Visibility is often good up to several hundred yards. Trees are planted on a fixed pattern and at a fixed density. Except where an estate has been neglected there is very little, if any, undergrowth.

(*b*) It is difficult, if not impossible, to track in rubber on account of the lack of undergrowth and the nature of the ground. Movement at night in rubber is possible and by day a rate of movement of up to two miles per hour can be attained.

4. **Primary Jungle.—**

(*a*) This is very thick and contains trees 150 feet or more in height with comparatively little undergrowth on the jungle floor.

(*b*) Tracking is easier in jungle as signs left by CT in parting a way through the undergrowth are visible.

5. **Secondary Jungle.**—Where for any reason primary jungle has been removed a secondary growth of every kind of bush, creeper or bamboo takes command quickly and soon forms a dense mass that is difficult to move through. The density and height of growth varies in accordance with the time that has elapsed since the cutting of the original forest.

6. **Swamp.**—On low lying ground in coastal regions swamps extend over considerable areas. The swamp consists of water and mud into which a man may sink knee deep and frequently deeper. The whole area is covered with trees and thick undergrowth which reduces visibility to a few yards.

Section 4.—ABORIGINES

There are about 100,000 Aborigines in the Federation. They are not a homogeneous people but fall roughly into three major groups—the Negritos, the Senoi and the Aboriginal Malays. The book "An Introduction to the Malayan Aborigines" by P. D. R. Williams Hunt, which has been issued to all units in Malaya, gives full details of their characteristics and the methods of handling them. Further up to date details are contained in Chapter XIX.

Section 5.—WILD LIFE

There is plenty of wild life in Malaya but it is possible to live for years in the country without actually encountering anything more than lizards, monkeys and birds. Tigers, elephants, wild pig, deer, buffaloes, crocodiles and snakes are all to be found.

Section 6.—COMMUNICATIONS

Compared with European countries there is a lack of road communication. Not all roads and paths are marked on the current maps, particular exceptions being the roads in rubber estates and the large number of tracks in Government Forest Reserves.

Section 7.—PRODUCTION

Agriculture

1. The main agricultural crops of Malaya are shown below.

2. **Rubber.**—This is produced both on large (over 100 acres) estates and smallholdings. These covered an acreage of 3,727,540 at the end of 1953 from which was produced a total of 572,792 tons or an estimated 33 per cent of total world production. Export duties yielded a total of 54¾ million dollars. 291,390 persons were directly employed in the industry. Comparative estate and smallholding production was as follows:—

	Planted Acreage	*Production in tons*
Estates	2,029,706	341,117
Smallholdings	1,697,834	231,675

Conditions throughout the industry vary widely but in general it may be said that large estates are to a great extent replanted or being replanted with high yielding material whilst the smallholdings are still covered with the original tree stand, much of it 40 years or more old. Again as a very general rule large estates will be found to be cleared of undergrowth and well maintained whilst smallholdings tend to be overgrown: even in some cases to secondary jungle.

3. **Rice.**—At the end of 1953, 834,010 acres were under dry and wet padi and it was estimated that this area produced some 700,000 tons of rice. Accurate statistics of home consumption in rice producing areas are not available but even taking these into

account the Federation does not produce more than 50 per cent of its normal annual consumption. The greatest proportion of the very considerable imports required come from Thailand.

In view of the general overall improvement in the world rice position Government rationing of this commodity ended on August 1, 1954. Rations can, however, still be imposed for operational purposes.

4. **Coconuts.**—Some 500,000 acres were under this crop at the end of 1953, and total production of copra, coconut oil and copra cake was 111,666, 79,459 and 50,422 tons respectively. Three-quarters of the total acreage is smallholdings. Generally speaking, coconut production is confined to the coastal clays of the West Coast. Net exports were of the value of some 60 million dollars.

5. **Pineapples.**—After total extinction during the war this industry has recovered to the extent that some 26,681 acres were planted as at the end of 1953. Total exports of 17,368 tons were valued at 19 million dollars.

6. **Tea.**—Approximately 4 million pounds of tea were produced during 1953 of which half was exported. Generally speaking Malayan teas are not of high quality.

7. **Cocoa.**—Cocoa is being grown on an experimental scale. It is a crop of high promise in view of the favourable climate and overall world shortage.

8. **Timber.**—Approximately 12,500 square miles, or 24.6 of the total land area of the Federation is now Reserved Forest. Despite the closure of logging areas from time to time on operational grounds, a total of 111,484 tons of timber of a net value of 18,686,700 dollars were exported during 1953. General revenue from timber royalties amounted to 10.6 million dollars. It is of interest that Malaya now ranks third as exporter of raw non-coniferous sawn timber to the United Kingdom.

Mining

9. **Tin.**—Tin is the main mineral resource of the Federation. During 1953 a total of 56,254 tons of metal tin were produced in the Federation. This represents approximately 32 per cent of the total world production with a total value of 340 million dollars. It produced a revenue of 50½ million dollars in 1953. At

the end of the year there were 76 dredges, 482 gravel pumps, 11 underground and 60 other types of mines being operated. 37,515 persons were directly employed in the industry.

10. Other minerals are of secondary importance although there is promise of extensive development of iron-ore mining on the East coast and aluminium (Bauxite) has certain prospects. The one coal mine (at Batu Arang) produces very poor quality coal.

Section 8.—POPULATION

1. The estimated population of the Colony of Singapore and of the Federation of Malaya at the 31st of December, 1953 were:—

Colony of Singapore

Malaysians	*Chinese*	*Indians and Pakistanis*	*Others*	*Total*
141,037	877,235	90,008	39,004	1,147,364

Federation of Malaya

Malaysians	*Chinese*	*Indians and Pakistanis*	*Others*	*Total*
2,830,863	2,152,906	665,503	83,680	5,705,952

The term 'Malaysian' embraces all members of the Malay race with the exception of Phillipinos.

2. It will be noted that Chinese in the Colony of Singapore comprise some 77 per cent of the total population, whilst in the Federation 49 per cent are of Malaysian stock, 36 per cent are of Chinese origin (almost without exception drawn from South China) and 12 per cent from India and Pakistan—the vast majority of the latter being from South India. Both the Colony of Singapore and the Federation of Malaya with net 1953 increases in population of 4.15 per cent and 3.65 per cent respectively have one of the highest percentage population increases in the world.

Section 9.—POLITICAL ORGANISATION

1. The Federation of Malaya includes the nine Malay states of Perak, Johore, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Trengganu and the two former Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca. It should be noted that

constitutionally the Malay states are 'protected' (not Colonies) and that Their Highnesses the Rulers are in Treaty relations with Her Majesty the Queen.

2. The Federation of Malaya Agreement provides for—

(*a*) A High Commissioner (appointed by Her Majesty upon the advice of the Secretary of State for the Colonies) who possesses certain reserved powers notably over Defence and Internal Security and Foreign Relations.

(*b*) A conference of the Rulers of the nine Malay States which must be consulted by the High Commissioner on the following major issues:—

(i) Any change in Immigration Policy.
(ii) Any new Legislation.
(iii) Any major change in a Federal Department.
(iv) Any major change in Salary Schemes.

(*c*) *A nominated Federal Executive Council* which at present consists of:—

The High Commissioner.
Three *ex officio* Members (the Chief Secretary, Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary).
The Member for Home Affairs.
The Member for Economic Affairs.
The Member for Health.
The Member for Education.
The Member for Local Government, Housing and Town Planning.
The Member for Works.
The Member for Transport.
The Member for Natural Resources.
The Member for Industrial and Social Relations.
The Member for Posts and Telecommunications.
Two officials (The Secretary for Chinese Affairs and the Secretary for Defence).
Two unofficials.

All members are responsible to the Legislative Council for the conduct of the Departments within their portfolios. Four of the Members are Malay, two are Chinese, two European, one Ceylonese and one Indian.

(*d*) *A nominated Legislative Council* which consists of:—

The Speaker.

Three *ex officio* members (the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General and Financial Secretary).

The ten Members holding portfolios.

The Secretary for Defence and the Secretary for Chinese Affairs.

Nine Presidents of the Councils of State and two Settlement Representatives.

Fifty unofficials.

3. Substantial changes in the composition of the Executive and Legislative Councils will probably take place in 1955 as the result of the Legislative Council Elections Ordinance, 1954. The present proposals make provision for a Legislative Council cnsisting of:—

A Speaker.

Fifty-two Elected Members and

Forty-six Nominated Members.

Provision will be made in the latter category for representatives of minorities.

4. If these proposals are agreed it is likely that the composition of Executive Council will reflect the political pattern of the revised Legislative Council. The franchise will be based on Federal citizenship and the estimated electorate will be some 2.2 million.

Section 10.—STATE AND SETTLEMENT ORGANISATION

In the States

1. The Ruler is advised by an Executive Council which consists of:—

(*a*) The Mentri Besar (the Senior State Administrative Officer).

(*b*) The British Adviser (whose 'Advice' on all matters except those pertaining to Malay religion and custom must, under the Federation of Malaya Agreement, be accepted but who in fact never gives such 'Advice'.)

(*c*) The State Legal Adviser and certain nominated officials and unofficials.

2. The larger Councils of State which meet on a very limited number of occasions under the chairmanship of the Mentri Besar, deal with the small quantity of State Legislation required. They serve a useful purpose as a sounding board for local grievances. Elections to the Councils of State, generally to provide an elected majority, are intended and several will take place in 1955. The franchise will be based upon State Citizenship.

3. **The State Administrative Machine.**—This consists of:—

(*a*) The State Secretariat.

(*b*) The District Officers, who are responsible to the State or Settlement Government for the overall policy in their districts and in particular for the Land Office, Treasury and in almost all cases for the Town Board. Both the State Secretariat and District Officer are normally staffed by Officers from the Malayan or State Civil Services.

(*c*) The Penghulu or Penggawa who is responsible for the Mukim or Sub-District.

(*d*) In Perak there is a system of Territorial Chiefs who are directly responsible to the Ruler and in Johore and Trengganu officers of the Malayan Civil Service, entitled Administrative Officers, assist the District Officers who are drawn from the State Civil Service. The Administrative Officers are invariably in charge of the Land Office.

In the Two Settlements

4. The Resident Commissioner is at present advised by a Nominated Settlement Council but elections are intended in the near future. The officers in the Settlement Secretariat and in the Districts are normally drawn from the Malayan Civil Service.

Section 11.—LOCAL GOVERNMENT

1. The three Municipalities of Penang, Malacca and Kuala Lumpur have a nominated President who is an officer of the Malayan Civil Service, and they have in all cases an elected majority.

2. The pattern of Local Government in the Districts is at present mainly the nominated Town Board (but this is rapidly being changed to a Town Council with an elected majority) and the

fully elected Local Council. These latter are a successful innovation and are the only form of Local Government based upon an adult franchise. Chairmen of Local Councils are usually men of substance and considerable local influence.

Section 12.—FINANCE

As is common in all forms of Federal Government the major items of revenue, e.g. Customs and Income Tax are Federal. State Revenues are drawn from Land and Natural Resources. Annual allotments from the Federal Government enable the State Government Budgets to be balanced.

Section 13.—COMMISSIONER-GENERAL

Her Majesty's Government is also represented in Singapore by His Excellency the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South East Asia. His role is twofold:—

(*a*) To co-ordinate policy for the Colonial Office amongst the four territories of the Federation of Malaya, and the Colonies of Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo.

(*b*) To co-ordinate policy for the Foreign Office in Burma, Thailand, Indonesia and Indo-China.

He is also Chairman of the British Defence Co-ordination Committee whose principal members are the three Commanders in Chief resident in Singapore.

CHAPTER II

THE CT — ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

The Emergency has now been in force for six years and there is still no noticeable sign that the end is in sight. So far, this Communist insurrection has not succeeded in upsetting the political stability of the country or in seriously dislocating its economy. But it remains a serious menace to the security of Malaya and Singapore.

Section 2.—ORIGINS OF COMMUNISM IN MALAYA

1. Communism in Malaya was not an indigenous movement. It did not develop from the grievances of its peasantry or labouring classes, nor from any frustrated desire for national independence on the part of a local population governed by a Foreign Power. It was the result of the direct infection of Communist virus into a small section of the Chinese community in Malaya through the agency of the Communist Party in China, which in turn was directed by the Far Eastern Bureau of the Communist International (the Comintern) the directing agency of Soviet Russia in its pursuit of 'world revolution'.

2. It was part of a plan, sponsored by the Comintern, which embraced the whole of South-East Asia and aimed at the spread of Communism in the Phillipines, Indo-China, Siam, Burma, the Netherlands East Indies (now Indonesia) and Malaya, with the consequent discomfiture of the 'Imperialist Powers' (Britain, America, France and Holland) which controlled colonial territories within those areas. This, in turn, was but part of a wider scheme of the Third International aimed at the establishment of Communism throughout the world by armed insurrection.

Section 3.—THE MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY

1. The first organised Communist Party in Malaya was created in 1927/1928 by the Comintern organisation in China through the agency of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It continued to be influenced, if not directed, by the CCP until 1930 when Soviet intervention severed this direction.

2. In 1933 the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was firmly and finally set up on its own feet. External direction laid down its future policy which required the MCP to concentrate its entire resources and main activities in penetrating and controlling the labour field and to achieve leadership of the strike movement. Expansion of Communism amongst youth was also listed as a priority.

3. The MCP was not slow in using genuine labour grievances for its own ends and wide-spread strikes took place in 1936/1937. This policy of fomenting labour unrest was continued until Soviet Russia became part of the allied front in June 1941. In view of British economic aid to Russia, the MCP then found it expedient to prevent any unnecessary labour friction which would indirectly harm the Soviet war effort.

Section 4.—THE MALAYAN PEOPLE'S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY

1. When the war against Japan began, the MCP offered its services to the British authorities. These services were accepted and the first seeds of the resistance movement were thus supplied by the MCP. Some 200 Chinese were recruited by the MCP and trained with them and it was not at any time then suggested that they were under British command—the emphasis was on co-operation. Arrangements were however made to enable this body to maintain contact with parties of British officers which had already been placed behind the Japanese lines independently of the Chinese supplied by the MCP. While British contact with Malaya was lost between February 1942, and May 1943, these trainees played a major part in organising the military side of the MCP resistance movement known as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). In the beginning, they carried out a considerable amount of offensive action against the Japanese, but as Japanese control tightened and the arms and food situation deteriorated, most of this came to an end and the MPAJA was fully occupied in maintaining its existence on the defensive in the jungle. British remnants were contacted and looked after by them, and though they were treated with deference throughout and invited to help over training, they were refused any voice in the organisation or control of the MPAJA. Such was the position when contact was re-established by a British party from India in August 1943.

2. In December 1943, a preliminary agreement was made between the British party representing the Allied Forces (later SEAC) and a Communist leader representing specifically the MCP, the MPAJA and the Anti-Japanese Union (as the political side of the MCP was then known). In accordance with this agreement the resistance organisations undertook to co-operate against the enemy and to accept orders and instructions from the Allied Forces. This co-operation was to continue throughout any period of military occupation. The British on their part undertook to arm, train and supply the MPAJA so far as was possible. By this time the MPAJA had become a fairly extensive organisation and was divided into eight groups, each with its own group leader. The groups themselves were split up into a number of small camps hidden in the jungle. Food supplies they received from outside, especially from the Anti-Japanese Union, and this they augmented with the produce of their small gardens in the jungle. Before the foregoing agreement could be implemented however all contact with India was again lost and the British were unable to fulfil their part of the bargain until February 1945, when contact was regained with India, and Malaya came within the range of Allied aircraft.

3. A further conference was now held, at which the organisation of the MPAJA was clarified and British liaison with it was settled. For co-operation with the British the MPAJA was organised into seven regiments each consisting nominally of five patrols of not less than 100 men each. British liaison officers were to be attached to each patrol headquarters and to each regiment or group headquarters. Patrols were to be under the operational command only of the British liaison officers, but internal command and discipline remained a matter for MPAJA's own officers and headquarters. Arms, equipment and money for the purpose of buying food, and possibly food itself, were to be supplied by air, but arms or equipment would not be supplied to patrols which had no British liaison officer attached. The period before D-Day for the Allied invasion was to be one of preparation, training and equipping and no offensive action was to be undertaken until orders were received from SEAC. The object of this was to preserve surprise for D-Day.

4. The plans were carried out with remarkable smoothness and rapidity, and at the time of the Japanese surrender over 4,000 members of the MPAJA were under operational control of British liaison officers. The majority of these units were grouped at strategic points near the main North-South road and railway line.

5. After the Japanese surrender, the MPAJA remained mobilised and under the control of the liaison officers. Other liaison officers were brought in and control was extended to remoter areas and patrols. This force, now employed on watch-and-ward duties, was fully rationed by the British Army and each man, regardless of rank, was paid at the rate of $30 monthly from the date of surrender. At the same time, in order to obtain some control over the large number of armed and uncontrolled bands roving over the country, it was ruled that any alleged guerilla who produced an effective firearm and applied for enrolment in a controlled patrol before the day of disbandment should be accepted.

Section 5.—DISBANDMENT OF THE MPAJA AND AFTER

1. On 1st December, 1945, the MPAJA was disbanded. The principal conditions of disbandment were that all arms, explosives and equipment were to be handed in, the MPAJA was to cease to exist and its insignia and badge (three red stars) were never again to be worn as uniform. In return each guerilla was paid a gratuity of $350 and received a promise that the Government would do all that was possible to rehabilitate him in suitable employment.

2. Some 6,000 members of the MPAJA were disbanded (this figure probably included guerillas who had joined the MPAJA shortly before disbandment purely for the sake of obtaining the monthly pay and gratuity), and over 5,000 arms including all those arms supplied through British liaison officers for which receipts had been obtained, were handed in. In addition, a number of rifles and shot-guns, most of which had probably been obtained during the British retreat in 1942 or immediately after the Japanese surrender, were also given up. Nevertheless, a large quantity of arms and ammunition, which included sten guns, .30 carbines and pistols, together with numbers of weapons which had been dropped from the air and picked up by the MPAJA unknown to the liaison officers, were never brought in or handed over on the disbandment of the organisation. These arms were hidden in secret dumps throughout the country for future use by the MCP.

3. At the same time, a secret branch of the MPAJA, which ran parallel to the open MPAJA, was retained and the members of this organisation kept their weapons and did not come forward to be demobilised. At the end of 1945, this clandestine organisation numbered some 4,000 men and included as many members as possible of long and tried service, units of the MPAJA which

had not come into contact with, and were therefore unknown to the British liaison officers, and most of the important MCP leaders who had remained incognito.

4. This secret force, and the secret caches of arms were formed for the express purpose of waging a guerilla war should the British Government not introduce into Malaya a People's Republic to the liking of the MCP.

5. Following the disbandment of the MPAJA, the MCP organised the MPAJA Ex-Comrades Association, ostensibly to look after interests of the ex-guerillas, but actually to preserve and perpetuate MCP influence over them. The record of this organisation after the war was one of continual abuse of the Government for alleged failure to look after guerilla interests coupled with refusal to co-operate with Government officers who attempted to carry into effect the Government's promises of rehabilitation. At the same time the MCP used the clandestine military organisation as a nucleus for mobilisation and training of their armed forces.

6. Such is the background of these forces which were born of British-Communist co-operation during the Malayan Campaign of 1941–42. Though motivated throughout by a political creed fundamentally antagonistic to the British, they were openly loyal to their agreement to co-operate throughout the war. The MPAJA units had never been a real menace to the Japanese authorities, but they had a considerable nuisance value and necessitated troops being held in readiness lest an attack should take place. They also performed signal service in helping to keep alive the spirit of resistance to the Japanese throughout the occupation.

Section 6.—MCP POLICY AFTER THE LIBERATION

1. While the MPAJA was occupied with active resistance to the Japanese, the political branch of the MCP was concentrated primarily on the dissemination of Communist propaganda, the boosting of a spirit of resistance, and the maintenance of supplies to the armed guerillas. Already during the Japanese occupation the MCP had planned to take over the government of Malaya when the war was over, but when the British came in with strong military forces after the capitulation and set up the British Military Administration, the MCP realised that their plans could not be carried out at that time.

2. The MCP then followed a policy of apparent co-operation while at the same time following the normal communist procedure of infiltrating its agents into government departments, public utilities, etc. It was also trying to get a firm grip of labour by controlling trade unions. During this time only a few of the lesser leaders worked in the open. The remainder and the greater part of the organisation worked under cover.

3. Throughout 1947 there was a great deal of internal dissension in the MCP. This coupled with the remarkable economic and political recovery taking place in Malaya made it quite clear to the MCP that a radical change of policy was essential if it was to continue to be effective.

4. In December 1947, the MCP decided on a more violent policy which became apparent through labour unrest and strikes. It was probably in March 1948, that it was decided to start an armed fight against the Government.

5. Up to this time the MCP had been permitted to function free of all legal restrictions, and since the liberation the Societies Ordinance had been deliberately left partially in abeyance. In the face of growing lawlessness in labour disputes and of increasing evidence that Communist agitators were using trade unions for political purposes, the Federation Government revised the Trade Union Ordinance. This was done not with the object of suppressing the unions, but to ensure that they should in fact be trade unions, with their members organised for trade union purposes. But strikes and labour unrest continued to increase, and the MCP began a campaign of violence throughout the country. Vast quantities of rubber were stolen, rubber estate offices were burned down, British planters and miners were murdered and also their Chinese, Indian and Malay employees.

6. On 18th June, 1948, the Government of the Federation proclaimed a state of Emergency and adopted emergency powers to deal with the outbreak of violence. On 23rd July, 1948, the Government of Singapore and the Federation specifically proscribed the MCP as an unlawful society.

Section 7.—ORGANISATION OF THE MCP

Introduction

1. Before considering the organisational structure of the MCP, a brief examination of its main elements is appropriate.

2. The MCP may be broadly divided into two, i.e.:—
(*a*) The Jungle Organisation.
(*b*) The Open Organisation.

3. It is not proposed to deal with 2 (*b*) in detail, as the individuals concerned cannot be classified as terrorists and therefore do not come within the scope of this pamphlet. It must be remembered however, that the Open Organisation plays a very important part in the Communist campaign.

The Jungle Organisation

4. This may be divided into two main categories:—

(*a*) Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) (see section 8 below).

(*b*) *The Min Yuen Movement.*—The Min Yuen Movement is controlled by District and Branch Committees. District and Branch Committees are the spearhead of the Political side of the MCP Organisation, and are in direct touch with the masses. In addition to their duty of indoctrinating the masses and spreading the gospel of Communism, it is the task of District and Branch Committees to organise the collection of intelligence from the Masses. From the very nature of their duties, District and Branch Committees operate almost entirely in their local areas near the jungle fringes, and cannot retire to the deep jungle without losing their contact with "masses" and thus losing their efficiency. All members are usually armed.

5. **Present Organisation.**—The MCP is organised on orthodox Communist Party lines:—

(*a*) *Central Committee.*—The Central Committee is composed of approximately 12 top ranking MCP executives under the direction of the Secretary General. This Committee rarely assembles and the actual Policy direction emanates from the so-called POLITBUREAU consisting of 3-4 members including the Secretary General.

(*b*) *Military High Command.*—This is believed to exist in name only and is probably the title assumed by the Central Committee when it issues directives to the Armed Forces.

(*c*) *Regional Bureaux.*—Directives and decisions by the Central Committee are passed to the North and South

Malaya Bureaux for transmission to the various State and Regional Committees below them.

(*d*) *State and Regional Committees.*—Although operational control normally exists on the State Committee level there are cases where, for geographic expediency, control in larger states has been split between two Regional Committees, e.g. North Pahang Regional Committee and South Pahang Regional Committee.

(*e*) *District Committees.*—Each State/Regional Committee has under its control a number of District Committees (MCP Districts). The number of MCP Districts varies from 4 to 7 according to the size and geography of each State/Region. The MCP District is the main functional level of the MCP.

(*f*) *Branch Committees.*—The Branch Committees work under the direction of the District Committees, each MCP District controlling an average of 4 Branch Committees. These Committees are the most important link establishing and maintaining contact with the civil population, i.e. they are the main physical link between the Jungle Organisation and its supporters living in the open.

(*g*) *Masses Organisation—MIN YUEN Movement.*—The Branches Committees contact the 'masses' (MCP terminology describing the general public) through so-called 'masses executives'. These 'masses executives' are individuals living in the open in important areas, who may be either full or probationary members of the MCP. Their activities include the organisation of MCP supporters, the procurement of food and miscellaneous supplies, the collection of subscriptions and intelligence, the dissemination of communist propaganda and generally speaking, the fostering of subversive, communist-inspired activities among the civil population.

(*h*) *Self Protection Corps.*—This consists of a number of selected MCP supporters, normally living in the open. Its members may receive part-time military and political training in the jungle and form a pool of potential recruits to the Armed Forces of the MCP. The formation of such Protection Corps is the responsibility of the Branch Committees through the "masses executives".

Section 8.—ARMED FORCES OF THE MCP

1. The Armed Force of the MCP is the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). It is organised in Regiments and Independent Platoons. The Brigade, Battalion and Company organisation (a relic of the British organised MPAJA) no longer exists. The MRLA Command is closely integrated with the Party organisation at all levels. This fact becomes obvious when one examines the chain of Command which is as follows:—

(*a*) *The 'Military High Command'.*—Policy directives, orders, etc., from the MCP Central Committee, affecting the MRLA are frequently issued in the name of 'The Military High Command'.

'The Military High Command' exists however in name only (See Section 7 paragraph 5 (*b*)).

(*b*) *The Regiment.*—The Party claims to have embodied 12 Regiments. These Regiments are however, broken down into Independent Platoons, which normally operate under the control of Party members of State Committee rank. Regimental commands exist in all State/Regional Committees. These Committees are, in fact, joint Political/Military commands, though directives addressed to MRLA Units are usually issued in the name of the Regimental Command. Regimental Commands issue directives on broad matters of policy only.

(*c*) *The Independent Platoon.*—This is the standard MRLA Unit. The number of Independent Platoons has been greatly reduced following the formation of Armed Work Forces (see (*d*) below). Platoons usually operate under the control of State Committee members. As a result an Independent Platoon may operate in two or more districts according to the area of jurisdiction of the State Committee Member controlling the Platoon. Platoon strengths vary considerably, from 30 to 40 down to 15. When carrying out operations, they may be joined by a local Armed Work Force.

(*d*) *Armed Work Forces.*—These Units have been formed primarily for the protection of the Branch and District Min Yuen workers in the jungle, by breaking down a number of Independent Platoons and attaching

sections of these Platoons to the Branch Committees. These Armed Work Forces contain three elements:—

(i) Min Yuen Workers (Branch Committee).

(ii) The Armed Section.

(iii) Miscellaneous operatives, couriers, bodyguards, etc.

Armed Work Forces are expected to carry out minor acts of terrorism and sabotage.

2. **The role of the MRLA in the deep jungle.**—A fair proportion of MRLA personnel, including some entire sub-units, have been withdrawn into deep jungle areas, to act as Jungle Base Protection Units and to engage in the cultivation of food. This latter activity, though by no means in keeping with their chosen 'profession' has been dictated to the MRLA by sheer necessity. Cultivation duties are performed on a rotatory basis, units changing military and 'agricultural' duties every six months. The withdrawal into the deep jungle and food cultivation by the MRLA are part of current MCP Policy Directives.

Section 9.—PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

There is documentary evidence showing that the MCP campaign is based upon the following phases:—

(*a*) *Phase* 1.—A preparatory period of guerilla warfare waged from temporary bases with the purpose of wearing down Government strength and building up the civil and military strength of the Party.

(*b*) *Phase* 2.—A period of expansion of the MIN YUEN Organisation and MRLA, an intensification of attacks on communications, and the occupation of 'enemy' bases in the smaller villages and towns.

(*c*) *Phase* 3.—The gradual assumption by MIN YUEN groups of administrative control of areas abandoned by the SF, the establishment of large permanent bases and the conversion of existing guerilla forces into a regular army.

Section 10.—MCP POLICY

1. MCP Policy, framed by the Politbureau of the MCP is designed to further the aims at section 9 above.

2. The basic policy has remained constant throughout the Emergency, but there have been periodic policy adjustments to meet changing conditions brought about not only by Government and SF measures but also by the reaction of the general public.

3. The following is an example. In October 1951, the Politbureau produced a detailed thesis entitled 'The Party's Achievements and Mistakes', which was a very candid summing up by the Politbureau of the conduct of the Revolution to date, a detailed exposition of the mistakes which had been made and an appreciation of the lines on which the Revolution should be developed in future. Four major achievements were claimed:—

(*a*) Despite grave difficulties there had been no weakening of the Central Committee's resolve to proceed with the armed struggle.

(*b*) A new structure of mass organisation which embraced both the workers and the peasants in rural areas had been created in support of the MRLA.

(*c*) The quality of the MRLA had been improved, politically by indoctrination and militarily by battle experience.

(*d*) Internationally, a valuable contribution had been made towards World Peace.

4. On the other hand, the Central Committee admitted being guilty of leftist deviations. It had embarked on a military plan of action without first laying the foundations of an effective supply organisation; it had failed to strike a correct balance between the revolutionary aims of the struggle and the present interests of the masses; in its approach to the capitalists it had omitted to discriminate between the hostile big businessman who cannot be converted and the smaller "national" capitalists who, though neutral in attitude, in the long run would listen to cajolery and persuasion; finally, in shaping the organisational structure in towns and in framing programmes of work, it had ignored the basic principles of security and thereby incurred avoidable losses.

5. Although claiming its own victory over both leftist and rightist deviations in at last steering the Party into the correct Marxist line, the Central Committee warned that thoughts of rightist deviations were still widespread among the comrades, including the cadres.

6. For the rest, the document defined the main tasks of the Party which were to:—

(*a*) Expand and consolidate Mass Organisations with the emphasis on Malays.

(*b*) Strengthen and expand the MRLA and improve its political education.

(*c*) Improve security measures.

(*d*) Develop and lead the struggle of workers and peasants for better living conditions.

(*e*) Broaden the basis of the United Front by including national capitalists and the petty bourgeoisie.

(*f*) Improve and develop Party penetration and influence in the SF.

(*g*) Put the food and material supplies of the Party on a sound basis.

7. This is the most important current policy document in our possession, as it was on the basis of this thesis that the Politbureau then issued its October 1951, Directives to the Party.

Section 11.—TACTICAL NOTES ON THE MCP

1. **CT Characteristics.—**

(*a*) Approximately 90 per cent of the CT are Chinese. The remainder are Malay and Indian with elements of Javanese, Siamese and the odd Japanese.

(*b*) They are mostly young, thoroughly familiar with life in the jungle and well acquainted with the topography of the areas in which they operate. They are able to withstand physical hardships and privations and if necessary, can subsist on jungle produce for lengthy, but not interminable periods. Their tracking, fieldcraft and standard of discipline are normally of a high order. Their handling and maintenance of personal weapons as well as their general standard of shooting is adequate for the type of warfare they are engaged in.

(*c*) CT Morale is an extremely variable factor depending upon such conditions as SF pressure, food and supply situation, leadership, own successes, etc. Generally speaking, the CT prefers hit-and-run tactics to pitched battle. Only the most fanatical elements amongst the CT will put up determined resistance when cornered.

When the CT realises he has the upper hand (during successful ambushes or when dealing with defenceless civilians who have incurred the displeasure of the MCP) he is utterly ruthless and cruel.

2. **Uniform and Personal Equipment.**—CT wear varying types of uniform and plain clothes. Sometimes it is khaki or jungle green complete including equipment and packs. Headgear varies from red-starred caps, civilians hats or caps, to no hats at all.

3. **Arms and Ammunition.**—

(*a*) The majority of CT arms and a high percentage of their ammunition is now very old and partly unserviceable. It is therefore of vital importance to prevent them from replenishing their stocks at the expense of the SF. It should be remembered that the capture of arms and ammunition is one of the principal tactical aims underlying any CT attack on SF patrols, bases and transport.

(*b*) An example of the arms held by a strong MRLA Independent Platoon is as follows:—

Two Brens.	Seven Shotguns.
Six Stens and TSMG.	Two Pistols.
Six Carbines.	Ten Grenades.
Twelve Rifles.	

(*c*) The MCP is known to possess a limited quantity of Vickers MMGs, A tk Rifles, Mortars, PIAT and miscellaneous small arms and grenades of Japanese origin but these are seldom, if ever, used owing to lack of suitable ammunition.

(*d*) Each State has at least one armoury where the repair of damaged weapons and ammunition is carried out; and also the manufacture of home-made grenades and land-mines.

4. **CT Camps.**—

(*a*) *Siting and location.*—*(*e*). The majority of camps possess the same major characteristics:—

(i) Adjacent to a stream, river or swamp.

(ii) Sentry posts situated on the main tracks or routes leading to the area of the camp.

(iii) Consist of bashas or lean-to huts, standing or collapsible.

(iv) Except in small or temporary camps they have a small parade ground or out-door lecture hall. In the larger ones they have both.

(v) Sited on the slopes of a hill or behind or in front of a swamp.

The extent of the camp defences and degree of resistance to be expected will depend on the size and importance of the camp.

Patrols should be able to recognise likely places where a CT camp might be located, remembering that often camps, for reasons of security, are built in the most unlikely places, i.e. in swamps, belukar and lallang. Men should make a habit of appreciating the ground and the area around them as they move so as to be prepared for immediate action.

(*b*) *Camp protection drill.*—The normal CT protection drill for their camps is as follows:—

(i) The sentry either fires at the SF as they approach his post or else the sentry moves back to the camp unseen.

(ii) On hearing the firing or on receiving information from their sentries the CT, who are always prepared, immediately disperse into the jungle and reassemble at a pre-arranged RV.

(iii) Sometimes, particularly in the larger and better organised camps, one or more counter attacks are put in after the SF have entered the camp. These counter attacks are seldom pressed with determination although a great deal of ammunition is usually expended.

5. **Communications.**—For the maintenance of communications the CT depend on:—

(*a*) *Jungle couriers.*—These usually move in groups of two or three, on compass bearings between their respective courier posts. Generally speaking the rear member of the group carries the most important documents. Jungle couriers are also used for carrying bulky items such as packages of propaganda material.

(*b*) *Open couriers.*—These provide the quickest means of communication. They are normally open members of the MCP and use public transport, taxis and bicycles. Messages are normally carried in the form of small rolled slips concealed about the person.

(*c*) *Wireless.*—The MCP is known to possess a very limited number of wireless transmitters. It is doubtful whether wireless communications have ever been successfully established. They make considerable use of commercial radio receivers, mainly to listen to Communist broadcasts from China, Russia, etc.

6. **CT Tactics.**—Basic CT tactics, such as immediate action drills, siting of ambush and defensive positions, the use of Bren, Rifle and Reconnaissance groups, resemble our own in character because the more senior military instructors in the MCP are ex MPAJA personnel who were trained by Force 136 officers. Training manuals include translations of British and Russian publications as well as original Chinese Peoples' Army pamphlets.

CHAPTER III

OWN FORCES

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

1. The responsibility for conducting the campaign in Malaya rests with the Civil Government. The Police Force is Government's normal instrument for the maintenance of Civil Authority but, in the current Emergency, the Armed Forces have been called in to support the Civil Power in its task of seeking out and destroying armed Communist terrorism. In addition, a Home Guard has been formed.

2. Since every function of Government is affected by the Emergency, a special system of control of operations has been evolved to provide intimate co-operation at all levels between Departments of Government and the SF. The Director of Operations, who is also GOC Malaya Command, is responsible to the High Commissioner for the conduct of the campaign and for the integration of Civil and SF Emergency measures. To assist him, he has a Principal Staff Officer and a small joint staff. Major policy matters are decided in the Director of Operations' Committee which consists of senior Government officers and Commanders of SF.

Section 2.—MAIN TASKS OF THE SECURITY FORCES

1. The methods used by the SF, to defeat armed Communism and re-establish normal conditions in Malaya, include the following:—

(*a*) The close control of populated areas such as towns, new villages, kampongs and estate lines. These areas are potential sources of CT food supplies and, in addition, must be afforded security in the interests of the economy of the country. *(*a*).

(*b*) The conduct of offensive operations on the fringes of the populated areas, with the object of eliminating CT and depriving them of contact with sources of food supply.

(*c*) The mounting of deep jungle and other special operations designed to eliminate CT, and to locate and destroy their headquarters, long term food and arms dumps and cultivation areas.

2. The most important factor in destroying the CT is to complete his isolation from the rest of the community. He must get no money, no food or clothing; no help of any sort. Bases must be secured in towns, new villages and kampongs. With these bases secure the armed forces, with their attendant resources of mobility, flexibility and fire power can then go after the CT and destroy him, his dumps, camps and cultivation.

Section 3.—THE BRIGGS PLAN

1. The Briggs Plan, which came into effect on 1st June, 1950, aimed at bringing proper administrative control to a population, much of which had never been controlled before. The main aspects of the Plan were:—

(*a*) The rapid resettlement of squatters under the surveillance of Police and auxiliary Police.

(*b*) The regrouping of local labour in mines and on estates.

(*c*) The recruitment and training of CID and Special Branch Police personnel.

(*d*) The Army to provide a minimum framework of troops throughout the country to support the Police, and at the same time to provide a concentration of forces for the clearing of priority areas.

(*e*) The Police and Army to operate in complete accord. To assist in this, joint Police/Army operational control is established at all levels and there is a close integration of Police and Military Intelligence.

2. **SWECs and DWECs.—*(r)**

(*a*) Each State and Settlement was ordered to form a State/Settlement War Executive Committee (SWEC) in order to wage the 'war' in its own territory. The members of these SWECs are:—

the Mentri Besar (*Prime Minister*)—(*Chairman*)
the British Adviser
the Chief Police Officer
the Senior Army Commander (usually the Brigade Commander)
the State/Settlement Home Guard Officer.

(*b*) A series of similar committees were also set up on the next lower level which is the Civil District. The members of the District War Executive Committees (DWECs) are:—

the District Officer (*Chairman*);

the Senior Police Officer;

the Senior Army Officer (usually a Battalion Commander).

3. The Plan was essentially a thorough but long-term proposition and it would be unrealistic to look for speedy and decisive results. It envisaged a logical clearing of the country from South to North, leaving behind a strong police force and civil administration once an area or State had been cleared. It also aimed to isolate the MRLA from the rest of the rural population, thus enabling the latter to feel safe to come forward with information, whilst at the same time depriving the MRLA of their means of support and so forcing them into the open where they could better be dealt with by the SF.

Section 4.—SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

White Areas

1. It has not proved possible to carry out the logical clearing of the country from South to North as envisaged in the Briggs Plan.

2. However progress has been such that certain areas of the Federation have been almost entirely cleared of CT. Consequently it has been possible to declare these as WHITE AREAS in which the majority of EMERGENCY REGULATIONS are lifted.

3. It has been explained to the population in these areas that it is their responsibility to keep the area WHITE by refusing to co-operate with the CT and by promptly reporting any CT activity to the authorities.

The Aboriginal Areas of Malaya

4. In December 1952, the D of O in Committee decided that a forward policy would be adopted for the control of the aboriginal tribes of Malaya. This would involve taking protection and administration to the aborigines in their own areas and the avoidance in future of the resettlement of aborigines who live in the deep jungle.

5. This policy has been implemented by the following measures:—

(*a*) The expansion of the Federal Government Department of Aborigines by the appointment of additional officers as Protectors of Aborigines in the States concerned and the recruitment of 'Field Teams' to work in the aboriginal areas.

(*b*) The mounting of operations by SF to establish a series of 'Jungle Forts' in selected deep jungle aboriginal areas.

(*c*) The establishment of a special staff to control some deep jungle operations.

6. The staff referred to above is known as the 'PARAGON' Control Staff (PCS). In composition PCS is based on the principles of close Military/Police/Civil co-operation laid down in the Briggs Plan and the members are:—

(*a*) *Chairman*—Staff Officer (Operations). D of O's Staff.

(*b*) Members:

Army—CO 22 SAS.

Police—Superintendent Police Field Force.

Civil—Federal Adviser on Aborigines, Staff Officer (Civil) D of O's Staff.

7. PCS is located in Kuala Lumpur and functions under the direct control of the D of O's Staff in the same way as the SWECs in the various States. It has a full time staff which includes Military Intelligence Officers at Federal Police HQ and at the Contingent HQ of the States adjoining the aboriginal areas in central Malaya and, also a RAF Intelligence Officer.

8. The troops available to PCS for operations in the aboriginal areas are basically 22 SAS and the Police Field Force garrisons of the Jungle Forts. From time to time however, this force may be altered and other Military and Police units may be placed under command.

9. During 1953 considerable progress was made in the establishment of Jungle Forts and by the end of the year six were functioning in the 'PARROT' aboriginal area which is the mountainous region immediately east of Perak, and one on the Tasek Bera in South Pahang which is part of the 'LAGOON' aboriginal area.

10. The aims of these forts can be defined as follows:—

(*a*) To establish bases from which the Federal Police can give local protection to the aborigines and from which offensive operations can be mounted when the occasion arises.

(*b*) To allow the aborigines in the selected areas to continue their normal way of life without risk of CT domination and so to build up an intelligence network on CT activity.

(*c*) To improve the moral of the aborigines by having permanent SF garrisons in their areas and eventually by the recruitment of selected men to assist in local defence.

(*d*) To provide centres from which medical and trading facilities can be made available to the aborigines.

Section 5.—THE POLICE

1. The Federation of Malaya Police Force is a joint force of Regular Police and Special Constables, totalling some 40,000 men and commanded by the Commissioner of Police. The Force is divided into Federal Police HQ and ten Contingents, the latter each being commanded by a Chief Police Officer (CPO) who is responsible for all police work in his State/Settlement. Contingents are further divided into Police Circles which are supervised by Officers Superintending Police Circles (OSPC). These circles are themselves divided into Police Districts, commanded by Officers Commanding Police Districts (OCPD).

2. The Regular Police Force consists of a Uniformed branch which includes the Criminal Investigation Department and a Special Branch which is responsible for political intelligence.

Role

3. The primary role of the Police is the maintenance of law and order in the Federation. The Special role of the Police in the Emergency is the control of the population in the areas in which it lives and works. To achieve this the Police must:—

(*a*) Gain the people's confidence and give them security.

(*b*) Collect information which will lead to the disruption of the Min Yuen organisation.

(*c*) Reduce to the minimum the supply of food and other essentials to the CT.

(*d*) Patrol actively in order to deny to the CT the populated areas and rubber estates.

4. The carrying out of this role is divided between the Uniformed Branch and the Special Branch as follows:—

(*a*) *Uniformed Branch:*—

(i) To give security to the population.

(ii) To enforce the Emergency Regulations.

(*b*) *Special Branch.*—To obtain, collate and disseminate intelligence on the MCP.

5. A part of the Regular Force, known as the Police Field Force, is trained for and carries out operations of a military nature, including operations from, and the garrisoning of Jungle Forts in deep jungle. The Police Field Force, by agreement with the Thai authorities, also patrols and operates across the Malaya/Thai Border within agreed boundaries.

6. The Special Constabulary is deployed in the form of Area Security Units (ASU) in the developed areas of the Federation. Its role is to carry out offensive patrolling against CT, the enforcement of food control measures, the safeguarding of planters and miners and the static defence of vital public or semi-public utility installations against sabotage.

7. **Police Clearance.—**

(*a*) *Introduction:*—

(i) One of the underlying principles in all operations against the CT in the present Emergency is that the Armed Forces are acting in support of the Civil Power.

(ii) It is important to remember this when examining the relationship between Police and Military, particularly on the question of clearance. While generally all operational activity will be co-ordinated through Combined Operations Rooms, there have been and will be occasions when the Army is acting on its own and requires offensive air or naval support at short notice. In all cases Police clearance must be

obtained, unless the SF are actually in contact with the CT, when an immediate air strike can be initiated without formal Police clearance.

(*b*) *Necessity for Clearance:*—

(i) While the operational responsibility for any particular area may be given to the Army, it is still the responsibility of the Police to ensure that no innocent person is killed or injured and no lawful habitation or property is destroyed or damaged as the result of SF action.

(ii) It is a comparatively simple matter for a Military or Police Commander to state at any given time the location of his own units. It is not so simple, however, to be sure of the location of wood-cutters, aborigines and their clearings, and other lawful habitations, and this, allied with other Emergency considerations, may at times result in some delay before the local Police Commander is able to give clearance for a proposed air strike or operation. It is essential, therefore, that the Police Commander in whose area of responsibility it is proposed to request an air strike or SF are to operate, be informed at the earliest possible moment of such intention to allow him to make the necessary enquiries, which will enable him to grant clearance.

(*c*) *Operations Requiring Police Clearance.*—Most operations are now mounted at SWEC or DWEC level and mutual clearances are arranged simultaneously. Where this does not occur and a military formation is acting on its own initiative, it should obtain Police clearance in the following circumstances:—

(i) Minor operations, e.g., ambushes, in or adjoining Police patrol areas, or in rubber or other areas likely to be occupied by innocent civilians.

(ii) All requests for offensive air support and artillery fire unless actually in contact with CT.

(iii) All requests for Naval bombardment.

(*d*) *Clearance Procedure.*—Police clearance will initially be given by the OCPD in whose district the operation, artillery shoot, naval bombardment or air strike is to take

place. This clearance for air strikes and naval bombardment must be passed via OSPC and CPO to Police HQ Kuala Lumpur, where Operations Information Branch are in close liaison with Advanced Air HQ and JOC at HQ Malaya Command. No naval bombardment or air strike, other than the immediate air strikes referred to in paragraph (*a*) (ii) above, will take place without such clearance.

(*e*) *Limitations of Clearance:*—

(i) The object of Police clearance has been explained in paragraph (*b*) (i) above. When given, it means that the Police believe, to the best of their knowledge, that no loss or injury to innocent civilians will result from SF action.

(ii) This does not mean that SF can shoot on sight any person found in an area which has been so cleared. If in any reasonable doubt, the unidentified person or persons should be challenged and any subsequent action by SF should be based on the reaction of such persons to that challenge.

Section 6.—THE ARMY

Role

1. The primary role of the Army is to seek out and destroy CT in the jungle and on its fringes. By the constant harassing of the CT, their lines of communication with sympathisers amongst the civil population are disrupted. Thus in an effort to maintain their food supply system they are forced into the open and so brought to battle.

2. The secondary role of the Army is that of supporting the Federal Police in the populated areas by helping to enforce food denial measures, curfews, etc.

Deployment

3. The deployment of military formations and units is based on the principle of Army/Police/Civil co-operation at all levels as embodied in the Briggs Plan. The principle is to have, in each State:—

(*a*) Brigade Headquarters alongside Police Contingent Headquarters in the State capital and responsible through the SWEC for military operations in the complete State.

(*b*) Battalion Headquarters near Police Circle Headquarters at the administrative centre of the Civil District and responsible through the DWEC for operations in the District.

(*c*) Infantry companies deployed in each Police District with the Company Commander in his turn working in close co-operation with the OCPD.

4. Superimposed on the above is the organisation of units into the normal military formations. Brigades may operate in an independent role directly under HQ Malaya Command or may be grouped under a Divisional Headquarters. Where this latter course is adopted Divisions are responsible for military operations in a group of States and the Divisional Commander becomes the military member of the various SWECs, with Brigade Commanders in individual States acting as his representative when he is unable to attend meetings in person.

5. Under this system the country is covered by a framework of military commanders each working in close co-operation with the Police and Civil authorities at his own level in his own area. Although this basic layout is adhered to wherever possible there are bound to be variations owing to such factors as the availability of units and the operational importance of different areas of the country. Thus in some cases there may be only one battalion in a State where there is little CT activity and the Battalion Commander will be the military representative on the SWEC with his Company Commanders acting at DWEC level. Alternatively for a particularly important operation a complete brigade may be concentrated in one district for a limited period. As progress is made in establishing WHITE areas in various parts of the country there will be an increasing number of Districts under Police control where no military unit is deployed.

6. Units of the supporting arms are either retained as HQ Malaya Command troops and deployed in support of operations as necessary, or are permanently allocated to Divisions.

7. Reserves are always essential and normally at least one battalion is kept under direct command HQ Malaya Command to act as Federal Reserve. This battalion will have no specific area of responsibility and will be deployed by HQ Malaya Command when additional troops are required for major operations in a particular

area. Locally, whenever possible, one company per battalion is earmarked as battalion or brigade reserve and is not committed to a 'framework' area.

Method of Operations

8. Operations fall into three main categories:—

(*a*) *Framework Operations.*—Day to day framework operations carried out by battalions or companies on their own initiative in the areas for which they are responsible.

(*b*) *Long Term Operations.*—These are planned at Brigade/SWEC level and involve a temporary diversion of companies from their normal areas.

(*c*) *Federal Operations.*—These are planned by HQ Malaya Command and the D of O's Staff and are directed against a CT target of particular importance.

9. Plans for major operations are now reviewed every six months by the D of O's Committee, which allots priorities and allocates SF to States/Settlements.

10. The term 'framework operations' covers the day to day activities of units in maintaining SF action against CT in their own areas. Such operations will consist of direct follow up action on specific information, or a set programme of offensive patrolling or ambushing as agreed by a DWEC.

11. Long term operations are normally given a specific codename and are based on a build up of information by the Police Special Branch on a particular CT unit and/or on CT activity in a given area. Long term operations may be mounted in conjunction with food denial measures by the Civil authorities in a populated area or may take the form of a reconnaissance in force in the deep jungle. In the latter case troops will usually be lifted in to suitable LZs by helicopter.

12. Federal Operations are virtually enlarged versions of the above. If the target is of the topmost priority the information will probably have been compiled at Federal level. If such operations are beyond the capacity of the local formation, the Federal Reserve battalion and other additional Army or Police units will be allocated, as considered necessary, by the D of O.

Section 7.—THE ROYAL AIR FORCE

1. Most of the Air Force effort in Malaya is available to support Emergency operations. The Air Force may operate independently or in direct co-operation with ground forces. The main roles of the Air Force are shown in the following paragraphs.

2. **Air Reconnaissance.**—Air reconnaissance in Malaya plays a major part in the planning and conduct of anti CT operations. The demand for survey and tactical photographic reconnaissance has exceeded the supply. Considerable progress has been made in mapping those parts of Malaya which had never before been adequately surveyed. To date over 90 per cent of the necessary photographs have been taken and drawing continues in Kuala Lumpur and London.

3. The slow speed and manœuverability of the Auster aircraft make it an ideal aircraft for close reconnaissance purposes. These aircraft are under the operational control of the Army and are piloted by Army personnel. The Squadron is under the command of the Royal Air Force who are responsible for maintenance and supply. These aircraft also function in the Target Marking Role.

4. **Coastal Reconnaissance.**—Air reconnaissance is also employed in conjunction with naval forces in coast watching operations designed to prevent the CT obtaining a supply of arms, personnel and equipment by sea.

5. **Offensive Air Support.**—The jungle provides unlimited cover from the air, thereby making recognition of targets difficult. Experience has shown that the CT seldom attempt to hold ground against attack. It has, therefore, been difficult for offensive aircraft to find CT and inflict casualties. By the application of appropriate tactics however, air striking power can be used to great effect.

6. Offensive air support can be of value in driving CT out of areas which are inaccessible to ground troops, or which are closely protected by Min Yuen or aborigine screens. It can also be used to make areas uncomfortable CT, and keep them on the move, often at less expenditure of force than would be required by the employment of ground troops.

7. Air strikes can sometimes be carried out with the object of 'flushing' CT out of hideouts, thus forcing them into the ground forces who have previously occupied stops or ambushes on CT lines of retreat or escape. Air cover has also proved valuable as a means of protecting convoys and helicopters operating in deep jungle.

8. **Air Supply.**—Air supply plays a vital part in the success of current operations in Malaya. Owing to the scarcity of road and rail communication it is often the only means whereby troops can be supplied and maintained when operating in deep jungle. Because of the hilly nature of the country, the height of trees, and the difficulty of finding DZs of a suitable size, air supply in Malaya is sometimes difficult.

9. **Troop Lifts.**—S 55 Helicopters have been widely used for lifting troops into remote and hitherto inaccessible parts of the jungle. In this way the effectiveness of the available forces has been increased considerably.

10. **Casualty Evacuation.**—There is a small number of S 51 helicopters in Malaya which are used mainly for casualty evacuation. Apart from the urgent need to evacuate casualties to hospital as quickly as possible, the ability to remove them by helicopter frequently enables patrols to continue operating when they would otherwise have had to return to base.

11. **Psychological Warfare.—**

(*a*) *Voice Aircraft.*—Dakota and Auster aircraft fitted with special broadcasting apparatus are used for making voice broadcasts over parts of the jungle known to be occupied by CT. The object of such broadcasts is to induce CT surrenders by the application of Psychological Warfare methods.

(*b*) *Leaflet Dropping.*—Dakota and Auster aircraft, and sometimes Lincolns and Valettas are used on leaflet dropping operations. Leaflets are dropped over selected areas of the jungle with the object of inducing CT surrenders.

Section 8.—THE ROYAL NAVY

1. The Royal Navy assists by carrying out:—

(*a*) Anti smuggling and anti-piracy patrols on the East Coast and West Coast.

(*b*) Amphibious landings.

(*c*) Bombardment of CT areas. Full details and method of calling for support are contained in Director of Operations Instruction No 33.

2. **R.N. Helicopter Squadron.**—No. 848 Squadron of S 55 Helicopters is manned and maintained by personnel of the Fleet Air Arm based at Kuala Lumpur Airfield. The squadron is controlled operationally by AOC Malaya.

Section 9.—THE HOME GUARD

Role and Tactical Employment

1. The aim of the Home Guard is the provision of a part-time armed force, composed of men of all races, who will be capable of protecting their own homes and the immediate vicinity of the areas in which they live. They will thus give greater freedom of manœuvre to the regular armed forces and to the police.

2. To achieve this aim, the Home Guard has two main roles:—

(*a*) The maintenance of the security of the kampongs, villages, regrouped areas and New Villages on which the Home Guard units are based, and of the countryside within reasonable patrolling distance of those areas. For this purpose, Home Guards patrol within a certain distance of their base in accordance with a plan agreed with the local DWEC. The Home Guard does not patrol or operate outside this area except under the direction of Police or Military forces.

(*b*) The provision of an offensive element consisting of Operational Sections from within the larger units. These receive additional training and special weapons to enable them to operate actively with the SF, or on special tasks in areas allocated to them. Home Guards engaged in this role are uniformed volunteers.

Organisation

3. **At Federal Level.**—The head of the Home Guard is the Inspector-General, Home Guard. He is responsible through the Secretary for Defence to the D of O for Home Guard organisa-

tion and training and for the allocation of funds to States and Settlements. The operational use of Home Guards does not require reference to the Inspector-General Home Guard except for financial reasons.

4. **At State Level.—**

(*a*) SWECs, in consultation with the Inspector-General Home Guard, are responsible for Home Guard organisation, administration and general efficiency. They also direct the operational use of the Home Guard. Their responsibilities are exercised through State and Settlement Home Guard Officers who, in addition, command the Home Guards in their areas.

(*b*) State and Settlement Home Guard Officers work within the financial provision allocated to them by the Inspector-General Home Guard. They follow the guidance of the Inspector-General in training matters and generally in matters of discipline, organisation and administration. They are full-time members of SWECs.

(*c*) All Home Guard Officers derive their legal status and disciplinary powers from the Mentri Besar or Resident Commissioner, who are also the Chairman of SWECs.

5. **At District Level.—**

(*a*) The District Officer is the Commander of all Home Guards in his District. Where necessary, an Assistant State or Settlement Home Guard Officer or a District Home Guard Officer is appointed. This officer is the District Officer's deputy for Home Guard matters. The District Officer, as Commander of the Home Guard, is responsible for their efficiency. He has under him a number of Home Guard Inspectors, Adjutants and Permanent Staff Instructors to assist him in the training and administration of his command.

(*b*) Units and sub-units of Battalions, Companies, Platoons and Sections are formed within the District, each under a Commander appointed from the unpaid members of the Home Guard. It is not intended that these

units are used operationally as such, except in accordance with the local defence scheme. They are formed primarily for the purposes of command, discipline and administration.

The Kinta Valley Home Guard

6. To provide protection for the predominantly Chinese owned mining area of the Kinta Valley of Perak, a full-time force known as the Kinta Valley Home Guard has been formed. Its members are Chinese, and part of the cost of maintaining the force is met by the mine owners concerned, through the Perak Chinese Mining Association. The tasks of the Kinta Valley Home Guard are to provide protection for opencast mines and, by contact with mine owners and workers, to gain information of CT movements and plans. The Force Commander is responsible to the State Home Guard Officer, Perak.

Section 10.—PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Introduction

1. Psychological Warfare (PW) is directed at the CT organisation with the object of seeking to alter the decision and policies of that organisation. It should be noted that the objective is much broader than just increasing the rate of surrenders.

2. It is important to note that PW must always operate within the policy directives of the responsible leaders of Government. PW cannot be divorced from military operations and must be looked upon by military formations as a supporting arm in all operations.

Organisation

3. PW policy is determined by the D of O's Committee and planned and executed by a special staff responsible to the D of O through the Principal Staff Officer. The staff consists of a Military officer, a Staff Officer Information Services, a RAF Officer and an Asian Editorial Staff.

4. At State level PW is planned, co-ordinated and executed by the State Information Officer who is responsible to the SWEC. Local campaigns are planned within the framework of existing

PW policy and calls are made on the Federal Department for support as required.

5. In some of the larger States it has been necessary to appoint Area Information Officers who are responsible to the State Information Officer and plan, co-ordinate and execute PW at District level.

Methods

6. PW attacks the CT organisation by both direct and indirect means. Direct means are by leaflets and Voice Aircraft broadcasts. Indirect means are through the public by Public Address, Press, Radio, Films and Dramatic Shows.

Leaflets

7. Leaflets are divided into two categories. First, strategic leaflets, based on themes intended to attack the CT organisation on a Federation wide basis; secondly, tactical leaflets especially designed to exploit local situations on a district level. Tactical leaflets are distributed by Auster flights and ground forces. Strategic leaflets are mainly distributed by Valettas of the RAF. Leaflets are dropped at the rate of 10,000 per map square or 5,000 per 1,000 yards flying line.*(*b*)

Requests

8. Requests for leaflets to be dropped will be made through State Information Officers. Such requests may be for dropping strategic or tactical leaflets.

(*a*) *Strategic leaflets.*—Requests for strategic leaflet dropping will be made through the DGIS at Kuala Lumpur.

(*b*) *Tactical Leaflets.*—Requests for tactical leaflet dropping will be passed through the State Information Officer concerned. In cases where supplies of tactical leaflets are held by him the drops may be carried out without further reference to higher authority. Where special leaflets are required the request for leaflets will be made to DGIS at Kuala Lumpur, who will arrange for the drop to be made by Auster if the quantity is small, or by applying to the JOC if large.

9. The tasks of the Voice Aircraft are co-ordinated and controlled by a Committee on which the GOC, the AOC, the Commissioner of Police and PW are represented.

10. The following are likely tasks:—

(*a*) The immediate exploitation of a tactical situation arising unexpectedly.

(*b*) The planned exploitation of a tactical situation as part of a specific operation.

(*c*) Broadcasts as part of the general PW campaign.

(*d*) Exploitation of CT surrenders.

(*e*) They can also assist in the rescue of lost patrols or crews and passengers of crashed aircraft.

11. Requests for Voice Aircraft are made by DWECs and SWECs to COMPOL (Ops) via Police Communications. A guide to the preparation of requests is shown at Appendix *L* of Chapter XVII and Chapter XVIII Section 11.

12. **Public Address.**—State Information Officers have at their disposal Public Address Units which can be used to support operations. These vans are fitted with cinema projectors, a public address system and in some cases radio and recording machines. The personnel manning the vans can speak all languages, are trained public speakers, are capable of handling audiences and organising short sketches and plays to illustrate the points to be put over. SEPs often accompany these vans to give special addresses.

13. **Press.**—A daily communique covering the Emergency is issued by the Information Services at Kuala Lumpur. The news is obtained from the Daily Sitreps. It is normal to issue the facts concerning all incidents over the past 24 hours. If for operational reasons an item of news should be withheld from the Press the item must be marked on the Sitrep, 'NOT FOR PUBLICATION'.

14. **Radio.**—The Information Service operates a Community Listeners Service. Wireless sets with loudspeakers are placed in the majority of new villages and a large number of Malay kampongs. These sets are tuned to the Rural Broadcasting Network of Radio Malaya which broadcasts in all languages including several dialects of Chinese. This network plays an important part in the PW campaign.

15. **SEP Tours.**—Special propaganda shock teams of SEPs are sent on tour to support special operations. They put over their points simply. They also perform sketches and plays.

THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS (ERs) AND METHODS OF SEARCHING

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

1. This chapter has been written in order to give members of the SF a brief outline of the ERs and to assist them in their day to day duties in connection with the Emergency in MALAYA. The important part of the Regulations is to be found on pages 1–54 of the latest volume published in 1953 by the Government Printers, as amended by subsequent legal notifications.

2. A short *aide memoire* has recently been issued by the D of O to the SF which outlines the powers of search, seizure and arrest under the ERs.

3. It is most important that all ranks of the SF understand that action in Internal Security situations will be taken in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code (sections 83 to 88—now being redrafted) and NOT under the Emergency Regulations.

Section 2.—NOTES ON ERs

1. This section contains various notes of importance and interest on the Regulations except for those Regulations dealing with Food Restriction which are dealt with separately in section 3.

Definitions

2. It should be noted that by a very recent amendment the term "supplies" includes money.

Offences

3. A recent amendment to ER 8 (*a*) should be noted. Prosecutions for giving misleading or false information can now only be undertaken with the consent of the Public Prosecutor.

Confessions

4. It should be noted that confessions made at any time during investigations into offences against the Regulations are admissible in court. This is in distinction from the Criminal Procedure Code wherein no confession made to a Police officer is accepted. Confessions must not, however, be obtained by any inducement, threat or promise; and no confession will be admissible in evidence

unless the person making it has first been given a warning to the effect that he is not obliged to say anything and that anything he does say may be used in evidence.

Detention and Deportation

5. (*a*) **ER 17.**—The Chief Secretary may order any person to be detained for a period of up to two years. Minors (under 17 years of age) are usually detained in an advanced approved school.

ER 24 (1).—Gives the Police powers to detain for up to 28 days any person against whom detention orders are pending.

(*b*) All cases of Detention are scrutinised by a Committee of Review who have authority either to confirm or to revoke the order of detention or to suspend it on suitable conditions.

6. (*a*) **ER 17 (c).**—The High Commissioner may order any person who has had an order of detention issued against him to leave and to remain out of the Federation. Such deportation order shall not take effect until the detainee has had an opportunity of presenting his case to the Committee of Review.

(*b*) Neither Federal Citizens nor British Subjects may be deported, but use can be made of the Banishment Enactments of the various States and Settlements.

(*c*) When a deportation order has been issued all the dependents are also deported. For definition of dependents see Page 1 of ERs. In the event of a deportee returning he may be sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The High Commissioner in Council may permit a deportee to return.

Restricted Residence

7. **ER 17 F.**—The Mentri Besar or the Resident Commissioner may order any individual and his dependents to leave any area and to reside in a specific locality. The family may not leave without permission from the OCPD. It should be noted that upon expiry of the time limit the individual against whom the order has been made is entirely free to move where he wishes. Note should also be taken of the powers of the OCPD to exclude people from his district under ER 21. An order must be in writing.

Controlled Areas

8. **ER 17 FA.**—The Mentri Besar or the Resident Commissioner may declare any area to be controlled in which case no

person shall reside in this area unless it be in a specifically declared residential part of such an area.

9. The Mentri Besar or Resident Commissioner may also order that no person shall be in other than the residential part of the controlled area during certain specified hours.

Miscellaneous Protective Measures

10. **ER 18.—Protected Places.**—The CPO may declare any area where it is desirable to restrict the entry of unauthorised persons to be a "Protected Place". Any person found in a protected place without authority may be arrested. He may be fired on if it is reasonably necessary to do so in order to effect his arrest, to overcome forcible resistance or to prevent his escape.

11. **ER 19 A. Danger Areas.**—The Mentri Besar or Resident Commissioner may declare any area to be a Danger Area, and any member of the S.F. may take any measures, including shooting, to prevent any unauthorised person entering, or remaining in a Danger Area.

12. **ER 19 B. Perimeter Fence.**—The Mentri Besar or Resident Commissioner may declare the fence surrounding any specified area to be a 'Perimeter Fence'. Where there are two or more fences round the area, all of them and the land between them are legally regarded as being a single fence. It is an offence to cross, or to take articles through, a perimeter fence other than by a recognised gate, and any person doing, or attempting to do either, may be arrested. He may be fired on in the circumstances described above in paragraph 10.

Curfews

13. **ER 20.**—Curfews are imposed at the discretion of the OCPD. Written permits of exemption from Curfew may be issued by any Police officer holding the rank of Sub-Inspector or upwards.

Meetings

14. The Emergency Regulation (22) which enabled any Police officer of or above the rank of sergeant to disperse assemblies of five or more persons has lately been cancelled.

Arrest

15. **ER 25 (2).**—Suspects may only be detained for 48 hours by the OCPD. If enquiries cannot be completed in that time further

detention may be authorised for an additional 14 days. The circumstances must be reported to the CPO.

ER 28 (1). Use of Lethal Weapons

16. Lethal weapons may be used legally under the following circumstances:—

(*a*) as a last resort in self-defence;

(*b*) against armed CTs who are resisting the SF;

(*c*) as a last resort to overcome resistance to arrest for the following offences or as a last resort to prevent the escape of any person reasonably suspected of committing any of the following offences:

(i) carrying firearms, ammunition or explosives without authority (ER 4);

(ii) consorting with a person carrying firearms, ammunition or explosives without authority (ER 5);

(iii) consorting with or harbouring persons acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety (ER 6A);

(iv) failing to stop on being challenged in a Protected Place or a Special Area (ERs 18 (5) and 19 (2));

(v) being in a Danger Area, not being a member of the SF (ER 19A (3)).

Search

17. **ER 29.**—A revised ER provides that any Police Officer or any member of H.M. Forces or of a Local Force may stop and search any vehicle or individual in any place, if he suspects that any evidence of the commission of an offence may be found. The same ER provides that any Police Officer of or above the rank of sergeant and any member of H.M. Forces or of a Local Force of or above the rank of NCO or Leading Rate may enter and search any premises if he suspects that any evidence of the commission of an offence is likely to be found. Home Guards may only conduct searches of premises, vehicles and individuals if authorised by the OCPD and a woman may only be searched by a woman.

Seizure of Foodstuffs

18. **ER 31.**—Any Police Officer or member of H.M. Forces or of a Local Force may stop and search any vehicle, vessel or individual in any place if he suspects that food is being carried which

is intended for, or may become available to CT. Further, any Police officer of or above the rank of sergeant and any member of H.M. Forces or a Local Force of or above the rank of NCO or Leading Rate may enter and search any premises if he suspects that they contain food which is intended for, or may become available to CT. Home Guards may only conduct searches if specially authorised by the OCPD.

Seizure of Property

19. **ER 32.**—Any Police officer of or above the rank of sergeant and any member of H.M. Forces or a Local Force of or above the rank of NCO or Leading Rate can take possession of any building and any land belonging thereto, which belongs to or has been used by CT or CT supporters, or which is owned or occupied by a person or persons who are harbouring or have harboured CT. The seizure must be reported to the Mentri Besar or Resident Commissioner who may make an order of forfeiture.

Requisitioning

20. **ER 35.**—The Mentri Besar or Resident Commissioner may requisition property for use of the SF only. Rent is payable. An appeal against the order goes to an Advisory Council.

Destruction of Property

21. **ER 37.**—The OCPD may order the destruction of any building which is liable to seizure under ER 32 if it is not practicable to seize or occupy it; of any building left unoccupied as a result of an order under ER 17 F to any person to leave a given area; and of any building outside the residential portion of a "Controlled Area" declared under ER 17 FA. Compensation is payable in respect of such destruction.

Control

22. **ER 39.**—An OCPD may restrict the use of any road, waterway, etc.

Clearance Orders

23. **ER 40.**—This Regulation provides for clearance orders (signed by the Mentri Besar or Resident Commissioner) upon owners of lands abutting on the roadside—50 yards have to be cleared—and upon owners of all lands cultivated with rubber, oil palms or coconuts. It should be noted that orders may be

served upon individual proprietors or they may be made in respect of general areas. If proprietors disobey the order, officers authorised by the Mentri Besar or Resident Commissioner may clear the land and present the bill to the proprietor. In addition the proprietor is liable to a fine of $1,000 and $100 a day for the continuance of the default. Paragraph (6) of the Regulation states that the DO may require that the inhabitants of any Food Restricted Area clear undergrowth for 35 yards outside the perimeter fence. Where two fences exist the outer fence shall be the deciding factor.

Miscellaneous

24. **ER 41A.**—A new Emergency Regulation which has just been gazetted gives power to the Mentri Besar/Resident Commissioner to instruct Telecoms. to withdraw any equipment. (This legalises the disconnection of telephones.)

25. **ER 43A.**—The DO or the ADO may order any person or classes of persons to attend at such place in his District as he may think fit.

26. **ER 44.**—Where an area has been declared 'controlled' under Emergency Regulations 17 FA the competent authority may order any buildings to be erected or any work to be carried out within the controlled area. Orders may also be made concerning Health and Medical supervision.

27. **ER 44A.**—Provides that the Mentri Besar or Resident Commissioner may for reasons of security (without enquiry) order the inhabitants of any area to:—

(*a*) take steps to protect themselves or others (e.g. clearance of undergrowth or construction of defence works);

(*b*) to repair damage caused by CT.

No payment is made for this work.

28. **General Note:**—In white areas all orders made under ERs

17 EA

20

39

are cancelled. No orders may be made under ERs 19, 19A, 35, 36 and 37 and 38 without unusually strong reasons and action must be reported to the D of O.

Section 3.—FOOD RESTRICTED AREAS (ER 17 EA)

1. **Foodstuffs comprise:—**

(*a*) any animal, alive or dead, which is normally used for human consumption;

(*b*) any substance or commodity which is normally used for food;

(*c*) any substance or commodity which is normally used for feeding animals, including rice bran containing 10 per cent of whole or broken rice.

2. **Restricted articles** comprise padi, rice, rice products, flour, flour products, tapioca, cereals, oil, sugar, salt, concentrated foods, tinned foods, cooked food, dried fish; paper, printing materials and printing instruments; typewriting objects in visible form; drugs, medicines and other medical supplies; torch batteries, canvas cloth and any clothing made from cloth. A new amendment to the ERs defines the types of cloth which are restricted.

3. The Mentri Besar or the Resident Commissioner may declare a *Food Restricted Area.* This may be defined in any convenient manner. After declaration it is an offence to carry any restricted article or any foodstuff whatsoever into or out of a Food Restricted Area. This does not apply to:—

(*a*) fresh meat, fresh fish, shell fish, prawns, crabs, fresh vegetables, fresh fruits, live poultry and eggs;

(*b*) liquids as approved by the DO;

(*c*) articles, the movement of which has been authorised by the DO;

(*d*) clothing made from any restricted article when worn on the person or conveyed as personal baggage.

4. Shopkeepers in a gazetted Food Restricted Area shall:—

(*a*) keep no restricted articles in excess of normal requirements;

(*b*) keep such records of purchases and sales of restricted articles as the DO may require and shall produce them on demand of any Police officer;

(*c*) not sell any restricted articles without production of an Identity Card.

5. The Mentri Besar or Resident Commissioner may prohibit shopkeepers in a Food Restricted Area from carrying on business

in any restricted article unless in possession of a licence issued by the DO.

6. The DO may order any shop in a Food Restricted Area to be closed or restrict business in a shop or make special orders relative to the sale of restricted articles.

7. Any Police officer, Home Guard, member of a military force or woman authorised by the OCPD may search any person leaving or entering a Food Restricted Area.

8. No woman may be searched except by another woman.

9. Where an area has been declared a Controlled Area under ER 17 FA, the Mentri Besar or Resident Commissioner may declare that area (except of course the residential part of it) to be *Food Prohibited.* Any person found with any restricted article in such an area shall be guilty of an offence against the Regulations.

10. The Mentri Besar or Resident Commissioner may declare a Rice Ration or a ration of any specified foodstuff. They may also order the maximum quantity of any specified foodstuff which may be held by any person other than traders. They may also declare the maximum quantity which any dealer or trader may hold.

11.—(*a*) No Food Restricted articles or cloth or clothing may be moved outside a Food Restricted Area or Town Board or Municipality between 1900 hrs. and 0600 hrs. Fresh foodstuffs and footwear and clothing worn on the person are exempt from this order. Foods carried between 0600 hrs. and 1900 hrs. must be covered by a tarpaulin firmly secured.

(*b*) The DO or assistant DO may make such orders regarding the movement of any restricted article as he sees fit. This is the legal backing for convoys.

(*c*) The Mentri Besar or Resident Commissioner or any person authorised by them may order any person transporting any restricted article to carry a manifest.

12. Any Police officer or any member of H.M. Forces or a Local Force excluding Home Guard may:—

(*a*) stop any vehicle, make enquiry as to its contents, and, if not satisfied, search it;

(*b*) give the driver any orders considered necessary to ensure that any restricted article or foodstuff in the vehicle is not used for an unlawful purpose and reaches the place for which it is intended;

(*c*) detain any restricted article or foodstuff if it is likely that it will be used for an unlawful purpose;

(*d*) detain any restricted article or foodstuff if it is suspected that an offence has been or will be committed in respect of it.

The above powers may also be exercised by any Home Guard or any woman who has been authorised by the OCPD.

If within four weeks of seizure no charge is made the goods shall be returned to the owner or if the latter cannot be found disposed of by a Magistrate.

13. Upon conviction of any person who gives false information relative to a consignment on a vehicle or who does not carry a manifest when instructed to do so, the vehicle itself may be confiscated.

14. No vehicle may—

(*a*) stop outside the limits of a Municipality, a town board, a local council area or a gazetted village other than at a place to which any goods in the vehicle are consigned;

(*b*) deviate from the normal route;

(*c*) offload in any place except where the goods are consigned.

15. Goods carried on trains may be searched by Railway officers or Police officers.

16. The DO may prohibit or limit selling by itinerant vendors outside Municipalities, Town Boards, Local Councils areas or gazetted villages.

17. **Note:**—A new ER 17 EA (11A) allows the Mentri Besar/Resident Commissioner to prohibit or to restrict the growing of any specified foodstuff in a Food Prohibited Area.

Section 4.—METHODS OF SEARCHING

Snap Control

1. Snap control is a defensive control having the following objects:—

(*a*) to ascertain a person's true identity;

(*b*) to ascertain a person's true character;

(*c*) to ensure that such person is not in possession of anything unlawful.

2. The methods adopted are entirely dependent upon the circumstances of each particular case but the best results are usually achieved by the operation of a road block or check point, where persons and vehicles are checked.

3. The road block or check point must be—

(*a*) properly manned and sited;

(*b*) speedily operated.

4. **Properly Manned and Sited.**—Ensure that precautionary measures are taken to give security to the persons manning the point, and sited so as not to cause danger or obstruction to through traffic.

5. **Speedily Operated.**—Every person manning the road block or check point should know his job thoroughly, be methodical and move quickly to prevent delay to traffic using the road.

6. Each vehicle must be dealt with separately. Three persons are required to carry out the check—

(*a*) No. 1 will approach the vehicle from the offside, open the driver's door and request the driver to leave the vehicle.

(*b*) No. 2 will approach the vehicle from the nearside and slightly to its rear; he will keep under careful observation any other occupants of the vehicle.

(*c*) No. 3 will be armed with, if possible, an automatic weapon which he will hold in the ready position. He will stand on the off side of the vehicle always maintaining a clear view of the driver and not allowing No. 1 or No. 2 to cross his line of fire. No. 3's part in the operation is purely defensive. He takes no part in the examination of documents or search.

7. The driver of the vehicle will not be questioned as to his identity or requested to produce documents from his person until he has been frisked by No. 1.

Summary or Routine Search of Persons

8. The word frisk, as used in this section, means the quick search of a person to ascertain whether or not any offensive weapons, i.e. pistol, hand grenade, knife, etc., are concealed within his clothing.

9. The person should be requested to stand facing his vehicle with his hands resting on the roof or side of the vehicle as the

case may be, and No. 1 should then quickly, but thoroughly, run over the individual's person from head to foot.

10. The clothing of a person should not be patted, as any small flat object like a knife may be overlooked. The clothing should be rolled between the fingers.

11. Frisking must include searching under the arms, the stomach, inside the thighs and the crutch.

12. Women will only be searched by women. When searching a woman particular attention should be paid to her hair.

13. It is to be remembered that the greatest advantage there is in Snap Control is the element of surprise which in many cases prevents the person from disposing of an illegal article.

14. After the person has been frisked, he will be asked to produce his Identity Card and, if applicable, his driving licence (or in fact any other official document he might possess). These documents should be carefully checked against each other.

15. The following points should be used as a guide for checking identity documents:—

(*a*) *Photograph.* Compare the photograph on the Card with the individual. When such a comparison is made one must endeavour to create the conditions under which the photograph was originally taken, i.e., a true likeness of a person photographed without a hat, as in Identity Cards, cannot be satisfactorily compared with the holder of the Card who may be wearing a hat at the time of the check. Likewise a woman having had her photograph taken two or three years ago with straight hair looks very different after a permanent wave. A good tip in comparing the latter is to place a finger across the photograph thereby hiding the hair, and compare only the features of the person. A check of age will assist in checking the comparison.

(*b*) *Stamp (Chop).* Careful examination of the Chop across the corner of the photograph will assist the examiner when checking to see if the original photograph has been removed and another substituted. The authenticity of the Chop itself should also be checked.

(*c*) When questioning a person in connection with particulars contained in their identity documents, such questions should be framed thus:

What is your name?

Where do you live?

How old are you?

Leading questions should be avoided.

(*d*) *Fingerprints.* Because a positive means of fingerprint identification can only be dealt with by experts, a mark indicating a thumbprint must be accepted. Should, however, any queries arise as to the true identity of a suspect, he can be held for further questioning and his prints used for identification.

16. **Damaged Identity Cards.**—These should be the subject of very careful scrutiny, but provided the holder passes security scrutiny he will be allowed to proceed. The Police will take such action as necessary to ensure that he applies for a new card to the appropriate Registration Officer.

17. When No. 1 has satisfied himself as to the true identity of the driver, he will then frisk and check the identity of any passengers. He will then commence a casual search of the vehicle.

18. The No. 2 of the team, having observed the passengers while the driver is being checked for any suspicious actions, will then assist in the search and checking of passengers and the search of the vehicle under the direction of No. 1.

Casual Search of Cars

19. A car should be searched as follows:—

(*a*) sun visors (examine behind and the item it is attached to);

(*b*) dashboard pockets or cubby holes;

(*c*) behind dashboard (wires, etc., leading from instruments. A letter or small weapon can easily be placed between the wires);

(*d*) under the driver's seat;

(*e*) between the driver's and passenger's seat;

(*f*) at the back of driver's seat, i.e., between back of seat and bottom of back rest;

(*g*) door pockets;

(*h*) behind front seats;

(*i*) any movable mats in the car should be lifted;

(*j*) back seats;

(*k*) rear window panel shelf;
(*l*) the luggage boot;
(*m*) under bonnet and spare wheel compartment;
(*n*) in addition, all loose baggage contained within the vehicle or boot should be carefully but quickly examined;
(*o*) particular attention should be paid to umbrellas, newspapers, magazines, and any seemingly innocent parcels, etc., all of which may easily be used as simple methods of concealment.

20. The checking officer, when satisfied, will allow the car to go. Should, however, any doubts arise as to the true identity of any individuals in the car, or any suspicion remain that clandestine material(s) are concealed within the vehicle, then such vehicle must be removed under direct Police supervision to a suitable place for a thorough search.

Search of Light and Heavy Goods Vehicles

21. The method of Casual search of lorries and goods vehicles are similar to those adapted for cars. There are the following additional points to watch for:—

(*a*) *Wooden Body Construction.* Owing to the wooden body construction of lorries, it is very simple to make effective places of concealment by the addition of enclosed panels or false bottoms, or the boarding-up of spaces between the battens supporting the floor. The sides of lorries may be prepared in a similar manner, and the best method of search in such cases is a close examination from all angles and careful measurements.

(*b*) *Twin Rear Wheels.* The chances of concealment between the twin rear wheels are small, but should be examined carefully.

(*c*) *Wooden Block (Chocks).* Practically all goods vehicles, particularly those of the heavy class, carry a wheel chock which is used under the rear wheels of the vehicle to help the brakes should the vehicle have to stop on a steep gradient. These chocks are generally square or triangular probably about $9'' \times 9'' \times 6''$. Through regular use, they become dirty, worn and greasy, and are generally thrown in the rear of the vehicle or carried in the driver's cab when laden. Such blocks can be hollowed out and become good places of concealment. Examine all wooden blocks carefully.

(*d*) *Gunny Sacks.* All gunny sacks will be lifted and searched. A common subterfuge is the concealment of articles under a heap of gunny sacks in an apparently unladen goods vehicle.

(*e*) *Driver's Cab.* Particular attention should be given to search of the driver's cab, the driver's mate and the "jaga" usually found sitting on the top of the laden vehicle. Their actions should be very carefully observed.

Search of Motor Cycles

22. Motor cycles are comparatively easy to search but attention should be paid to the following:—

(*a*) Petrol Tank. May be divided, one division being false.

(*b*) Tool Box/Case. Open, remove all tools and examine.

(*c*) Rubber Handle Grips-Controls. A few moments may be well spent on an examination of the handle grips.

(*d*) Footrests-Supports. Examine footrests and machine support, which is hinged, and is used to support motor cycle in upright position during absence of rider.

(*e*) General. Lamps, mudguards and all hollow or tubular constructions should be examined. A search should also be made under the saddle.

Search of Bicycles

23. Examine the following with care:—

(*a*) Handle bars and rubber grips.

(*b*) Bells.

(*c*) Lamps, dynamos, etc., including behind reflector glasses.

(*d*) The saddle.

(*e*) All tubular frame-work, particularly open ends and joints.

(*f*) Under mudguards.

(*g*) In the case of very old bicycles some parts may appear to be damaged, i.e., frame, pedals, etc., and have been repaired with wire or string. Remove and examine beneath.

Search of Trishaws

24. Examine as for a bicycle, together with all tubular constructions attached to the actual passengers' hood.

(*a*) Remove all tapestries, padding, etc., used for seat covering, and examine underneath.

(*b*) Many trishaws have, underneath the seat, a shelf or tray containing sundries together with water-proof cover. Remove and examine these, particularly at the back and underneath the shelf.

(*c*) Examine the roof and take considerable care when examining the edges.

(*d*) For proper examination of the trishaw, it should be turned on its side.

(*e*) Particular attention should be given to the 3rd wheel, i.e., the wheel on the passenger's side. The type and hub should be inspected.

House Search

25. There is only one way to search a house, building, etc., and that is the thorough search after a carefully planned Police raid.

26. A procedure similar to the following should be adopted:—

(*a*) Arrests, whenever possible, should be made in the early hours of the morning to ensure the element of surprise.

(*b*) The suspect will immediately be frisked as described earlier, and when the personal search is satisfactorily completed, he should be told to stand back against the wall with his back to the wall and his hands clasped behind his head. He will be covered by one member of the section.

(*c*) No requests made by the prisoner at the time of arrest should be granted. He should be treated fairly but firmly. The initiative must be retained by the searching party.

(*d*) All other members of the household should be collected together in one room. They also should be frisked.

(*e*) One member of the section should visit at once kitchens, lavatories, etc., or any place where a person might well try to burn or destroy a clandestine communication.

(*f*) All drawers should be quickly emptied and the contents examined.

(*g*) Clothing belonging to the prisoner should be examined, also any pairs of shoes found in the premises.

(*h*) Attention should be given to writing tables, desks, etc., and bedside furniture.

(*i*) Kitchen utensils and partly consumed tinned goods should be examined.

(*j*) Any dead birds or animals hanging up awaiting consumption should also be examined. (Ensure that a patrol or an arrest team consists of mixed religions otherwise such things as dead meat, etc., will not be examined or touched.)

(*k*) Rubbish heaps, fowl pens, pig styes, cow sheds, etc., should also be the subject of quick examination.

(*l*) Private letters, documents, papers, diaries, address books, photographs, etc., should always be collected and taken back to Headquarters for careful and detailed examination. Any burnt papers should be carefully preserved by placing some large object over same (a bowl) and reported to Headquarters.

(*m*) Any vehicle found on the premises should be searched as described earlier.

27. When carrying out a search it is often necessary to know the Malayan scale of weights. A comparative scale is shown at Appendix *A* to this Chapter.

APPENDIX *A*

COMPARATIVE SCALE OF MALAYAN WEIGHTS

1. Scale of Weights: Pounds/Katty—

1 oz.	=	$\frac{3}{4}$ tahil
1 lb.	=	12 tahils
1 stone	=	10 katties 8 tahils
1 qr.	=	21 katties
1 cwt.	=	84 katties
1 ton	=	1,680 katties or 16 pikuls 80 katties

2. Scale of Weights: Katty/Pounds—

1 tahil	=	$1\frac{1}{3}$ oz.
1 katty	=	$1\frac{1}{3}$ lb. or 1 lb. $5\frac{1}{3}$ oz.
1 pikul	=	$133\frac{1}{3}$ lb. or 133 lb. $5\frac{1}{3}$ oz. or 1 cwt. 1 stone 7 lb. $5\frac{1}{3}$ oz.

Note:

16 tahils	=	1 katty
100 katties	=	1 pikul

APPENDIX A

COMPARATIVE SCALE OF MALAYAN WEIGHTS

1. Scale of Weights: Pounds/Katty—

1 oz.	=	½ tahil
1 lb.	=	12 tahils
1 stone	=	10 kattys 8 tahils
1 qr.	=	21 kattys
1 cwt.	=	84 kattys
1 ton	=	1,680 kattys or 16 pikuls 80 kattys

2. Scale of Weights: Katty/Pounds—

1 tahil	=	1⅓ oz.
1 katty	=	1⅓ lb. or 1 lb. 5⅓ oz.
1 pikul	=	133⅓ lb. or 133 lb. 5⅓ oz. or 1 cwt. 1 stone 7 lb. 5⅓ oz.

Note:

16 tahils	=	1 katty
100 kattys	=	1 pikul

THE CONDUCT OF ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS IN MALAYA

PART TWO

OPERATIONS

PART TWO

OPERATIONS

CHAPTER V

PLATOON ORGANISATION, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

1. There is no standard platoon organisation in use by battalions on operations in Malaya. The organisation adopted depends on the tasks to be carried out and on the number of troops available. Other matters affecting the organisation are terrain, local CT characteristics and sometimes the duration of the operation.

2. The normal platoon organisation was designed for operations against a first class enemy in a normal theatre of war. This organisation has to be adapted to suit the characteristics of the terrain and of jungle operations. The CT are lightly equipped and can move very quickly. Our organisation and equipment must therefore be such as to confer maximum mobility.

Section 2.—ORGANISATION WITHIN THE PLATOON

1. Where possible the platoon should be organised into a platoon HQ and three Sections each of three Groups.

2. The platoon HQ should consist of:—

Pl Commander
Pl Sergeant
Batman
Signaller (Attached)
GF Rifleman.

3. The section should consist of:—

(*a*) A reconnaissance or contact group, consisting of a group commander and two scouts.

(*b*) A support group, consisting of a group commander, the 2 IC and two Bren gunners.

(*c*) A rifle or reserve group, consisting of a group commander and two riflemen.

4. In addition certain specialists may be attached to Platoon HQ, e.g. medical orderlies, police, guides, JCLO, Sarawak Rangers and SEPs.

5. When the strength of the platoon is low, the sections can be reduced to two, or the groups in each section reduced to two by discarding the Rifle Group.

6. The section should be organised into three groups because this organisation:—

(*a*) Simplifies the section commander's job of control.

(*b*) Provides the grouping needed for the effective minor tactics which have been evolved for use against the CT.

(*c*) Helps to train potential junior leaders who can take over a section if necessary.

(*d*) Provides small three men teams which experience has shown to be a good basic team.

Section 3.—WEAPONS

1. This section gives some notes on the best use of platoon weapons based on experience gained in operations in Malaya. A summary of the best methods of firing weapons is included in Appendix *A* to this Chapter.

2. Weapons used in the Machine Carbine role (in the Standing Position) are:—

No. 5 Rifle
Bren LMG
M1 and M2 Carbines
Owen gun
SMG 9 mm. L2 A1.

3. Experience on operations and detailed trials have shown that poor results are obtained when weapons are fired from the hip using Ball ammunition, and that the chances of hitting a man when using this method at over 100 yards range are small. Within this range all weapons have sufficient powers of penetration and will kill if a vital part is hit.

4. Attention should be paid to the following points in order to ensure that weapons are reliable.

(*a*) They must be maintained correctly zeroed and in good mechanical condition.

(*b*) Magazines must be kept clean.

(*c*) Dirt and grit must be removed from ammunition.

5. A rapid rate of fire will increase the chances of a kill. However it is highly important that a proper aim from the shoulder, using the sights, should always be taken.

6. **No. 5 Rifle.—**

(*a*) The No. 5 Rifle is a single shot weapon with a magazine capacity of 10 rounds of .303. This rifle is a precision weapon and must be fired from the shoulder in steady well aimed shots.

(*b*) The number of rounds that can be fired in a short exposure depends on the skill of the firer. The rifle is reliable and hard hitting in skilful hands, and is light and handy to carry and can knock down a CT with one shot. Experienced shots have confidence in its capabilities and reliability.

7. **Bren LMG.—**

(*a*) The LMG firing single rounds or automatic has a magazine capacity of 28 rounds of .303.

(*b*) Best results are obtained when the LMG is fired from the shoulder in single aimed shots, but this can only be done by men of strong physique. The gun should be rested against a tree if possible.

(*c*) The LMG is normally carried at the waist supported by the sling over the right shoulder, and it is difficult to bring into the shoulder quickly.

(*d*) For men of less strong physique, firing from the hip in a long burst produces good results.

(*e*) The pistol grip attachment for fitting to the forward part of the gun considerably assists firing from the shoulder, and helps to steady firing from the waist.

8. **M1 and M2 Carbines.—**

(*a*) The M1 fires single shots only, but the M2 can be fired automatic (magazine capacity 30 rounds of .300). Both are light and easy to carry. The M2 has a high rate of fire on automatic.

(*b*) The M2 muzzle lifts strongly when the weapon is fired automatic, causing loss of control, therefore when fired from the shoulder single shots should be fired. This will also be the method used with the M1.

(*c*) Using one method of firing will produce the best results at all ranges because of the varied degrees of skill of men who fire the weapons. It will also produce the best standard in a limited training time.

(*d*) The trigger should be operated quickly in order to get the most shots off in a given time, consistent with accurate aiming.

(*e*) The weapon must be stripped so that it can be cleaned satisfactorily, but owing to the possibility of losing parts and of incorrect assembly, stripping must only be carried out by qualified individuals.

9. **Owen Gun.—**

(*a*) The Owen gun fires single rounds or automatic. The magazine holds 33 rounds of 9 mm. The gun is heavier than the rifle but is steady and reliable. The magazine is above the weapon and gravity assists feeding.

(*b*) It should always be fired from the shoulder at targets which are up to 100 yards away. Bursts should consist of 3–4 rounds at short ranges and of 2–3 rounds at targets over about 50 yards.

10. **SMG 9 mm L2 A1.—**

(*a*) This carbine, previously known as the Patchett, fires single rounds or bursts. (Magazine capacity 34 rounds of 9 mm.).

(*b*) This weapon is much lighter and has a shorter barrel than the Owen Gun. It is reliable and suffers from few stoppages.

(*c*) The carbine should be fired from the shoulder in bursts at ranges of up to 100 yards. Bursts of 2–3 rounds at the shorter ranges, and bursts of 2 rounds at the longer ranges.

11. **GF Rifle.—**

(*a*) The EY Rifle, known as the GF Rifle in Malaya, although obsolete in other theatres, is used in this country in situations when the use of the 2-in mortar is impracticable because of the chances of the HE bomb striking trees.

(*b*) The GF Rifle can be used to drop No. 36 grenades behind the CT to prevent their escape. Care must be taken when firing to ensure that grenades do not strike tree trunks and rebound on to our own troops.

(*c*) The GF Rifle should be carried in Platoon HQ whenever there is a chance that it can be used.

(*d*) When the weapon is likely to be required for use at short notice the Platoon Commander can order a grenade to be placed in the discharger cup with the pin out, and the whole discharger cup covered with a 3-in mortar bomb tail fin cover bag. The gas port should be set for approximately 120 yards. All that is necessary to fire the grenade is to load a round of ballistite into the Rifle and press the trigger, thus blowing the grenade out of the discharger cup through the water-proof bag.

(*e*) The following drill will be used to remove the grenade after a patrol. The GF Rifleman will move to the side of a re-entrant or depression, away from other troops. If a grenade fuze becomes ignited, the grenade can be thrown into the re-entrant or depression. No grenade will be removed from a discharger cup in the presence of other troops.

12. **2-in Mortar.—**

(*a*) This weapon is impracticable for use in jungle. It has a contact fuze on the bomb, and there is a great danger of accidents due to the bombs striking the trunks, branches or twigs of trees during its upward flight.

(*b*) The 2-in mortar can be extremely useful if carried in MT as an anti-MT ambush weapon. In this role it can be used either from the vehicle or from the ground after dismounting, when fire can be brought down initially on the ambush positions, and, if necessary, lifted to fall behind CT to block their escape. An assault can then be made on CT positions by the ambushed troops.

13. **36 Grenade.**—This grenade is difficult to use in jungle. The limited distance it can be thrown may result in casualties to our own troops. The grenade should only be used when our troops have height on the enemy, and on orders from the platoon or section commanders.

14. **80 Smoke Grenade.**—

(*a*) 80 Smoke grenades are useful lethal weapons, as well as smoke grenades. A good distribution is one to every fourth man, but men should not carry and use these grenades until they have thrown a number in training.

(*b*) These grenades should be carried evenly distributed throughout a patrol. They are useful should the patrol walk into an ambush. Men should throw them in such a way as to hide them from CT view. The patrol can then manœuvre behind the smoke and take aggressive action against the CT.

15. **Shotgun.**—Shotguns are useful patrol weapons because they cover an area target and are lethal at short ranges. They are light and easy to carry. They are issued to battalions on a small scale.

16. **Verey Pistol.**—Verey light pistols are usually carried by patrol commanders for signalling to aircraft or to dislodge air drop containers from high trees by burning the parachute canopy. The cartridges deteriorate quickly in Malaya. They should be protected from dampness and a reserve carried to allow for failures.

Section 4.—EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING

1. **CT Identification Equipment *(*c*).**—

(*a*) Each battalion holds 5 cameras and 16 fingerprint sets for identification purposes.

(*b*) Details of the use of these items are shown in Chapter XIV, Section 3, paragraph 8 et seq.

(*c*) Additional cameras and fingerprint sets can be obtained by air drop.

2. **Entrenching Tools.**—These are carried for digging latrines, refuse pits, and improving water points. It is normally unnecessary in the present operations to dig-in against CT.

3. **Web Equipment.**—The equipment in use is the 1944 pattern web equipment. This should always be sufficient to carry whatever is necessary, including four days rations. More rations can be carried by modification of the ration scale within the unit. No satisfactory ammunition pouch exists for the various clips and magazines of ammunition which are carried. In practice most men manufacture their own pouches.

4. **Clothing.**—

(*a*) Spare clothing is carried only in order that troops may sleep dry. It is the normal practice for wet, dirty clothes to be put on again before leaving base in the morning, unless an opportunity to wash and dry out clothes has arisen on the previous day.

(*b*) Although it is a matter for personal choice, under-clothing is not recommended for use on patrol as it forms an accumulation of perspiration against the skin and can be the cause of severe skin infection. One pair of underpants is recommended in order that troops in jungle base who are not on sentry duty may expose their skins to the air.

(*c*) Starch should not be used in laundering clothing to be used on operations.

(*d*) All clothing which is used on operations should be treated fortnightly with DBP.

5. **Poncho Capes.**—The Poncho Cape is carried rolled underneath the small pack. Rolled within it will normally be a man's dry change of clothing. The poncho should never be worn as a cape on operations as it restricts the actions of the wearer. The cape is normally used in the construction of one or two-men shelters in a jungle base.

6. **Hammock—British Nylon Pattern.**—The main value of the hammock is for use when it is necessary to form a base in swamp.

7. **Water Bags.**—The 3 gallon water bag is issued in order to avoid unnecessary movement to and from water points, both in the case of a jungle base and of the administrative base on a long term ambush.

Appendix A

SUMMARY OF METHODS OF FIRING WEAPONS

The best results with all automatic weapons in the Machine Carbine role are likely to be obtained when fired from the shoulder as aimed fire, 9 mm carbine shots in short bursts, and M1/M2 carbine, Bren LMGs in single shots.

Serial	Weapon	Do's	Don'ts
1	*Owen*	Fire from shoulder in aimed bursts— 3–4 rounds at close range, or 2–3 rounds at longer range.	Don't fire single rounds. Don't fire from hip. Don't fire by rough alignment of sights from shoulder.
2	*SMG 9 mm L2 A1* (Patchett)	Fire from shoulder in aimed bursts— 2–3 rounds at close range or 2 rounds at longer range.	do.
3	*M1/M2*	Fire from shoulder in single rounds at the highest possible rate.	Don't fire from hip.
4	*Bren LMG*	Fire continuous burst from the hip.	Don't fire tracer from the hip in short bursts.
5	*No. 5 Rifle*	Aimed fire from shoulder in single rounds.	Don't fire from the hip.

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SUMMARY OF METHODS OF FIRING WEAPONS

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2	9MG 9 mm (L2 A1 (Patchett))	Fire from shoulder in aimed bursts— 2–3 rounds at close range or 2 rounds at longer range.	do.
3	M1/M2	Fire from shoulder in single rounds at the highest possible rate.	Don't fire from hip.
4	Bren L.MG	Fire continuous burst from the hip.	Don't fire tracer from the hip in short bursts.
5	No. 5 Rifle	Aimed fire from shoulder in single rounds.	Don't fire from the hip.

CHAPTER VI

THE JUNGLE BASE

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

1. Owing to the difficulties of administering small or large forces operating in the jungle, and of the limited time for which they can operate independently it is necessary to establish jungle bases. These may be patrol, platoon or company bases. The general principles to be followed in establishing bases are the same irrespective of their size.

2. A jungle base is a secret camp from which patrols operate. It may be in existence for one night or for months, depending on the size and tasks of the force occupying it.

Section 2.—DECEPTION

A jungle base depends largely on secrecy for its security, and it is always necessary to have a cover plan which will draw away CT attention from your base. Deception should always be planned. Some suggestions are as follows:—

(*a*) If the terrain is suitable for night movement, the approach march should be made at night.

(*b*) In the approach march, centres of population should be avoided.

(*c*) It may sometimes be necessary to detain local inhabitants who have blundered into patrols during the approach march.

(*d*) The further bases are away from obvious base sites the more secure they will be.

(*e*) Fires by day should be smokeless.

(*f*) Not more than one track should lead into a base. This track should be well camouflaged and guarded.

(*g*) The base must be established silently.

(*h*) Make a cover plan to conceal obvious preparations for operations and allow as few men as possible to be in the know.

(*j*) Hockey boots of local pattern are available for use to avoid certain patrols being given away by the well known pattern of the jungle boot.

Section 3.—SITING A BASE

1. Well-trained and hardened troops can make a base practically anywhere but obviously some places are better than others. The following are some of the factors involved in the siting of a base:—

(*a*) It must be sited so that the patrol can carry out its task.

(*b*) It must be secret and secure. If it is not secret the CT will quickly find out where it is and all chance of a contact will be lost, and therefore the use of a jungle base for more than 48 hours should be the exception rather than the rule. If the base is not secure, troops will be unable to rest as they will be uneasy about their safety. The type of place required is one remote from tracks and villages and with a good thick jungle canopy.

(*c*) It must have good facilities for the erection of wireless aerials for the WS 68. Communications are improved when the set is mounted on high ground.

(*d*) If it is anticipated that an air drop is required, the base should have a convenient DZ. DZ's are generally better if sited on high ground as Valetta aircraft find it hard to manœuvre in valleys. The base should not be too close to the DZ or its security will be prejudiced.

(*e*) It must allow men to sleep in comfort. Areas which are wet underfoot should be avoided. Men will not sleep comfortably on steep slopes. Flat and dry ground that drains quickly is the best.

2. It is important that the area chosen for the jungle base should be suitable, or patrolling from it will suffer accordingly. Planning, forethought and study of the map and air photographs will give a good idea of where to go, but experience is the surest guide.

Section 4.—LAYOUT OF A BASE

1. Appendix *A* to this chapter shows a suggested layout for a two section base. Appendix *B* shows the layout for a three section base.

2. It has been found from experience that once the set drill is clearly understood basing up procedure becomes a simple routine matter. All that is necessary is for the patrol commander to indicate the centre of the base and 12 o'clock. The men then adopt Stand-To positions in pre-allotted areas which are checked and the necessary alterations made. Such a cut and dried procedure is far quicker than any impromptu arrangements which inevitably lead to numerous readjustments, general confusion and an unnecessary strain on the troops.

3. Once this drill is understood each man knows his own and his neighbours areas of responsibility.

Section 5.—SEQUENCE OF ESTABLISHING A BASE

A suggested sequence for establishing a base is as follows:—

(*a*) The patrol commander orders the patrol to halt, puts out whatever local protection is necessary and indicates 12 o'clock for the base.

(*b*) Sections under their commanders move into their positions according to a clock system and make contact with the sections on their right and left.

(*c*) The patrol commander goes round making adjustments among sections as necessary.

(*d*) Local patrols are sent out to ensure that the area within hearing distance is clear of CT, woodcutters, squatters, etc. It may be necessary to maintain outposts on approaches to the perimeter beyond 'hearing distance' until the building of the camp is completed. Where the base is to be occupied for only 48 hours there should be no chopping and Poncho shelters should be built with string and parachute cord.

(*e*) Men start putting up shelters and settle in.

(*f*) A perimeter path can be cut around the front of the shelters. Another path may be required into the centre of the base from the section commanders to the patrol commander, but cutting should be avoided as much as possible. It is the clear trademark of a patrol's presence.

(*g*) If time permits the patrol commander holds an 'O' Group. The following are some of the points to be covered:—

(i) Sentries, passwords, Stand-To, Stand-Down and alarm scheme.
(ii) Local patrolling.
(iii) Work for the next day.
(iv) Maintenance of weapons.
(v) Water and washing parties.
(vi) Cooking, fires and smoking.
(vii) Latrines.
(viii) Refuse pits.

Section 6.—SECURITY AND PROTECTION

1. **General.**—

(*a*) Although CT have attacked patrol bases on only a few occasions it would be unwise to underestimate their ability to do so. Every precaution must therefore be taken. The base must be well sited and well protected.

(*b*) When the majority of a patrol is out operating away from its base sufficient troops must remain in base in order to give it adequate protection. A base commander will be detailed to co-ordinate the defence. All duties such as sentries, local patrols and action in case of alarm must be clearly understood by every man. Base protection troops will usually consist of troops due for a rest, and specialist personnel not on patrols such as wireless operators and dog handlers.

(*c*) All movement to and from a water point must be controlled and have adequate protection.

2. **Stand-To.**—As in any other operation, morning and evening Stand-To will be strictly observed. Special points to note are:—

(*a*) Evening Stand-To enables every man to check up that he knows the night dispositions of his neighbours to the flanks, front and rear. This is the safeguard against confusion amongst our own troops should shooting start at night.

(*b*) Stand-To ensures that every man rises in the morning and retires for the night, properly dressed and with every item of his arms and ammunition to hand.

(*c*) If an early move is planned for the following day, evening Stand-To is the ideal time for a commander to check that every man is properly equipped so that there will be no delay on the following morning.

(*d*) For the reasons given in (*b*) and (*c*) above, all men Stand-To in their alarm positions, their arms and equipment close to hand.

(*e*) Sub unit commanders will detail day and night sentries and can check at Stand-To that every man knows his tour of duty and his orders.

(*f*) Commanders will check that each man:—

(i) Is in a sound tactically sited position.

(ii) Knows what to do in case of alarm.

(iii) Knows his fire task, and that each sub unit commander knows his sub unit task.

(iv) Knows what troops, if any, are outside the patrol base and their route and expected time of return.

(*g*) Stand-To is an opportunity for commanders to ensure the strictest observance of all medical precautions, and to inspect weapons.

(*h*) Stand-To is an insurance against possible dawn or dusk attack and also enables men to accustom themselves to the growing and fading light.

(*j*) Fires should not be allowed after the evening stand-down.

3. **Sentries.—**

(*a*) *By Day.*—

(i) Sentries must always be posted by day, particularly on tracks leading past or into the base.

(ii) They should be posted at the limit of noise. In a well conducted camp this should be 20–30 yards only.

(iii) With troops new to the jungle it is advisable to post sentries in pairs.

(*b*) *By night.*—

(i) Double sentries will always be posted.

(ii) Listening posts or ambushes may be laid on tracks into the position.

(iii) Sentries must have some means of waking their section commander silently.

4. **Local Patrols.**—Local patrolling must be carefully controlled by the patrol commander so that tracks in the area of the base are kept to a minimum.

5. **Carrying of Weapons.**—Every man must be armed at all times and men must never move about singly. The reason is obvious but only strict discipline will ensure that this rule is observed.

6. **Alarm Scheme.**—

(*a*) When firing starts, or when the signal for the alarm is given, every man moves silently to his alarm position and remains there. From then on any movement seen or heard during the period of the alarm is regarded as being CT.

(*b*) There should be no firing at night until the CT is a certain target. In no circumstances should there be any firing from the centre of the base.

Section 7.—LEAVING A BASE

1. When leaving a base every effort must be made to obliterate any signs of occupation, and in particular any tell-tale marks of the time of occupation.

2. Any basha type shelters should be destroyed before the base is vacated, because the location by Auster of a SF camp (which is then reported as a CT camp) might well cause a waste of valuable time by other SF sent out to locate and destroy the camp.

Section 8.—ADMINISTRATION OF A BASE

If base administration is bad, patrolling from that base will deteriorate because living in it will be unpleasant and tiring. Some of the points which require attention are:—

(*a*) *Siting and cleanliness of latrines and urinals.*—These are normally outside the base and will be protected by the sentry layout. Excreta must be covered or flies will cause dysentry.

(*b*) *Disposal of rubbish.*—Rubbish must be disposed of as it occurs. Empty tins must be buried. If this is not done flies will increase quickly. Before evacuating a base the commander must ensure that all rubbish and food is completely destroyed, or CT will use it.

(*c*) *Water purification.*—The patrol commander must ensure that water is sterilised. Water-borne diseases are common throughout Malaya and jungle water will not be drunk unless it has been properly sterilised.

(*d*) *Cooking.*—Where individual 24 hour ration packs are carried each man prepares his own food. However, if compo ration is issued cooking is usually done on a section basis.

Section 9.—CONCLUSION

1. A jungle base must be sited in a position from which its patrols can best carry out their tasks, but its exact location will be decided by the requirements of security and comfort. These two factors may conflict but they are interdependent, for without security there can be no comfort.

2. The extent to which a jungle base will be developed depends on the length of time it will be occupied. But every effort must be made to ensure that it is as secure and comfortable as possible so that patrols returning to it can rest.

3. This security and comfort can only be achieved first by good discipline and leadership, and secondly by paying careful attention to the following:—

(*a*) There must be a sound alarm scheme known to, and practised by, everyone.

(*b*) Adequate sentries must be on duty at all times.


(*c*) A careful duty roster must be kept, and rest must be organised.

(*d*) Strict hygiene rules, and water discipline must be laid down and observed.

(*e*) Well constructed shelters should be built.

(*f*) Cooking should be of as high a standard as possible according to the circumstances.

Suggested Layout of a Two-Section Base




NOTES

1. The patrol commander having indicated 12 o'clock, the leading section of the patrol moves into position between 0300 hrs., 1200 hrs. and 0900 hrs. The second section moves into position between 0300 hrs., 0600 hrs. and 0900 hrs.

2. If the layout is kept standard within sub units every man and group will know their approximate positions and who will be on their left and right.

APPENDIX A

Suggested Layout of a Two-Section Base




NOTES:

1. The patrol commander being indicated 12 o'clock, the leading section of the patrol moves into position between 0200 hrs. 1200 hrs. and 0800 hrs. The second section moves into position between 0300 hrs. 0600 hrs. and 0900 hrs.


2. If the layout is kept standard within sub units every man and group will know their approximate positions and who will be on their left and right.

Suggested Layout of a Three-Section Base



NOTES

1. The patrol commander having indicated 12 o'clock, No. 1 section moves to take up position between 12 o'clock and 0400 hrs. No. 2 section between 12 o'clock and 0800 hrs. No. 3 section between 0400 hrs. and 0800 hrs.
2. The entrance to this base is at 12 o'clock.


Perimeter
Type
12 O'clock
Path to Commander's
Shelter
H.Q.
0800 hrs
0400 hrs

(*b*) *CT.*—Information may be available from Special Branch briefs, SEP, informers, air reconnaissance both visual and photographic, captured documents and diaries. The past history of CT activities in the area should be studied.

(*c*) *SF.*—Boundaries and movements of all SF in the area should be considered. These are recorded in the Combined Operations Room.

(*d*) *Civilians.*—Movements and habits of civilians must be studied if movement by troops is to remain secure.

2. All information from informers and SEP must be carefully considered and assessed.

Section 3.—PLANNING AND CONTROL OF PATROL OPERATIONS

1. All patrols require 'clearance' (full details are given in Chapter III Section 5). This requires that boundaries for the movement of the patrol must be given and agreed with other SF. It is often necessary to arrange this some days in advance in order to prevent loss of security by a sudden switch of task of a unit involved in routine work, such as an Area Security Unit.

2. The main problem when planning patrolling is the introduction of patrols into their operational areas without the loss of security. Every means of avoiding observations by civilians must be used, e.g. deception; movement by night; the use of civilian vehicles (arranged through the Police) and the use of indirect routes. Security and deception are essential factors to consider when planning a patrol.

Section 4.—BRIEFING BY BATTALION/COMPANY COMMANDERS

1. All patrols must be sent out with a clearly defined mission. In a reconnaissance patrol this should take the form of a question or series of questions posed to the patrol commander. Fighting patrols will have tasks such as the attack and destruction of a party of CT, or the prevention of contact between CT and civilians in a fixed area, e.g. in food control operations. The mission must be clearly stated and understood by the patrol commander.

2. The officer despatching a patrol must make available to the patrol commander all possible information which may affect his mission.

3. It is essential that Battalion Commanders, and in the case of detached companies, company commanders, maintain patrol maps showing areas covered by patrols, and results and information gained. Consultation with the previous patrol commander, if an area is being re-visited, can often be of considerable assistance to the new patrol commander.

4. A sound communication drill must be arranged to avoid signallers giving away the presence of patrols by their efforts to open communications. This drill must be laid down by the officer despatching a patrol. It is suggested that fixed times are given for patrols to open listening watch. Control transmits the call sign for periods of 30 seconds at 30 second intervals from five minutes before to five minutes after the fixed time. Substations should net to control and reply during one of the 30 second intervals. Substations should not of course reply unless the patrol commander has a message for control which MUST be passed. CW should be used for all transmissions.

5. When arrangements are made for transport to bring in a patrol from a rendezvous and where empty transport has to return by the same route, more than normal alertness is required. Troops MUST be reminded of this and where possible escorts and armoured vehicles should accompany the transport. A similar danger arises when troops investigate incidents and where only one route to the site is available.

6. So that any member of a patrol can give comprehensive intelligence information on his return, he must have studied Section 3 and it's Appendices of Chapter XIV before leaving base.

Section 5.—PLANNING AND PREPARATION BY THE PATROL COMMANDER

1. An 'Aide Memoire for Patrol Orders' is attached as Appendix *A* to this Chapter *(*m*). This aide memoire gives a comprehensive list of headings for consideration by a patrol commander. The items which should be included in his orders will depend on the task and likely duration of his patrol.

2. Routes and timings are two of the more important considerations for the patrol commander:—

(*a*) Movement into the operational area must be secure if the patrol is to achieve success. This implies that any form of habitation must be avoided and that movement through rubber and other estates should take place before the arrival of estate workers.

(*b*) The return should be by an alternative route. ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD A PATROL RETURN BY ITS OUTWARD ROUTE.

3. 'Time in', as understood in normal military patrolling, must be very elastic. Speed of movement is very difficult to estimate and the possibility of a contact, and a resulting track or 'blood trail' make it necessary to allow extreme latitude in this matter. More important is the fixed listening time for the daily sitrep and location report.

4. When troops are to be committed to jungle, the problem of casualty evacuation must always receive prior consideration. Before leaving base a patrol commander should mark locations of possible LZs on his map or photograph. Then, if a casualty occurs, he is in a position to decide whether to move to an existing clearing or to search for and cut a new LZ. It is a good idea to have packs of cutting equipment (saws or explosives) held in unit store, ready for free drop by Auster.

Section 6.—DEBRIEFING AND REBRIEFING

1. **Debriefing.—**

(*a*) The use of a debriefing aide memoire such as that in Chapter XIV, Appendix *C* greatly simplifies the task of the patrol commander in making his report. Remember, he will be tired.

(*b*) Whatever the time of day or night, the company commander, or debriefing officer, must be up ready to interrogate the patrol commander. His information is required urgently so that commanders can plan the next operation and other patrols.

(*c*) The test of good interrogation followed by a good clear report is that few, if any, queries are raised later.

2. The value of information obtained from a debriefing to other units and higher formation must be borne in mind.

3. **Rebriefing for the next day.**—At the same time the patrol commander, must in addition to debriefing his patrol, start to think of action for the next day's operations. In this way full briefing of the patrol will be completed before the men are dispersed or go to bed.

Section 7.—RETURN TO COMPANY BASE

It is essential that a drill is arranged for the reception of patrols returning to base. This can have considerable morale value in a campaign where abortive patrolling is the rule rather than the exception. This drill, as well as catering for normal administrative matters, must include a post-mortem for every patrol which has had a contact or appears to have narrowly missed a contact.

Appendix A

PATROL ORDERS—AIDE MEMOIRE

Suggested Headings

Situation

1. (*a*) *Topography.*—Use maps, air photos, visual recce and patrol going map.
   (*b*) *CT in Area.*—
      (i) Strength.
      (ii) Weapons and dress.
      (iii) Known or likely locations and activities including past history.
   (*c*) *Movements of Aborigines and civilians in area.*
   (*d*) *Own troops.*—
      (i) Clearance.
      (ii) Patrol activities of SF. Include means of identification.
      (iii) Air and arty tasks.

Mission

2. This must be clear to patrol commander:—
   (*a*) *Recce Patrol.*—takes form of question or questions.
   (*b*) *Fighting Patrol.*—definite object.

Execution

3. (*a*) Strength and composition of patrol.
   (*b*) Time out and anticipated time of return.
   (*c*) Method of movement to patrol area.
   (*d*) Routes out and in. If helicopters are to be used location and state of LZs.
   (*e*) Boundaries.
   (*f*) Probable bounds and RVs.
   (*g*) Formations.
   (*h*) Deception and cover plan.
   (*i*) Action to be taken on contract.
   (*j*) Action if ambushed.
   (*k*) Action if lost.
   (*l*) DO NOT.—
      (i) Move in file through rubber.
      (ii) Move through defiles.
      (iii) Cut unnecessarily.
      (iv) Return by the same route as that used for outward move.
      (v) Allow weapons to become jammed through dirt.
      (vi) Relax because you are nearing base.

Appendix A—*continued*

Administration and Logistics

4. (*a*) Rations.—
   (i) Type and number of days.
   (ii) Resupply.
   (iii) Cooking.
   (iv) Dog rations.
   (v) Rum.

   (*b*) *Equipment and Dress.*—
   (i) Change of clothing.
   (ii) Large or small pack.
   (iii) Poncho capes.
   (iv) Footwear.
   (v) Maps, compasses, and air photos.

   (*c*) *Avoidance of noise.*—
   (i) Does equipment rattle?
   (ii) Leave behind men with coughs.

   (*d*) *Weapons.*—
   (i) Types and distribution.
   (ii) Special weapons—GF rifle, etc.

   (*e*) *Ammunition.*—
   (i) Type and distribution.
   (ii) Grenades, Hand and Rifle, including gas checks and clips for 80 grenades.
   (iii) Check grenade fuses.
   (iv) Signal cartridges.

   (*f*) *Medical.*—
   (i) First field dressing, J packs.
   (ii) Medical orderly and haversack.
   (iii) Water sterilising tablets.
   (iv) Salt tablets.
   (v) Paludrine.
   (vi) DBP clothing.
   (vii) Foot powder.
   (viii) Copper sulphate ointment for burns.

   (*g*) *Special Equipment.*—
   (i) Saws and parangs.
   (ii) Cameras.
   (iii) Finger print outfit.
   (iv) Surrender pamphlets.
   (v) Night equipment.
   (vi) Explosives.
   (vii) Dogs.
   (viii) Marker Balloons.

   (*h*) Inspect all equipment for serviceability.

Command and Signals

5. (*a*) *Frequencies.*—
   (i) Times of opening.
   (ii) Special instructions.
   (iii) Air.

   (*b*) *Codes.*—
   (i) Net identification signs.
   (ii) Codes.
   (iii) Passwords.

   (*c*) *Check and test sets.*—
   (i) Aerials.
   (ii) CW keys.
   (iii) Spare batteries.

   (*d*) *Ground/Air Communications.*—
   (i) DZ panels and DZ letters allotted.
   (ii) Ground/Air signal code.

Check

6. Check thoroughly that all points have been understood by patrol members.

CHAPTER VIII

PATROL MOVEMENT AND FORMATION

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

1. All movement on operations in Malaya is tactical movement. The CT is cunning and ever ready to take advantage of any carelessness or relaxation by the SF.

2. The formations given in this Chapter are similar to those used in normal warfare, though the placing of individuals and weapons within the formations may be peculiar to anti-CT operations under Malayan conditions. The factors which have affected the evolution of these formations are:—

(*a*) The requirement to produce maximum fire power immediately on contact.

(*b*) Battle is largely at close quarters.

(*c*) Formations must be such that troops are capable of taking immediate counter ambush action.

Section 2.—MOVEMENT—GENERAL

1. Rate of movement in primary and secondary jungle is seldom more than one mile per hour, which is fast going. More often it is not more than half a mile per hour. Every now and then small clearings are found and there are places where the overhead branches of trees are not thick. It is possible to receive an air drop through this type of jungle provided adequate smoke signals are given.

2. On account of the shade given by trees, movement in jungle and rubber can be made over reasonable distances without great physical discomfort. On the other hand movement in lallang or belukar is most exhausting because of exposure to the sun and also the hot haze off the ground.

3. Owing to restricted visibility in the jungle the only sure means of maintaining direction is by compass. Every commander down to the most junior must be able to use a compass with confidence and accuracy.

4. Movement by night in jungle is not often practical and should only be undertaken by well-trained troops. Movement by night in rubber is easier.

5. Movement through swamp is the most tiring and slowest of the conditions likely to be encountered. Some assistance can be obtained by clambering from the roots of one tree to the next. The CT have been known to build submerged tracks across swamps which enable faster movement. Such tracks are available to our own forces only with the assistance of a SEP who knows the area.

6. The chief characteristics of the jungle must be explained to men new to Malaya as early as possible. They must be trained to feel at home in the jungle and made to realise that it provides good cover which enables them to close unobserved with the CT and so more easily kill them.

Section 3.—MOVEMENT OF PATROLS

1. **Silence.**—Silence is essential at all times. This refers both to voice and movement. With practice it is possible to move at considerable speed in comparative silence. Move steadily and carefully and part the undergrowth rather than crash through. Do not blunder forward—this will produce bruises, scratches and loss of direction besides loss of silence. Avoid treading on dry leaves, sticks, rotten wood, etc. wherever possible.

2. **Cutting.—**

(*a*) Cut only as a last resort and only to avoid excessive detours. There is nearly always a way nearby where movement is easier. Cutting has the following disadvantages:—

(i) It is not silent.

(ii) It reduces speed of movement.

(iii) Fatigue is increased in the leading elements.

(iv) Quick handling of weapons is prejudiced.

(*b*) If it is necessary to cut:—

(i) Make sure the matchette is always kept sharp.

(ii) Do not slash—a sawing action is just as quick and is more silent.

(iii) Cut upwards—this stops pulling vines, etc. down on you.

(*c*) In many battalions cutting on the move is forbidden.

3. **Tracks and Track Discipline.**—Movement on tracks should be avoided, though it may sometimes be necessary when speed in

follow up is required, or when moving out of a permanent base. Movement on tracks simplifies the problem of the CT who constantly seek SF targets on tracks as a potential source of weapons. To frustrate these tactics—AVOID TRACKS.

4. Not only should established tracks be avoided but efforts should be made to disguise or hide signs of movement to prevent the leaving of a trail even in virgin country. Some aids in this problem are:—

(*a*) (i) Wear gym shoes or hockey boots.

(ii) Muffle the boots with old sand bags or old sock tops.

(iii) Have the last man brush the trial lightly with a small branch after the patrol has passed.

(*b*) Remember track discipline. Do NOT signpost the route with litter such as cigarette packets, sweet papers, cigarette ends and waste food. All these should be kept and burned. Do NOT while away the time by plucking leaves, breaking twigs—this blazes a trail.

(*c*) When crossing streams a patrol should spread out along the bank, and be ready to give supporting fire to the leading troops.

(*d*) When crossing established tracks sign of crossing should be obliterated by the rear man.

(*e*) When moving through close, hilly country avoid handling small saplings. The shaking of overhead branches can be seen and heard at a distance.

5. **Speed of Movement.**—Speed of movement is dictated by the nature of the country and the task. Speed in moving from one point to another will be better obtained by intelligent route planning than by trying to push quickly and blindly forward.

6. In reconnaissance, speed will be limited by the desire to avoid noise of movement and will often be painfully slow, whereas a fighting patrol, when tracking, will move as fast as possible commensurate with safety. A commander must remember that movement in jungle is fatiguing, both physically and mentally, and that he must balance his desire for speed against the necessity for keeping his troops fresh and alert for action.

7. Halts must be frequent for observation and listening and less frequent for rest. When halted, always take up positions for all round defence. In single file formation it may be necessary to delegate responsibility for protection and lookouts down to groups.

As a guide, when working out times for rest halts, start with the usual ten minutes in the hour. Do not march for longer periods. Usually the halts will be more frequent especially when traversing difficult country. After passing through swamp or climbing a steep slope it is a good plan to have a short rest. Make sure the whole party has passed through a defile before halting or only the leading elements will be rested.

8. **Observation.**—In jungle a man observes with all his senses. On the move he must notice every sign of movement, marks on tracks and broken vegetation. His nose must be keen and free from cigarette smoke, sweets, the smell of hair oil, so that he immediately notices any strange smell such as tobacco, cooking and woodsmoke. Every few minutes, depending on how close the commander suspects the CT to be, and certainly not less often than every ten minutes, a patrol must stop and listen.

9. Eyes must be trained to disregard the general pattern of foliage immediately to the front and to look through rather than at it. A better view is often obtained by looking through jungle at ground level.

10. As soon as any unusual sign or sound is noted a patrol must 'freeze' silently. There should be no further movement until the commander, and his tracker, have investigated.

11. The direction of responsibility for observation by the various men in a patrol is shown diagrammatically in the Appendices to this Chapter. This method must be practised before a patrol moves out from base. Observation to the rear must NOT be forgotten.

Section 4.—SEARCHING GROUND

1. When searching ground, or patrolling for information, the most that a platoon can be expected to search in a day is one 1,000 yard map square. Commanders, when briefing patrols, must bear this in mind otherwise ground will be only partially searched and incomplete information will result.

2. The most effective method of search in jungle is the 'five finger' or 'fan' method. A patrol base is established from which reconnaissance patrols of three or four men are sent out towards the area in which CT activity is suspected. These patrols are sent out on compass bearings, at intervals of 10 degrees, like the ribs of a fan. Their radius of action should be limited to two to three

hours outwards from base, i.e. approximately 1,000 yards. It is essential to limit their radius of action in this way because their task is an exhausting one and they must remain alert and ready for action all the time. For this reason they should be changed frequently.

3. These patrols wear no equipment and carry no rations. They carry only their arms and ammunition, maps and compasses. They move slowly, pausing frequently to listen, and as silently as possible to avoid detection. They return on the back bearing. In the early stages of training, men may be permitted to bend twigs along their route to assist their return, but it must be remembered that such signposting of a trail may leave a weak reconnaissance patrol open to CT action.

4. If CT are in the area they leave signs of their presence. It is for these signs that the patrols search; both visual signs and noise. Ideally every man should be able to recognise a fresh trail (i.e. marks showing the passage of CT—they seldom establish permanent tracks) even if made by only one or two men. Some men will obviously be better than others at this, but all can be trained to notice the more obvious signs, e.g. disturbed vegetation, footprints, and marks made on the banks of a stream.

5. Equally important is the need to listen carefully all the time. The biggest give away of the CT is the noise of cutting and, as they use wood fuel for cooking they must cut fairly often.

6. Reconnaissance patrols used in this type of search must realise that their function is to obtain information on which their commander can make a plan. If they find traces of CT movement they should try to establish:—

(*a*) How many CT made the track.

(*b*) When tracks were made.

(*c*) Where found.

(*d*) Direction of movement of CT.

At this stage an unwise move by the reconnaissance patrol may disclose the presence of SF. The correct procedure is for the patrol to return and report to its commander.

7. Each patrol must know what to do in the case of a surprise clash, e.g. return to base, freeze or carry out a limited follow-up.

8. If no information is forthcoming the patrol base moves on and a fresh series of reconnaissance patrols is sent out.

Section 5.—FORMATIONS

Section

1. Two types of section patrol formations are considered sufficient for use in the various types of terrain to be met in Malaya. They are:—

(*a*) Single File formation .. .. Appendix *A*

(*b*) Open formation .. .. .. Appendix *B*

Platoon

2. The platoon normally consists of two or three sections. Each section moves in groups as illustrated in Appendices *A* and *B*. The sections may follow one another in single file formation or move in open formation, one or two up, on parallel axes.

3. When a platoon is moving in its selected formation it may be necessary for the 'O' group to move behind the leading section, but in close country it may often be more important for the section commanders to be with their sections.

4. The patrol commander must continuously appreciate the ground and vary the formation of his patrol to suit it. Similarly he must continuously appreciate the tactical position of the patrol in relation to the ground so as to be able immediately to take action in the event of a contact.

Section 6.—POSITION OF COMMANDERS

1. The position of the section commander will normally be that shown in the diagrams.

2. The position of platoon and company commanders will be dictated by ground, tactical circumstances and formation. It should not be too far forward because:—

(*a*) A commander must be in a position to influence the battle by the use of his reserve, which he should normally control himself. This duty cannot be carried out if commanders are caught in the opening phase of the fire fight and are unable to order the mounting of practised IA drills.

(*b*) Unless scouts, group commanders and section commanders are allowed and encouraged to do their particular job, they will never learn to do it well.

(*c*) If scouts are hampered and distracted by the immediate presence of their commander, their work will not be thorough nor will they be called upon to show initiative. Scouts are, or should be, specially trained in their own specialist task.

(*d*) Other functions of a commander are to exercise control, control his guides, read his map and air photos, give orders with regard to navigation, orders halts when necessary, decide on the day's routine and finally to arrive in base sufficiently fresh to be able to organise the base and issue orders for the next day.

3. These requirements must be balanced against the delay, in passing information and ordering action, which must arise when a commander is too far to the rear.

Section 7.—POSITION OF GUIDES AND TRACKERS

1. The word 'guide', as used here, means somebody with an intimate knowledge of an area or someone who can lead SF to a known CT location. These may be SEPs, CEPs, Aborigines, Malay, Chinese or Indian estate workers. They may expect to lead the patrol and have on occasions been allowed to do so, but this is wrong because:—

(*a*) They are not trained scouts and are not part of the military team. Their function is merely to show direction.

(*b*) If CT are encountered *en route*, guides may react badly and prejudice the patrol's chance of killing.

(*c*) Cases have occurred of troops being led into ambush.

2. The correct position for a guide is with the patrol commander. The patrol commander will make decisions as to direction and tactics, using the guide's advice as he wishes.

3. The tracker has a different function—that of following a trial. Once a trail has been picked up, the tracker, be he man or dog, must move in the lead, otherwise faint signs of CT movement will be obliterated and confused. The tracker must be protected by the scouts who must not be allowed to relax their alertness or be distracted by the signs of the trial. The patrol commander must appreciate that a tracker, born to the jungle and lightly equipped, may tend to outstrip the patrol. The patrol commander must ensure that contact is maintained by seeing that the tracker conforms to the speed of the patrol.

Section 8.—MAINTAINING CONTACT AND MOVEMENT BY NIGHT

Maintaining Contact

1. The patrol leader must always base his speed of movement on that of his rear elements, in other words, responsibility for keeping touch must be from front to rear. The flanks must maintain their position by the centre. The only exception to this rule will normally be the leading group whose whole attention must be focussed forward.

2. Obstacles must be crossed tactically. It must be remembered that obstacles and defiles are the CT choice killing grounds. A simple drill should be evolved to cover troops crossing obstacles to ensure that all elements are over before the patrol moves on.

Night Movement

3. Movement by night in jungle, without a guide or an intimate knowledge of the area, is difficult but it must never be regarded as impossible. Movement on established tracks and up streams has been carried out with success, but away from tracks it is extremely noisy and maintenance of contact is difficult. It is, however, normal to move through rubber by night in order to reach an operational area before estate workers are in position.

4. The following aids will help to maintain contact when moving by night:—

(*a*) Sets of luminous patches worn on the back. These are issued through Ordnance channels.

(*b*) White towels fixed behind the pack straps.

(*c*) Where CT are NOT expected, the use of screened weak torch light directed at the ground.

5. If contact within a patrol is broken both parts of the patrol must halt and:—

(*a*) The rear part of the patrol will cast forward trying to follow the trail of the leading elements. This forward casting must be limited as it is often impossible for even highly trained troops to pick up the trail of a few men.

(*b*) The leading elements must retrace their steps to bridge the gap. They should not start to do so immediately the gap is noticed but should allow five to ten minutes for the rear elements to cast forward.

Section 9.—MAINTAINING DIRECTION

1. The compass is the only completely reliable and constant guide to direction and should be issued on as generous a scale as possible. Because of limited visibility in jungle it is important that commanders carry their compasses in their hands and constantly recheck their direction. If this is not done loss of time and direction will result. Other commanders in the column should consult their compasses and maps frequently so that at all times they know where they are, both on the map and on the ground. This is always necessary, even if there is a guide with the patrol. The leading group commander should indicate directions to his scouts. Orders for change can be given by some pre-arranged signal.

2. Chapter IX deals with Jungle Navigation.

Section 10.—RETURN TO BASE

A patrol is most vulnerable to CT action when it is tired. After several days operations men may relax as familiar landmarks near their base appear. This is known by the CT and is the time when many successful CT ambushes have been sprung. Remember the first sentence of this Chapter—'All movement on operations in Malaya is tactical movement'—and keep men alert and ready for action until they are inside their camp. DO NOT use tracks close to camp as a normal route for returning patrols.

Key to Symbols in Appendices A and B—

(*a*) S1—Leading Scout.
S2—No. 2 Scout.
SC—Recce Group Commander.

(*b*) PC—Section or Patrol Commander.
G —Guide.


(*c*) B1—Bren Gun No. 1.
B2—Bren Gun No. 2.
BC—Support Group Commander and Section 2 Ic.

(*d*) R1—No. 1 Rifleman.
R2—No. 2 Rifleman.
RC—Rifle Group Commander.

(*e*) Small arrows indicate the direction of responsibility for observation.

Appendix A

SINGLE FILE FORMATION



1. This formation must NEVER be used in rubber or other plantations.

2. Single file formation is used in jungle where troops cannot move in a more open formation, or when speed of movement is necessary, e.g. when troops are acting in a follow-up role.

3. Distances between individuals and groups will vary according to visibility. The golden rule is that the reconnaissance group should be a tactical bound ahead of the patrol commander.

4. Generally men should be as spread out as possible and there should never be less than five yards between each man. Distance between groups should be governed by the nature of the ground and vegetation, and that necessity for maintaining control.

Appendix A

SINGLE FILE FORMATION

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Appendix B

OPEN FORMATION


1. **'One Up'.—**

(*a*) *Advantages.*—

(i) Ease of control.
(ii) Good fire power to front and flanks.
(iii) On contact the leading group only is committed and two are available to manœuvre.

(*b*) *Disadvantages.*—

(i) With the fleeting targets which are offered in Malaya fewer men are likely to see the CT on first contact.



Appendix B—*continued*

OPEN FORMATION—*continued*

2. **'Two Up'.**—

(*a*) *Advantages.*—

(i) A wider front is covered.

(ii) The formation is less vulnerable to ambush.

(iii) More weapons are available to fire forward in event of a sudden contact.


(*b*) *Disadvantages.*—

(i) On contact the two forward groups may be committed and there are less troops available for manœuvre.

3. **'Three Up'.**—Although this formation will cover more frontage it is difficult to control and allows nothing for manœuvre.

4. Distances between individuals and groups will vary according to the ground through which troops are passing.

OPEN FORMATION—TWO UP



CHAPTER IX

JUNGLE NAVIGATION

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

1. Map reading and navigation in Europe, where landmarks are easily seen and recognised, is fairly straightforward. In Malaya with its large areas of dense jungle it is more difficult.

2. In jungle it is possible to see for only very short distances—25 yards and upwards, sometimes even less, and therefore skill in the use of the compass is essential. There are few artificial features. Landmarks, therefore, consist largely of jungle covered hills (making it impossible to see one hill from another), streams and rivers. However, as in any other theatre, these natural landmarks are the surest guides in map reading.

3. The aim of this Chapter is to explain the elements of jungle navigation and to show how to make the best use of the available aids.

Section 2.—AIDS

1. **Maps.—**

(*a*) *General.*—For obvious reasons map survey in Malaya is difficult and has been mainly carried out from the air. However, main hill features and streams are accurately shown, and maps can be relied on, although maps of some areas do not show enough detail.

(*b*) *Map Study.*—Careful study of the map is an essential preliminary to jungle navigation. This study will provide the answer to many questions e.g. the best route to be taken and areas to be avoided. It will reward the individual by helping him to visualise the lie of the land, to assist his sense of direction and to increase his confidence. If this careful map study is not carried out before going on patrol the chances of being lost are doubled.

(*c*) *1-in to 1 mile.*—This map is in general use. Some of its topographical detail is out of date and checks should be carried out with the unit operations room in order to ascertain the latest topographical information, e.g. rubber and jungle edges.

(*d*) *1:25,000.*—There is not a complete map coverage of Malaya on this scale. The map is not always clear, but local data can be added more easily than on the 1-in to 1 mile.

(*e*) *Going maps.*—Going maps lose their value if they are not kept up to date. Information contained on them must be checked and confirmed by at least two patrols. Going maps should include all data about types of cultivations.

(*f*) *Estate and Forest Department Maps.*—A library should be kept in unit operation rooms of local estate and forestry maps. They contain valuable and accurate information which is normally shown on a large scale.

2. **Air Photographs.**—A complete photographic coverage of Malaya is not yet available, but large areas have been completed. These air photos provide a valuable check, when used in conjunction with the stereoscope, to map reading. It is important when reading air photographs to check the date of printing because tracks and clearings can become overgrown in three or four months.

3. **The Compass.**—The value of the compass is equal to that of the map. It is used in jungle as for night movement, and must continuously be used as a check to direction keeping. Straight forward marches on a set bearing are seldom possible because of the terrain, but when used correctly in conjunction with the map the compass makes it virtually impossible to be lost. Account should be taken of tin mines and weapons which may upset a compass's accuracy.

4. **The Protractor.**—This must be used in conjunction with the compass and is invaluable.

5. **The Sun.**—The jungle canopy frequently hides the sun from view but it is often a valuable aid to direction which should be taught to all other ranks.

Section 3.—PLANNING

1. Map study has been mentioned in Section 2 as the essential preliminary to planning. In deciding the best route from one point to another the following factors should be considered:—

(*a*) *The grain of the country.*—It is far easier to follow the grain of the country than to go against it, and therefore a direct route in the form of a straight line is practical only in flat jungle. It is useless in hilly jungle.

(*b*) *Watersheds.*—Tops of ridges and hills contain sparser jungle than the valleys. Animal tracks are often found on these ridges and therefore it is easier to march on the ridges. It is less tiring and much quicker. Once the effort of climbing the hill is over a relatively easy march follows.

(*c*) *River Lines.*—While rivers are useful aids to maintenance of direction, it is poor policy to follow them. They always wind about and are bordered by dense jungle. The further one keeps away from them the faster one can usually go.

(*d*) *Speed.*—The route finally selected will often depend on the time and space factor and it will usually be found that the easiest route is also the quickest route. Tracks should be avoided for fear of ambush, and villages should be detoured for security reasons.

(*e*) *Conclusion.*—By balancing the factors mentioned above the best route will be selected.

Section 4.—CHECKING

1. Once the march starts checking must be continuous. The following means of checking should be used.—

(*a*) All features, hills and rivers should be checked as they are reached, and identified on the map. Note the direction of flow of all streams and rivers and check with the map.

(*b*) Tracks should be identified, but should always be regarded with suspicion. It is easy to place too much confidence in a track which may not be the one marked on the map.

(*c*) Forest boundaries may be useful checks.

(*d*) *Checking of Distance.*—Pacing is a doubtful check unless you are moving on flat ground. Time taken, the type of country and estimated speed and above all common sense will be a good guide to the distance travelled. The normal error is to overestimate the distance moved.

(*e*) It is a good rule to stop and check if in doubt. To blunder on, hoping for the best is a sure way of getting lost. Having stopped, obtain data—possibly by casting about with small patrols—and check with the map. If this rule is followed you will NOT get lost. If it is not followed the contents of the following paragraph should be remembered.

(*f*) *Action if lost.*—The feeling of being lost is an attitude of mind and therefore the first essential is to sit down and calm down. Then:—

(i) Work out where you are.

(ii) Make a careful map study. Make a plan which aims to take you to a recognisable feature, preferably a river, and then if still in doubt move down-stream towards civilisation.

(iii) Some use can be made of the sun and stars.

(iv) Above all—do NOT panic.

(v) It may be possible to obtain an Auster Contact Patrol. See Chapter XVII Section 7 para. 2 (*a*).

Section 5.—OBSTACLES

1. Preliminary map study will reduce the number of obstacles likely to be encountered, but some may be met, e.g. unmapped swamps and lallang.

2. The natural tendency is to follow round the edge of the obstacle, but this process is usually slow and tends to make direction keeping difficult. It is quicker to cast wide, checking the bearing carefully. When on the far side of the obstacle, resume the original course.

Section 6.—CONCLUSION

Jungle navigation is not easy, but the difficulties are easily overstated. Provided that methodical map study and planning are undertaken, followed by careful use of the map, compass and protractor, all ranks can find their way about. With experience the individual will gain confidence in himself, his map and his compass. Once this confidence has developed a feel for the grain of the country and a sense of direction will become instinctive.

CHAPTER X

IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

1. Encounters with the CT are sudden, short, and often so unexpected that the opportunity to inflict casualties is lost if a leader has to give orders at the time of the encounter. What is required is immediate, positive and offensive action.

2. For this reason it is essential for simple Immediate Action (IA) Drills to be taught and thoroughly practised. It is impracticable to attempt to cover every contingency by committing to paper numerous IA Drills, because not only would they tend to cramp initiative but they would not be read or digested or remembered in the stress of action. It is however, important to teach one IA drill to cope with each situation commonly met. The principles underlying each drill must be simplicity, aggression and speed.

3. Before a patrol leaves its base, the commander in his briefing, should include directions on IA drills. This is necessary each time because patrols vary in strength and organisation according to the nature of their task. In addition the mere quotation of the standard drills applicable to the operation in question, will act as a reminder to the troops taking part and so help them to avoid being surprised.

4. IA drills are of little value unless the standard of weapon handling and marksmanship is high and unless troops understand and remember instinctively the capabilities and limitations of the weapons with which they are armed. A guide on this subject is contained in Chapter V.

Section 2.—THE IA DRILLS

1. Four IA Drills are described in this Chapter. These are considered sufficient for use in the varied terrain of Malaya and they suit any standard patrol formation. It should be noted that the drills suggested are a sound framework on which units may build as their experience dictates.

2. The drills quoted are described under TWO headings:—

(*a*) *Action on encounter* which includes:—

(i) Freezing and an Immediate Ambush.

(ii) The Immediate assault.

(iii) The IMMEDIATE assault on a CT camp.

(*b*) *Counter Ambush Action* which includes:—

(i) The encircling attack.

(ii) An immediate assault.

3. Sub-para. 2 (*b*) generally applies also in countering an MT ambush, but detailed IA drills for MT ambush are contained in Chapter XIII, Sections 5 and 6.

4. It is important to note that although these drills are usually taught on a section basis, they can be adapted for use by a platoon.

5. These drills are applicable to close country. In open country normal infantry minor tactics will usually obtain.

6. Although the members of a patrol will know and have practised their IA drills, a patrol may be accompanied by other people who have only a little knowledge of these drills. In general, guides, informers and SEP should be kept strictly under command and in view of the commander. They must be briefed as thoroughly as possible before the patrol starts. (See Chapter VIII, Section 6).

7. **Silent Signals.**—For success, IA drills depend on speed and silence. Silent hand signals are therefore essential. They are contained in Appendix *A* to this Chapter.

Section 3.—ACTION ON ENCOUNTER

The Immediate Ambush

1. This drill is designed to deal with an ideal situation, when there is no problem of gaining the initiative but rather one of making the best use of such initiative. It is a drill which depends on a very high standard of discipline and training—and the ideal circumstances. Given these factors the killing potential is extremely high.

2. There will be occasions when a patrol, without being seen itself, sights a CT party approaching either on the same track, across a clearing, or in jungle. It is obviously advantageous to allow the CT to approach as close as possible before opening fire on them. There may be time only for a silent signal to be passed through the patrol for an immediate ambush. It remains then for the men of the patrol to move quietly and quickly into the positions indicated and for the signal to open fire to be given when

the CT reach a position in which they are most vulnerable. Essentials are:—

(*a*) Discipline to ensure that no shot is fired in the excitement when CT are first sighted.

(*b*) Clearly understood silent signals, which must reach the last man in the patrol.

(*c*) Quick silent movement and concealment.

(*d*) Control by the commander, who will normally spring the ambush.

3. An immediate ambush should be sited only on one side of the CT line of advance to avoid confusion.

4. As many CT are possible must be allowed to enter the ambush area. The signal to open fire will be given by the patrol commander but troops must be trained to open fire as soon as the CT give indications that they have discovered the patrol's presence. At the first sign of the CT turning to run or signalling to other CT behind them, every man must fire of his own accord and the ambush will then turn into an immediate assault.


5. Diagram 1 and the notes following the diagram explain the drill.

DIAGRAM 1

IMMEDIATE AMBUSH

By a Patrol of Section Strength.

Key: B =Support Group.
A =Assault Group.
G =Guides.
AC=Patrol commander.
S =Scouts (Recce Group).



NOTES

1. Ringed symbols indicate ambush positions of patrol members. CT must be allowed to reach point.

2. This drill can be used only when CT are moving towards the Patrol and have NOT seen our own troops.

3. The leading scout passes a silent signal back as soon as he sees CT approaching. The patrol commander then gives the silent signal for Immediate Ambush.

4. Sometimes when the CT are very close before the leading scout sees them, there may not be time for this. The section commander must, therefore, be prepared to delegate to the leading scout the responsibility for giving the silent "Immediate Ambush" signal. (The importance of the leading scout being a highly trained soldier should be remembered).

5. On seeing this signal the leading group must immediately get under cover from view and remain still even if they have not assumed a good fire position. The CT may be too close to allow sufficient time for fire positions to be adjusted.

6. Other groups further down the patrol will have more time to choose good positions, the siting of the LMG being of great importance.

7. The signal to open fire will normally be given by the patrol commander who should be able to see when the LMG has a good target. Nevertheless everyone must be ready to open fire if the CT becomes aware of the ambush before the signal has been given.

8. There must be a pre-arranged signal to cease fire. It is suggested that voice control or whistle by the commander constitutes the best cease fire signal under these circumstances.

The Immediate Assault

6. This drill is used when our troops and the CT become aware of each other at the same time.

7. Should all the CT engaged NOT be killed, the assault and follow up may well strike a CT camp or resting place. Alternatively, if a patrol is fired on by a single CT and an immediate assault results, the single CT may well turn out to be a sentry placed outside a CT camp perimeter and once again the assault may lead into the camp. For these reasons the Immediate Assault should always be considered in relation to an Immediate Assault on a CT camp.

8. As contacts are often made at some distance from a CT camp, the Immediate Assault is considered as a separate drill, but the facts set out in para. 7 must be kept in the forefront of the commander's mind.

9. As the name suggests, the drill is a controlled and immediate frontal attack led directly at the CT.

10. The assault will probably start with the first member of the patrol, who may or may NOT be the leading scout, sighting the CT, firing at the CT and shouting 'CT front (left or right) charge'.

11. The commander must control the distance to which the assault is allowed to go. The assault should continue until there is no CT in sight. In close country a very careful search should be made of the area where contact was lost as the CT may have gone to ground. After the search the patrol should follow up any tracks found. This is the time when a tracking dog, if accompanying the patrol, can be employed to its best advantage.

12. It is essential that the assault should be pressed home by the whole patrol. If the ground allows, the GF rifle can be used to good advantage by immediately putting down grenades on or in the rear of the CT. Remember, however, that our reactions must never be stereotyped. For example, the immediate assault presents to the CT a chance of luring our patrols into an ambush. On contact, if the patrol has been in single file, it should shake out into line. The advantages of line are:—

(*a*) More men can search for and engage CT.

(*b*) There is less chance of ambush.

(*c*) More ground is covered, should the CT go to ground.

13. The immediate assault must be applied in the event of a patrol being totally within an ambush in open country. On these occasions, when through lack of cover, manœuvre is precluded, a determined and immediate assault by the survivors is usually the only solution to the problem.

The Immediate Assault on a CT Camp

14. This drill is applied only when a patrol:—

(*a*) Contacts a sentry on a CT camp, resulting in an Immediate Assault which reaches the edge of that camp

OR

(*b*) Contacts several CT and the resulting assault leads the patrol on to a camp.

15. It is stressed that the drill will NOT be used when a patrol locates a CT camp and the patrol is unobserved by the CT. For action when the patrol is unobserved, see Chapter XII.

16. The normal CT protection drill for their camps is as follows:—

(*a*) The sentry either fires at the SF as they approach his post or else he moves back unseen to the camp.

(*b*) On hearing firing or on receiving information from their sentries the CT, who are always prepared, immediately disperse into the jungle and reassemble at a prearranged RV.

(*c*) Sometimes, particularly in the larger and better organized camps, one or more counter attacks are put in after the SF have entered the camp. These counter attacks are seldom pressed home with determination although a great deal of ammunition is usually expended.

(*d*) In well defended camps, when held in strength, the CT may stand and fight in dug-in positions, or fight a delaying action to cover the withdrawal of a CT VIP *(*d*).

17. If a camp is located, as the result of an unexpected contact as opposed to reconnaissance, the following drill (see Diagram 2) is suggested:—

(*a*) *Recce Group.*—

(i) Leading scout shouts 'CT Camp' in a loud voice.

(ii) Recce Group gets into a fire position and returns fire as necessary.

(iii) Recce Group awaits the arrival of the assault group.

(*b*) *Support Group.*—

(i) On hearing the shout 'CT Camp' the Support Group moves up as quickly as possible to a position whence the LMG can return the fire of any CT in the camp.

(ii) The Support Group will fire one magazine from the LMG at any visible CT or, failing that, will sweep the camp with one magazine from the LMG. They will not fire more than one magazine without orders from the patrol commander.

(iii) After the assault has gone in, the Support Group will move into the best position in the camp to beat off any counter attack.

Note:—The firing of one Magazine, besides its lethal effect, will also indicate the position of the LMG to the Assault Group.


(*c*) *Assault Group.*—

(i) On hearing the shout 'CT Camp', the Assault Group will move quickly into line with, and on right or left of the Recce Group.

(ii) The patrol commander will then shout 'CHARGE', and the Recce and Assault Groups will assault through the camp in line, and on as wide a front as possible.

DIAGRAM 2

IMMEDIATE ASSAULT ON CT CAMP



NOTE

After the assault patrol immediately reorganises and prepares against counter attack.

18. Pursuit by the Recce and Assault Groups is continued until contact is lost after which the patrol re-organises against a possible counter attack. The camp and its vicinity is searched for:—

(*a*) CT casualties.

(*b*) Arms, ammunition, stores and documents.

(*c*) Food dumps.

(*d*) CT tracks and blood-trails.

The procedure thereafter for the follow up is considered and deliberate and cannot be taught as a drill.

Section 4.—COUNTER AMBUSH

The Encircling Attack

1. The encircling attack is the correct reaction to a CT ambush and is based on the normal principles of fire and movement, taught in basic section leading. The difference lies in the speed at which the manœuvre is carried out.

2. The CT do not like having their line of withdrawal cut. By cutting it we undermine their confidence and prevent them escaping.

3. Our formations are designed so that part only of a patrol should be caught in an ambush. If these formations are practised and the distances correctly observed, the patrol commander and his reserve should not be involved in the opening burst of fire.

4. It may be that speed of movement dictates the use of tracks and in consequence troops must be prepared for an ambush. This drill is designed to counter an ambush when a track or defile must be used.

5. As he advances the patrol commander should be constantly appreciating ground and thus when the recce group comes under fire the patrol commander's mind should already be made up. He must now take control of the battle by shouting 'Encircling Attack —LEFT or RIGHT—follow me'. This should be all that is necessary. The troops will have practised the drill and will know their positions in the assault—they will not have had time to go to ground or get out of control.


6. This drill is NOT suitable for action on encountering a CT patrol.

7. Diagram 3 and the notes following it explain the drill.

DIAGRAM 3

ENCIRCLING ATTACK

Key: B = Support Group.
A = Assault Group.
G = Guides.
PC = Patrol commander.
S = Scouts (Recce Group).



NOTES

1. Dotted lines indicates route taken by members of the patrol who are not pinned to the ground in the opening burst of fire.

2. Survivors of the leading group/groups fire back at the CT after moving their positions. This leading group should always be a tactical bound ahead of the patrol commander.

3. This drill can be worked in reverse if CT allow the leading elements of a patrol to pass and take on the rear elements.

Appendix A

SILENT SIGNALS

These signals are additional to those normally taught, e.g. advance, halt, close, turn about, and double.

Meaning	*Signal*
1. Seen or suspected CT	... Thumb pointed towards the ground from a clenched fist.
2. No CT in sight or All Clear or OK	... Thumb pointed upwards from a closed fist.
3. Support group ...	... The clenched fist.
4. Recce group ...	... The clenched fist with forefinger upright.
5. Rifle group ...	... The Victory Sign.
6. Section Commander	... Two fingers held against arm to indicate Cpl's chevrons.
7. Platoon Commander	... Two fingers held on the shoulder to indicate Lieut's stars.
8. You	... Point at man concerned.
9. Me	... Indicate the chest.
10. Give covering fire ...	... Weapon brought into the aim.
11. Track Junction ...	... Arms crossed.
12. House or hut ...	... Hands formed into an inverted V to indicate the shape of a roof.
13. Recce	... Hand held up to eye as though using a monacle.
14. Attack	... Clenched fist swung vigorously in direction attack is required.
15. Immediate ambush ...	... Hand placed over face followed by pointing to place for ambush.

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8. You	Point at man concerned.
9. Me	Indicate the chest.
10. Give covering fire	Weapon brought into the aim.
11. Track Junction	Arms crossed.
12. House or hut	Hands formed into an inverted V to indicate the shape of a roof.
13. Radio	Hand held up to eye as though using a monocle.
14. Attack	Clenched fist swung vigorously in direction attack is required.
15. Immediate ambush	Hand placed over face followed by pointing to place for ambush.

CHAPTER XI

THE AMBUSHING OF CT

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

1. More CT are killed in ambushes than in any other form of contact. Even so many CT who are ambushed escape. From May 53 until April 54, 432 CT were ambushed. 213 of these were killed and 219 escaped. While this is a great improvement over previous figures, it is clear that ambush technique can still be greatly improved. Every ambush sprung must be based on sound and detailed planning.

2. This chapter sets out a basic doctrine for the planning of ambushes laid as a result of information or suspicion, or as part of a large scale operational plan. The aim of such an ambush is to contact the CT under circumstances of the attackers' choosing.

3. The majority of ambushes in Malaya are laid as a result of intelligence provided by SEPs, informers and chance information. This is often unreliable and inaccurate, particularly in respect of ground, time and distance. Commanders must always take this into consideration and not become despondent if a carefully laid ambush fails to achieve its object.

4. Action by SF when sighting approaching and unwitting CT is dealt with in Chapter X, IA Drills.

Section 2.—THE PRINCIPLES OF AMBUSHING

1. To achieve success, spontaneous co-ordinated action on surprised CT held within a well covered killing area is needed. This requires:—

(*a*) A high standard of training in ambush technique.
(*b*) Careful planning and briefing.
(*c*) First class security in all stages of the ambush.
(*d*) Intelligent layout, siting and concealment.
(*e*) A high standard of battle discipline throughout the operation.
(*f*) Determination by all members of the ambush party to wait and kill.
(*g*) Simple clear cut plan for springing the ambush.
(*h*) Good shooting.

Section 3.—THE LAYOUT OF AMBUSHES

Principles

1. There are two fundamental principles of general layout:—
   (*a*) All possible approaches should be covered.
   (*b*) The ambush must have depth.

2. **Approaches.**—Information may frequently give the destination of the CT but will rarely give the exact route they will take. However good information may be, CT have a flair for arriving from an unexpected direction. This has caused a high failure rate in our ambushes. It is therefore essential that all possible approaches be covered.

3. **Depth.**—At the first burst of fire CT scatter with remarkable rapidity and the chances of getting a second burst from the same position are small. It is important, therefore, that groups should be so sited that when the CT scatter after the first burst, subsequent groups take a progressive toll of any survivors.

The Ambush Group

4. An ambush is made up of a series of small groups of men. The size of these groups will vary, but two to six men can be taken as a guide.

5. The group should be self contained. A leader must be nominated and arrangements made for rest. It is not possible for men to remain alert for six to eight hours. One or two men in a group will be listening and watching, while the others rest in the ambush position. By rest, is meant that a man relaxes in his position, resting his eyes and ears. This should eliminate fidgeting and dozing.

6. In siting the men of his group the commander must:—
   (*a*) Consider concealment as his first priority. Movement in the area must be kept to a minimum, even at the expense of indifferent fire positions. Each man should enter his position from the rear. The group commander must ensure that all traces of movement into the position are removed or concealed.
   (*b*) Ensure that the man detailed to spring the ambush has a good view of the killing ground.
   (*c*) Ensure that other men of the group will have good fire positions when they break through their concealment, i.e. to stand up to engage moving CT.
   (*d*) Site his men in a position of all round defence.

(*e*) Choose his own position for maximum control of his group.

(*f*) Organise a simple and clear system for alerting his group.

Types of Ambush


7. Groups may be employed in two ways, bearing in mind the principles of layout:—

(*a*) Where there is more than one approach, all must be covered. Approaches should be covered in depth to catch CT scattering from the position which springs the ambush. Such an ambush is known as an AREA AMBUSH (see Diagram 1). It consists of a series of small groups, each with its own commander, sited as part of an overall plan to encompass a particular CT party which is expected. The groups may be laid out as limited ambushes (see 7(*b*) below). Area ambushes have proved much more successful than limited ambushes.

(*b*) When, because of the ground, there is only one likely approach, a group or groups may be sited in depth with all round defence at a place on that route which gives adequate concealment. This is a LIMITED AMBUSH (see Diagram 2). It is used when the area ambush is impossible or as part of an area ambush, along a very likely approach track.

DIAGRAM 1

AREA AMBUSH



NOTES

1. Information received that CT will contact Tappers at or near track junction 'D'.

2. It is decided that CT will probably approach through primary jungle along side of slope. Alternative approaches are 'A' to 'D', 'B' to 'D', 'C' to 'D' or through rubber.


3. Ambush groups are posted at 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E'.

4. If CT approach from 'A' to 'D', 'A' will allow them to pass through.

5. 'D' will probably spring ambush. CT will scatter and may run into 'A', 'C' (both downhill) or 'B'. If they hit 'A' or 'C' they may rebound along stream on to 'E'.

DIAGRAM 2

LIMITED AMBUSH



NOTES

1. A camp is known to be in an area approximately 1,000 yards square.

2. Information has been received that a party of three CT will collect subscriptions from tappers. The party will approach along the line of the stream. The ambush is therefore sited along this stream.

3. The ambush could be improved by siting the LIMITED AMBUSH as one element of an AREA AMBUSH thus covering all approaches.

Section 4.—THE SEQUENCE OF LAYING AN AMBUSH

1. **Planning.**—Many factors affect a plan for ambush. The following are common to all ambushes.

(*a*) *Information.*—Information on the ambush area can be obtained from maps, previous patrol reports, Police, SEPs and air photos.

(*b*) *Clearance.*—Movements of other SF in the area must be considered.

(*c*) *Time Factor.*—The necessity of being unseen, coupled with knowledge of the habits of the local population will dictate the time at which it is safe to move into the ambush area.

(*d*) *Security.*—The CT have a good intelligence system. Intentions of our own troops must be disguised from the start, e.g. by moving out to the ambush position by dark, and making false moves. The telephone should not be used when discussing plans for an ambush. A cover plan should always be made when time is available.

(*e*) *Ground.*—All possible approaches should be considered. When considering likely ambush sites such as defiles and water crossings, the obvious should be avoided.

2. **Preparation for Ambush.—**

(*a*) Success depends on adequate preparation. The time available for preparation is often limited. Certain items must therefore be kept in a state of constant readiness, e.g.:—

(i) Weapons must be kept zeroed and tested.

(ii) Ammunition, magazines and chargers must be kept clean and frequently emptied and refilled.

(*b*) Preparation on receipt of information should include:—

(i) Thorough briefing.

(ii) Rehearsal, when time allows.

(iii) Firing practice, if time allows.

(iv) Final checking of weapons.

3. **Briefing.**—All members of the ambush party must be fully briefed. It is suggested that briefing be divided into two parts:—

(*a*) Preliminary briefing at static location. This should include the items shown in Appendix *A* to this Chapter.

(*b*) Final briefing in the area of actual ambush by the commander of that ambush. This will be kept to the minimum but must include:—

(i) General area of each group including direction of fire.

(ii) Orders for springing the ambush.

(iii) Orders on completion of ambush.

4. **Siting.—**

(*a*) *Area Ambush.*—

(i) The ambush commander will first choose the killing ground and the general area of each group from his personal knowledge of the area, aided by maps and air photos. He will lay down the directions of fire for each group in order to obtain the maximum fire effect from the weapons at his disposal, and to ensure safety to his own troops. He will nominate the RV and give the administrative plan.

(ii) The ambush party then moves to a dispersal point from which groups then move by carefully selected routes to their various group positions. The ambush commander may only be able to site one position in detail, leaving the remainder to be sited by group commanders.

(iii) Each group commander will then carry out his reconnaissance, siting, and issue of orders.

(*b*) *Limited Ambush.*—On reaching the ambush area, the commander will:—

(i) Make his reconnaissance to choose a killing ground and consider the extent of his position bearing in mind that CT move with intervals varying from 10—50 yds. A killing ground of 60—100 yds. is desirable. The ambush position should offer concealment but should not be too obviously a position suited to ambush.

(ii) Ensure that the man nominated to spring the ambush has a good view of the killing ground.

5. **Occupation.**—The occupation of an ambush position should be carried out with great care. All routes made by the ambush party must be carefully concealed. Remember that suspicious items

such as paper scraps, foot prints, and bruised vegetation put CT on their guard. It is frequently necessary to wear PT shoes or have bare feet for the move into the positions. When allotting tasks and fields of fire for weapons it is seldom possible to site each weapon with a good field of fire. Each individual must be able to see his arc of responsibility and must be prepared to fire from any position, on the ambush being sprung.

6. **The Wait-Control.**—Once a group is in position there must be no sound or movement. This is a test of training and battle discipline. Men must be trained to get into a comfortable position and remain still for long periods. During the wait weapons must be cocked and in a state of instant readiness to fire (i.e. safety catches forward).

7. **Springing the Ambush.**—The ambush should be sprung when all possible CT are in the killing ground and the range has been reduced to the minimum. There must be no half-heartedness or premature action. All men must clearly understand the orders and drill for opening fire:—

(*a*) The principle to be observed when springing an ambush is that fire should NOT be opened so long as CT are moving towards someone in a better position to kill. A limited ambush will normally be sprung by the commander when he estimates that the leading CT is moving out of the ambush.

(*b*) Should any CT act as though he has spotted the ambush, any man who sees this should spring the ambush.

(*c*) All shots must be aimed to kill. Once fire has been opened targets become more difficult and to cope with moving targets men may have to stand up.

(*d*) *Cease fire.*—A signal must be arranged to stop firing, so that immediate follow up action and search can start as soon as CT become impossible to engage.

(*e*) *The search.*—When the ambush has been sprung men who have been previously detailed will search the immediate area under cover of ambush weapons and covering each other. They will:—

(i) Check CT in the killing area and secure any who is still living.

(ii) Search surrounding area for dead and wounded.

(iii) Collect arms, ammunition and equipment.

8. A definite signal for calling off the ambush must be arranged. This is particularly important in area ambushes and night ambushes in order to avoid groups running into other ambush parties. No movement to contact an ambush *in situ* should ever take place in darkness.

9. **Rendezvous.**—An easily found RV must be selected at which troops will rally at the end of an action on the receipt of the prearranged signal. This item cannot be stressed too strongly as several officers and men have been killed when returning to collect a man left in ambush.

Section 5.—PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS

1. Cases have occurred where soldiers and police are shot by parties of SF which are waiting to ambush the CT on information.

2. The primary cause is that the ambush party is keyed up to expect the arrival of the CT in the area of the ambush and on seeing any movement fire is opened. The conditions are such that it is not possible for them to recognise the identity of the people fired at.

3. Once an ambush has been set there should be no movement of any kind by our own forces anywhere near the ambush position unless the fact that fresh information may be forthcoming is known to every single member of the ambush party.

4. Where it is essential for such movement to take place it must be very carefully planned and rehearsed. In all other cases once clearance has been given for the ambush to take place no movement of any kind is to be allowed.

5. It is important to ensure that fire discipline is observed in ambush operations in close country as in any other form of operations.

Section 6.—GENERAL

1. **Training.**—As ambushing is a most successful means of killing CT, time must be given to training for it. This is particularly important for group leaders. Training must be aimed at eliminating common faults and improving technique. Its objects are to:—

(*a*) Achieve silence and stillness in ambush.

(*b*) Train troops to occupy ambush positions without advertising their presence by smells (curry, chewing gum,

cigarettes), by paper scraps, crushed vegetation, and foot prints.

(*c*) Ensure good siting of weapons, and positioning of commanders.

(*d*) Improve fire control and particularly the even distribution of fire.

(*e*) Practise clear, well understood drills for springing ambushes, follow up and search.

(*f*) Ensure accurate shooting at difficult moving targets.

(*g*) Improve care of weapons and eliminate stoppages.

2. **Dogs.**—A great many CT, wounded in ambush, get away. In many cases they probably escape by rushing into the undergrowth and lying low until the hue and cry has died down and they can crawl away. Many wounded CT have been tracked by dogs and captured by SF.

3. The existence of a blood trail offers an excellent opportunity for the use of a dog. It is therefore suggested that, where possible, a follow up party, including a tracking dog or dogs, should stand by in camp, (if it is not too far away) to be moved out when shooting announces that the ambush has been sprung, thus allowing the dogs to be set onto a fresh scent.

4. Dogs should not be kept in an ambush position because they pant, make other noises and may be smelly. However, if used they will invariably be alert before any human.

5. **Administration—Long Term Ambushes.**—Eighty per cent of ambushes are sprung within nine hours of setting and require no administration other than arrangements for rest within groups. These are called short term ambushes and are the normal ambush.

6. Where ambushes are set for periods of more than twelve hours they become long term ambushes and administrative arrangements for relief of groups for feeding and sleeping are necessary. Such an ambush may be placed on the approaches to a cultivation area which is ready for harvesting, or on the approaches to a known CT camp.

7. In long term ambushes an administrative area must be set up. It should be sited at least 500 yards from the ambush position, far enough to avoid noises and smells disclosing the presence of troops. Communication lines may have to be cleared and swept to enable silent reliefs to be carried out. Water should be available.

8. Careful consideration must be given to the problem of reliefs, particularly in the case of the area ambush. Normally the relief will come from the administrative area along the communication lines. Although the whole party in the ambush will eventually be relieved, only one fire position should be changed at a time in case CT come during this period. The reliefs should take place when no CT movement is expected.

9. The ideal is that ambushes should be divided into three parties, one in the ambush position, the reserve, and the party at rest. On relief the party at rest takes over the ambush position; the men in the position go to the reserve; and the reserve goes to the rest area.

10. If the party is less than six and the duration of the ambush long, the whole party should be withdrawn during set periods to rest. Such a party would be responsible for its own security when resting.

11. When an ambush party is over six, but not large enough to carry out the three group method, sufficient men for all round observation should man the ambush. The others move away from the ambush position, post sentries and rest. This party at rest will act as reserve and will not, therefore, go far away. It will not be able to smoke and its food will be pre-cooked.

Section 7.—AMBUSH BY NIGHT

1. **General.**—The doctrine for day ambush also applies to night ambush. In darkness concealment is easy, but shooting is obviously less accurate. Much therefore depends on good siting of weapons so that the killing ground is interlaced with fire.

2. **Factors.**—The following factors apply to night ambushes.

(*a*) The maximum use should be made of automatic fire. At night carbines are of far more use than rifles. Shotguns are also very useful.

(*b*) In darkness all weapons, particularly LMGs firing down tracks, should have their left and right arcs of fire fixed by means of sticks to eliminate danger to own troops.

(*c*) The ambush party must never move about. Any movement will be regarded as CT.

(*d*) Clear orders, precise fire control instructions, clear RVs and signals are essential.

(*e*) Men and groups will be sited closer together than by day. Control at night is all important and therefore an area ambush will seldom be possible.

(*f*) It is difficult to take up an ambush position at night. Where possible, therefore, it should be occupied before last light.

3. **The Torch Lighting Method.—**

(*a*) The firer uses a torch attached to his weapon with the beam zeroed to coincide with the MPI of the shots at 20 yds. The switch for the torch can be strapped to the pistol grip. Thus one hand can switch on the torch and press the trigger. The torch attachments have been issued to units. As an interim measure an ordinary hand torch attached to the barrel with the switch operated by the left hand is effective.

(*b*) Using this method CT can be quickly found with the torch beam and, as soon as the beam illuminates the target, the weapon can be fired. The MPI of the bullets must be zeroed with the beam. The sights of the weapon are not used. The weapon can be fired from any position.

(*c*) A disadvantage is that the firer's position is disclosed as soon as he has switched on the torch. It is therefore important that as soon as the ambush is sprung, preferably by the commander switching on his torch, all other torches are switched on immediately. The torch should be kept on for the minimum time.

(*d*) The maximum range up to which effective fire can be applied is aproximately 50 yds.

(*e*) Care must be taken to ensure adequate safety for the search party if they use torches, as they will present good targets to any CT lurking in the area.

Section 8.—WISDOM IN RETROSPECT

1. The following are some reasons for failure which have been reported by ambush commanders. These may help in the training for and mounting of future ambushes:—

(*a*) 'Disclosure of the ambush by the noise made by cocking weapons and moving safety catches or change levers.' Check your weapons, practise men in their silent handling and ensure that all weapons are ready to fire.

(*b*) 'There was a tendency to shoot high at the light face of the terrorist'. This must be corrected on the jungle range.

(*c*) 'Disclosure of the ambush position by footprints made by the ambush party moving into position and by movement of individuals at the crucial time, when the CT are approaching.'

(*d*) 'There was a lack of fire control and commanders were unable to stop the firing and start the immediate follow up.'

(*e*) 'Commmanders were badly sited with consequent lack of control.'

(*f*) 'There was a lack of all round observation resulting in CT arriving in the area of an ambush unannounced.'

(*g*) 'There were misfires and stoppages through failure to clean, inspect and test weapons and magazines.'

(*h*) 'There was a lack of a clearly defined drill for opening fire and orders were contradictory.'

(*i*) 'There was a tendency for all to select and fire at the same target.'

2. This Chapter deals with principles which may have to be adapted to suit special circumstances, but the mistakes referred to above should be avoided.

Appendix A

AMBUSH ORDERS—AIDE MEMOIRE (m)

REMEMBER SECURITY—DO NOT USE THE TELEPHONE. DO NOT ALLOW MEN OUT AFTER BRIEFING.

Suggested Headings

Situation

1. (*a*) *Topography.*—Use of air Photographs, Maps and Local Knowledge Consider Use of a Guide.

(*b*) *CT.*—

(i) Expected Strength.
(ii) Names and anticipated order of march. Photographs.
(iii) Dress and weapons of individuals.
(iv) Which is the VIP.
(v) What are habits of party concerned

(*c*) *SF.*—

(i) Guides or SEP to accompany.
(ii) What other SF are doing.

(*d*) *Clearance.*—

(i) Challenge.
(ii) Password.
(iii) Identifications.

(*e*) *Civilians.*—

(i) Locations.
(ii) Habits.

Mission

2. This must be clear in the mind of every man especially when a particular CT is to be killed.

Execution

3. (*a*) Type of layout.
(*b*) Position and direction of fire of groups.
(*c*) Dispersal point.
(*d*) Weapons to be carried.
(*e*) Composition of groups.
(*f*) Timings and routes.
(*g*) Formations during move in.
(*h*) Orders re springing.
(*i*) Distribution of fire.
(*j*) Use of grenades.
(*k*) Action on ambush being discovered.
(*l*) Order to cease firing.
(*m*) Orders re immediate follow up.

(*n*) Orders for search.

(*o*) Deliberate follow up.

(*p*) Signal to call off ambush.

(*q*) Rendezvous.

(*r*) Dogs—if any.

(*s*) Deception plan.

(*t*) Alerting.

Administration and Logistics

4. (*a*) Use of transport to area.

(*b*) Equipment and dress:—
Footwear for move in.

(*c*) Rations—if any.

(*d*) Special equipment:—
(i) Night lighting equipment.
(ii) Cameras.
(iii) Finger print equipment.

(*e*) Medical:—
(i) First field dressing, J. packs.
(ii) Medical Orderly.
(iii) Stretcher and ambulance.

(*f*) Reliefs.

(*g*) Administrative Area, if required Orders re cooking, smoking.

(*h*) Transport for return journey.

(*i*) INSPECTION OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT:—
(i) Men with colds not to be taken.
(ii) Is zeroing of weapons correct.
(iii) Is ammunition fresh?
(iv) Are magazines properly filled?

Command and Signals

5. Success signal.

CHAPTER XII

THE LOCATION AND ATTACKING OF CT IN CAMPS AND CULTIVATIONS

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

1. The action taken when a CT camp is unexpectedly encountered (the CT sentry firing) is described in Chapter X and it will be appreciated that the Immediate Assault is the only answer under those circumstances. However, it has been proved over a period of years that such an attack seldom succeeds in killing many CT in the camp because they make good their escape immediately after the CT sentry fires the first shot. *(*e*)

2. The deliberate method described in this Chapter will result, if carried out successfully, in the extermination or capture of every CT in a camp or cultivation. To ensure success it requires both training and rehearsal.

3. Although, for simplicity, the remainder of this Chapter refers only to camps, the method of attacking a CT cultivation is the same.

Section 2.—SIGNS OF CT

1. CT disclose their presence by tracks, marks on the ground and noise. It is therefore essential that every man should be able to recognise the marks of the passage of CT, even when made by only one or two. CT seldom use permanent tracks. Some men will be better than others at tracking, but all can, with training, spot the more obvious signs of CT passage, e.g. disturbed vegetation, foot-prints in soft ground and the marks of a water point on a stream bank.

2. Noise is an important factor in locating CT. Men patrolling must listen carefully all the time. CT do make a noise. They use wood for cooking and their biggest give-away is the noise of chopping. They also cough, talk and rattle tins like any other human beings.

Section 3.—THE SEARCH

1. A great deal of tactical skill and patience are necessary to discover CT in their camp. This is done, as in other theatres when exact locations are not known, by reconnaissance patrols.

2. Although the suspected area of a camp may be known, only by careful and often prolonged searching of the area will the camp be located on the ground. At the same time a force must be at hand to take immediate action on receipt of information from reconnaissance patrols.

3. A well commanded company is the ideal size of force for this type of operation, though the task can on occasion be undertaken by as few as thirty to forty men.

4. Once the force has moved into the suspected area, the commander sends out reconnaissance patrols in the direction in which he judges the camp to be. The paths of these patrols radiate from their base like the ribs of a fan, on compass bearings at intervals of 10 degrees. There may be as many as eight or nine patrols. There will seldom be less than five.

5. Each patrol consists of three or, at most, four men. The men wear no equipment and carry no rations. They carry only their weapons, ammunition, maps and compasses. They search silently and must remain alert all the time. The lightness of their equipment tends to limit their radius of action but is basic to this method of working. The whole search may take days or even weeks, yet men patrolling must remain as fresh and alert as possible. Even lightly equipped, the task is an exhausting one. Each patrol must therefore be out for limited periods only and must be changed frequently.

6. The distance that reconnaissance patrols move away from base may vary but, as a rough guide, they can be told to move out for approximately two to three hours. They then return on the back bearing of their outward route. Men new to this type of patrolling may be allowed to bend twigs over as they go, to assist their return. This must be done with care or a CT crossing their path will learn of their presence in the area; it must be stopped as soon as men are confident in their ability to find their way by compass alone.

7. The reconnaissance patrols move slowly and silently, pausing frequently to listen. On their skill depends the success of the operation. If and when they find traces of CT they must try to establish what the commander wants to know:—

(*a*) How many CT were there.

(*b*) How old are the signs.

(*c*) Where are the signs.

(*d*) In what direction were the CT moving.

8. Having found traces of CT and the answers to these questions, the patrol should return immediately to base. It is unwise to be dogmatic about this but, if CT are close at hand, the company commander must be informed and must direct all future action. An unwise move by a junior leader may disclose the presence of the attacking force. Above all, a reconnaissance patrol must never move along the track it has discovered.

9. Now it is the job of the company commander to conduct further searches. He will often himself cast forward, accompanied by two or three men, in the direction taken by the CT, or towards the noise. Listening becomes vitally important, since noise may disclose the CT camp, if it is near.

10. The search does not always follow this pattern. It is possible that a reconnaissance patrol may return having actually located the camp. In any event, once the camp is located, the next step is for the company commander and his 'O' group to view the camp, guided, if possible, by the patrol commander who found it.

Section 4.—THE ATTACK

1. The extent to which the company commander can show his 'O' group the actual camp must depend on the situation. He would obviously like to show it to them all, but care must be taken to avoid possible sentries or in any way disclosing the presence of the force.

2. Meanwhile, the main body should have been moved up to a position of readiness for the attack. The movement of troops into position demands extreme stealth; all equipment and packs should be dumped and, in the final phase, men should carry only their weapons and ammunition.

3. The attacking force will be divided into:—

(*a*) An assault party.

(*b*) A cut-off party.

4. The task of the assault party is to flush the CT. This party can normally be small, as the usual reaction of CT is to flee in all directions (except up hill) when attacked. However, where a camp is equipped with prepared defences, a larger party, organized as for a set piece attack, may be necessary. The bulk of the force will form the cut-off party or cordon, which must be complete and as close to the camp as possible, in order to catch the CT as they scatter.

5. By virtue of previous training and rehearsal, the commander should be able to limit his orders to the—

(*a*) Composition of the assault party.

(*b*) Arcs of responsibility of sub units in the cut-off party.

He will, if possible, give these to 'O' Group during reconnaissance. However, if it has not been possible to indicate arcs, it may be necessary to move the cut-off party in one line to their positions about 100 yards distant from the camp perimeter. They will then crawl silently forward to their action stations. At least an hour must be allowed for this difficult final move.

6. Commanders must devise and practice their own drill for encircling camps. Most prefer to indicate arcs and move their cut-off party into position from opposite sides of the camp; others prefer to move in on a succession of compass bearings from a selected point. Where the camp is in a clearing, the light filtering through the trees may be used as an aid, men keeping it just visible on their flank as they move into position. Sometimes noise from the camp will help. The encircling of the camp is the crucial manœuvre and must be carried out with the greatest patience and stealth.

7. The assault must be timed to start when the cordon is complete. The assault party moves into the camp picking its targets and opening fire as it does so. As soon as fire is opened the men in the cut-off party assume the best possible fire positions and wait for targets to present themselves. There must be NO indiscriminate firing and NO movement out of their positions. If this order is observed, the cordon remains complete and the risk of accidental shooting of our own troops is negligible.

8. All men must be briefed that, if they are seen while moving into position or if it is obvious that CT are trying to escape, anyone may open fire. In that event all men double to their allotted positions.

Section 5.—GENERAL POINTS

1. When a patrol returns with information of a track, the company commander should normally wait for the remaining patrols to come back. If one has information of a track, another may have discovered the camp.

2. The commander must know the limitations of his troops. If their jungle craft is weak, he may have to limit his reconnaissance of the camp, not risking too close a move before his cordon is in position.

3. Reconnaissance patrols must be permitted to shoot if they are actually seen by CT, but disciplinary action should be taken against a patrol commander who allows fire to be opened in any other circumstances, or if he bumps into a sentry through moving along a track.

Section 6.—CONCLUSION

This method demands high standards of jungle craft and self-reliance, which can only be achieved and maintained by training and rehearsal. Mistakes may occur and chances may be missed but, when success is achieved, all the CT in a camp—instead of just the sentry—will be destroyed.

CHAPTER XIII

MOVEMENT BY ROAD

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

1. SF must constantly use the roads in Malaya and the danger of ambush by CT is ever present. The risk of such ambush varies in different parts of the country and for this reason a system of road classification has been evolved. This system is dealt with in detail elsewhere in this Chapter.

2. It is the duty of all commanders to keep the problem of counter ambush action constantly in mind and to keep themselves informed as to CT tactics and activity in any particular area. *(*f*).

3. It is also extremely important that troops appreciate the problem, take precautions against ambush, and are prepared for immediate offensive action should the need arise.

4. This Chapter deals with movement by road as it affects sub units of the infantry battalion and sets out measures which can be taken to counter any attempt by the CT to ambush military vehicles. It should be noted that these principles apply to units of other arms. In considering these measures two main principles should be borne in mind:—

(*a*) An ambush is a contact with CT and by offensive retaliatory action the opportunity must be taken to inflict the maximum casualties on them.

(*b*) The primary object of the CT in staging an ambush is to gain arms and ammunition and every effort must be made to prevent this equipment falling into their hands.

Section 2.—THE PROBLEM

1. The following paragraphs deal with the 'why, where and how' of CT action in laying a road ambush.

2. The aim of the CT in ambushing vehicles can be summarized in the following order of priority:—

(*a*) To obtain arms and ammunition, without which they cannot continue their campaign.

(*b*) To inflict casualties on the SF with the minimum risk to themselves.

(*c*) As part of a deception plan to draw off SF from another area.

(*c*) *Follow Up Group*—They seize arms and ammunition and carry them away without waiting to see the final outcome of the engagement.

(*d*) In addition there may well be protection and/or warning groups and there are always scouts and lookout men. Where CT plan to use a road block look-out men are posted from half to one mile up and down the road.

9. A great deal of care is usually apparent in the preparation of the actual ambush positions which will be dug in if there is no other means of protection from fire. Individual positions will be well concealed and fire lanes and escape tracks may be cut. The main body of the ambushing party will usually be deployed along the length of the ambush position in groups of various sizes according to the organization (as mentioned above), the nature of the ground and the kind of convoy being ambushed.

10. The CT use the bren, sten, carbine, rifle, shotgun and grenade. They may be dressed in uniform, in civilian clothes or in a mixture of both; or even as police or soldiers.

11. The CT will employ various methods to block the road. Thus he may mine the road with explosive to disable the first vehicle of a convoy, fell a tree or use a civilian vehicle. On an estate road he can also make a crater to hold up movement.

12. While CT normally carry out ambushes by day, they are prepared to lay them at night when they can deploy greater fire power because of less difficulty of concealment. These ambushes may take the form of:—

(*a*) Fairly heavy sniping at odd vehicles, on a particular section of road.

(*b*) The deliberate ambush of a convoy based on information.

(*c*) The deliberate ambush of any SF vehicle using a particular section of road on a certain day.

13. As stated in the introduction to this chapter CT will often stage an ambush as part of a deception plan. Thus they will frequently create a minor incident in order to bring the SF out in transport through an area in which a deliberate ambush has been laid. They try many tricks to conceal their intentions and numbers. For example, three CT stop a civilian vehicle, take identity cards and a few odds and ends from the occupants and send them on their way to report the incident to the police or military. A small patrol on its way to investigate in one or two vehicles may later be ambushed by 20 or 30 CT in the area of the first incident, or on the way to it.

Section 3.—COUNTERING THE PROBLEM

1. This is considered in two parts:—

(*a*) Precautionary measures to reduce the chances of being ambushed and to ensure instant readiness for action.

(*b*) Action on Contact. Immediate action drills designed to gain the initiative by offensive action.

Section 4.—PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES

The Military Classification of Roads

1. Roads in Malaya are classified in three main categories for military purposes. This classification is based on the estimated risk of CT action in the area concerned and may be adjusted from time to time according to the operational situation. The road categories are:—

(*a*) UNRESTRICTED.

(*b*) WHITE.

(*c*) BLACK.

2. UNRESTRICTED roads are those which lie within the Town Board limits of major towns. Subject to any particular restrictions which local commanders may wish to impose, military personnel are permitted to travel on these roads unarmed, in uniform or civilian clothes, and in any type of vehicle.

3. WHITE roads are those upon which there is considered to be only a very limited risk of CT ambush activity. Nearly all of the main trunk roads in Malaya come under this category. The following regulations apply to the movement of military personnel on WHITE roads:—

(*a*) All ranks travelling in military or police vehicles will be armed.

(*b*) Vehicles may move singly but every military vehicle will carry one armed man in addition to the driver.

(*c*) Military personnel may travel alone in civilian cars whether in uniform or plain clothes but must be armed when travelling on duty.

(*d*) Single and unaccompanied motor cyclists on WD machines are NOT permitted.

4. BLACK roads are those roads which are not classified as UNRESTRICTED or WHITE. The rules governing the movement of military personnel and vehicles on such roads are as follows:—

(*a*) All ranks will be armed, irrespective of the type of vehicle used or the purpose of the journey.

(*b*) Travel at night (1900 to 0830 hours) will be restricted to cases of operational necessity.

(*c*) Movement of single military 'soft' vehicles is NOT permitted and the minimum combination of military vehicles will be—two soft—one armoured and one soft—or —one armoured.

(*d*) Every vehicle whether military or civilian will carry one armed man in addition to the driver.

5. If considered necessary BLACK roads may be divided into sub categories by the Formation HQ responsible for the area concerned and additional precautions to be taken on certain sections of road may be laid down at the same time.

6. Detailed instructions on the road classification scheme and a list of UNRESTRICTED and WHITE roads in Malaya are given in HQ Malaya Command Standing Operation Instructions.

Movement of Military Convoys

7. For the purposes of these instructions a convoy is defined as a group of more than 5 vehicles.

8. There are no special regulations concerning the movement of military convoys on UNRESTRICTED roads.

9. **On WHITE roads.—**

(*a*) An armoured vehicle as escort is not considered essential.

(*b*) Convoys of up to 10 vehicles will move at normal density (i.e. 20 or 30 vtm.) and in blocks of not more than 5/6 vehicles.

(*c*) Non operational convoys of more than 10 vehicles (i.e. from units not in the combatant arms) will NOT move without the authority of the Formation HQ concerned who will make special arrangements for escort if it is considered necessary. All convoys of more than 10 vehicles will also move in blocks as in (*b*) above.

10. **On BLACK roads.—**

(*a*) Troop convoys of operational units will be primarily responsible for their own protection but the fullest use will be made of armoured vehicles as escorts according to availability.

(*b*) Groups of non operational vehicles such as RASC supply convoys will be escorted by armoured vehicles whenever possible. The scale of escort for such convoys should be one armoured vehicle to every five soft vehicles.

(*c*) Soft vehicles will move a tactical bound behind each other, i.e. approximately 150 yards apart, depending on the type of country. Armoured escort vehicles will move within this overall density so as to position themselves where they are best able to give protection.

(*d*) Non operational convoys will NOT be moved without the authority of the Formation responsible for the area concerned who will ensure that adequate arrangements are made for escorts.

11. Particular attention is directed to the convoy density on BLACK roads as given at para. 10 (*c*) above, which will also be applicable to groups of less than 5/6 vehicles. On this type of road it is important that vehicles move sufficiently close to each other to be able to render mutual assistance in case of emergency but not so close that an ambush is likely to catch several vehicles. Thus if two vehicles are moving very close together CT fire will bear on them both and neutralize offensive action from either. If, however, the second vehicle is further back its occupants may be able to debus unmolested and take rapid organized offensive action.

Unit Standing Orders for Convoys

12. Every unit should have comprehensive orders covering movement by road based on the classification system described above. These orders should state clearly who is authorised to put a convoy on the road and should cover in detail the following points:—

(*a*) The appointment and duties of convoy and vehicle commanders.

(*b*) The organisation of the convoy.

(*c*) The weapons and ammunition to be carried.

(*d*) The state of vehicles, e.g. detailed instructions regarding canopies, tailboards and windscreens.

(*e*) IA Drills.

(*f*) Security measures.

13. **Security.**—The CT intelligence system is carefully and widely organised and is very effective. It is essential, therefore, that the movement of convoys should never become a routine matter and that the maximum precautions are taken to prevent the CT gaining advance information of vehicle movement. In this connection it should be remembered that:—

(*a*) The telephone system in Malaya is not secure.

(*b*) Wireless messages in clear can be picked up on an ordinary civilian type receiver.

(*c*) The loyalty of civilian employees cannot be guaranteed, although they are subjected to screening.

(*d*) Troops tend to be talkative both inside and outside their lines.

In short, the fewer people who know about the timing, route and composition of a convoy before it sets out the better. Generally speaking, therefore, drivers and escorts should be warned as late as is possible and the use of alternative routes and other deception measures should not be overlooked.

14. **The Convoy Commander.**—A commander must be detailed for every convoy of vehicles moving by road. This will not necessarily be the senior officer or NCO travelling. The convoy commander will position himself where, according to the circumstances, he can best control the convoy. This will not necessarily be in the first or last vehicle.

15. **Briefing.**—Briefing by the convoy commander before moving off must be detailed and explicit. All drivers, vehicle commanders and if possible all men travelling in the convoy should be present at the briefing. Briefing shoud include:—

(*a*) Details of timings, route, speed, order of march, maintenance of contact and action to be taken if contact is broken.

(*b*) The distribution of men to vehicles.

(*c*) The distribution of all weapons.

(*d*) The appointment and duties of vehicle commanders and sentries.

(*e*) The action to be taken in the event of CT attack.

16. **Alertness.**—It must be impressed upon all ranks that a high degree of alertness is essential when moving along routes likely to be ambushed by the CT. Experience has shown that the idea of having different scales of alertness for different categories of road under the military classification scheme is not practicable. The policy will be, therefore, that on all roads other than those classified UNRESTRICTED the maximum degree of alertness will be maintained and EVERY MAN IN THE CONVOY MUST BE READY FOR INSTANT ACTION AT ALL TIMES.

17. **The preparation and loading of personnel carrying vehicles.**—Men travelling in a vehicle must be able to see all round them, fire their weapons or throw grenades without hindrance and debus in quick time—all with the minimum restriction of movement. For this reason the following points should be noted:—

(*a*) One ton or 3 ton vehicles should have canopies and canopy framework removed and tailboards down. Alternatively canopies can be rolled up to give overhead cover only but it should be remembered that the canopy framework does restrict the traversing of weapons, throwing of grenades or quick debussing over the sides of a vehicle.

(*b*) 14/15 is the maximum number of men which can be carried safely in the back of a 3 ton vehicle. If more than this number is carried men will be unable to use their arms effectively and in a sudden emergency are quite likely to become difficult for their vehicle commander to control. Similarly the number of men carried in other types of vehicle must be restricted to ensure freedom of movement.

18. **Vehicle Commanders.**—A commander must be detailed by name for each vehicle. His duties will be to ensure that all personnel in his vehicle are constantly on the alert and to assist in maintaining convoy formation by controlling the driver. The primary task of the vehicle commander is to command the troops in his vehicle should the convoy be ambushed and he must therefore travel in the back of the vehicle with the troops.

19. **Lookout Men.**—Although there is only one scale of alertness and all personnel travelling in a vehicle must be constantly on the alert and prepared for immediate action, it is obviously not practicable and is an unnecessary strain for everyone in a troop carrying vehicle to be scanning the road the whole time during a journey. In troop carrying vehicles, therefore, four men should be

posted as sentries or lookout men. These men should be posted two at the front and two at the rear with arcs of observation covering the 90 degrees from the centre of the road to the side in each direction. Where possible these sentries should be armed with automatic weapons and grenades. In the event of an ambush it will be their duty to cover with fire from their positions the evacuation of the vehicle should this be necessary. They can also assist in the control of the convoy by informing the vehicle commander if the next following vehicle halts or drops back.

20. **Platoon Weapons.**—LMGs, GF (EY) rifles and 2-in mortars should be distributed throughout the length of a convoy. Detailed points to be considered in connection with these weapons are:—

(*a*) *LMGs.*—The provision of an improvised mounting is recommended provided that this is so constructed that the gun can be taken off quickly. The Bren LMG on its bipod perched on the top of the cab of a vehicle is in a very insecure position and the gunner is very liable to be jolted off his feet should the vehicle swerve suddenly or the driver brake unexpectedly.

(*b*) *2-in Mortar.*—This weapon is rarely carried on patrol but can be carried easily in a vehicle and fired from it. Generally, there is overhead clearance along a road and a mortar can easily be brought into action from the roadside whilst troops move round a flank or the rear of the CT position.

(*c*) *GF (EY) Rifle.*—This can be used in the same way as the mortar, firing '36' or '80' grenades.

21. **Smoke.**—The No. 80 Phosphorus Smoke Grenade, besides producing an immediate effective smoke screen, can inflict painful phosphorous burns and can be more useful as an anti-ambush weapon than the '36' grenade.

The Scout Car

22. **Characteristics.**—The Scout Car is fitted with run flat tyres and is fully armoured, including overhead cover. It is armed with a Bren LMG mounted above the roof of the vehicle which the gunner can fire by remote control with the hatch closed above him. 100 round or normal magazines can be used but the former have been found to be unreliable and are not favoured by the majority of units. Six of the ten scout cars in each infantry battalion

are equipped with turrets. These afford the LMG gunner protection when bringing direct fire to bear on CT. The scout car carries a crew of two, i.e. driver and gunner/wireless operator.

23. **Role.**—Scout cars are issued for use as convoy escort vehicles or as Commanding Officers' or Company Commanders' vehicles. In the latter role they provide an efficient and safe means of transport for commanders and officers should regard them as personal chargers and, interest themselves in their maintenance and appearance.

24. **Close Escorts.**—When small groups of vehicles move on BLACK roads the scout car should be posted centrally in the convoy. It has been found from experience that a vehicle posted at the front or rear of a convoy in these circumstances may be prevented from moving into the ambush area by other vehicles which have been halted or by dead or wounded lying in the road.

25. **Convoy Escorts.**—When large convoys move on main roads vehicles should be divided into blocks of about 5/6 and when sufficient scout cars are available one should be placed at the rear of each block. The reasons for this are:—

(*a*) Although the LMG and PLM mounting has a 360 degree traverse it is awkward for the firer to position himself in the vehicle so that he can fire accurately to the rear.

(*b*) The particular role of the scout car in an ambush is to drive into it giving immediate fire support to those vehicles which are being attacked. Reversing or turning is a difficult and dangerous operation under fire and causes delay. Thus if the scout car is at the rear of a block of vehicles it can always move ahead and bring fire to bear forwards.

Other Armoured Vehicles

26. **Semi-armoured Vehicles.**—These are 1 ton or 3 ton GS vehicles which have been fitted with armoured cabs.

27. **Armoured troop/load carriers 3 ton.**—These vehicles are issued on a scale of 6 per British/Gurkha infantry battalion and 5 to others. They are fully armoured and are capable of carrying ten equipped men or a maximum of 30 cwts. of stores and weapons, including the Bren LMG and GF rifle which can be fired easily through the ports.

Convoy Control—Wireless

28. The WS No. 19 is always fitted in the scout car. The WS No. 88 can well be used as a link with the scout car and between other vehicles in a convoy. It must be remembered that in any ambush there will come a time when the CT will break off and retreat into the jungle. Personnel of the convoy may not themselves be able to follow up the CT and a quick wireless message to unit headquarters could well bring a follow up party to the scene before the CT have moved far—or in some cases have moved at all.

Precautionary Tactics

29. In some areas it may well be advisable for troops moving by road to stop and debus before approaching a likely ambush area in their vehicles and then to move forward on foot to clear the jungle on either side of the road. It is unlikely that such tactics will find the CT in position as they will probably move as soon as they see the troops moving towards them. Nevertheless, the very fact that troops are prone to get out of their vehicles and examine likely ambush positions on foot will become known to the local CT who will be less confident that they are going to secure easy victims without danger to themselves.

Section 5.—ACTION ON CONTACT

Introduction

1. Whatever precautions are taken and preparations are made, the ambush when it is sprung, will always be an unexpected encounter. IA Drills are simple courses of action designed to deal with the problem of the unexpected encounter. They aim at IMMEDIATE, POSITIVE and OFFENSIVE action.

2. The CT springs his ambush on ground that he has carefully chosen and converted into a position from which he can kill SF by firing at them from above often at point blank range. The principle behind the IA Drill dealt with in this Section is that it is incorrect to halt in the area which the CT have chosen as a killing ground and so covered by fire—unless one is forced to do so. The drill, therefore, is to endeavour to drive on when fired upon, to halt only when through the ambush area or before running into it, and to counter attack immediately from flank and rear.

Immediate Action Technique

3. **The Danger Zone.**—This is the area in which effective CT fire can be brought to bear. In order that the CT may not have the advantage of operating on ground of their own choosing every effort must be made to get vehicles clear of the DANGER ZONE. Thus, when vehicles are fired upon:—

(*a*) Drivers will NOT stop but will attempt to drive on out of the danger zone.

(*b*) Lookout men/sentries will fire immediately to keep the CT heads down.

(*c*) When vehicles are clear of the Danger zone they will be stopped to allow their occupants to debus and carry out offensive action.

(*d*) Following vehicles approaching the danger zone will NOT attempt to run the gauntlet of the ambush but will halt clear of the area, to allow their occupants to take offensive action.

4. **Vehicles forced to halt in the danger zone.**—Where vehicles have not been able to drive clear of the area under fire, troops will debus under the covering fire of the lookout men, which should include smoke if possible, and will make for cover on the side of the road. The actual 'baling out drill' is dealt with in greater detail later on in this Section.

Counter Attack

5. **General.**—CT are always sensitive to threats to their rear or flanks. Offensive action to produce such threats can, however, only be carried out by those troops who are clear of the danger zone. If there are no such troops then a frontal attack under cover of smoke will have to be made.

6. **Action when no troops have entered the danger zone.**—The convoy commander, or in his absence the senior vehicle commander present, will launch an immediate flanking attack on the CT position, leaving on the ground as supporting fire such weapons as LMGs, 2-in mortars and GF rifles.

7. **Action when all troops are clear ahead of the danger zone.**—In this case it will be difficult to put in an attack as quickly as in para. 6 above, because troops will be moving away from the scene of action. Nevertheless an encircling attack must be mounted as quickly as troops can be marshalled and brought back to a starting point. It is difficult to state categorically who should take the

initiative in these circumstances and it must be made clear at the Convoy Commander's briefing whether the rearmost vehicle commanders are to act on their own initiative in this type of situation.

8. **Action when some troops are clear ahead of the danger zone and others are halted short of it.**—With two parties one each side of the ambush confusion may arise as to which group should put in the attack against the CT and precious time may be wasted in getting the attack under way. If both parties attack at the same time without co-ordination, an inter unit clash may result. It is suggested therefore, that the party which has not yet entered the ambush should make the attack as in para. 6 above.

9. **Scout Car tactics.**—Usually the best way in which a scout car can assist in counter ambush action is by driving right up to the danger zone to engage the CT at very short range. In this way it will probably be able:—

(*a*) To give good covering fire to the flanking attack.

(*b*) To afford protection to any of our own troops who are caught in the CT killing ground.

10. **Platoon weapons.**—The 2-in mortar and GF rifle should be concentrated on the CT position or on his probable escape routes. In order that at least one of these weapons can be brought into play they should always be well spaced out in the convoy.

11. **Command and control.**—It is always possible that the convoy commander may be killed or wounded by the CT initial burst of fire. He may be pinned down in the killing ground or be on the wrong side of the danger zone when the ambush is sprung. In order to ensure that there is always a nominated commander on the spot, whatever the situation, it is essential that vehicle commanders understand their responsibilities for organising a counter attack. This should be clearly laid down in unit convoy orders and stressed at the briefing before moving off.

12. **Training.**—The technique outlined above should be practised again and again in varying situations until the natural reaction to a CT ambush is the application of an immediate action drill.

Section 6.—BALING OUT DRILL

1. In springing an ambush the CT first of all tries to stop one or more vehicles in his killing ground by the use of mines or obstacles and/or by firing at the tyres and driver. He then tries to kill the entire vehicle load in the first moments of surprise. To do

this he places an automatic weapon where it can cover the rear of our vehicles. It is therefore essential that when a soft vehicle is brought to a halt in a danger zone the troops debus instantly. This must be taught and practised as a drill.

2. **Vehicle loading.**—To ensure ease of debussing all packs and stores will be piled in the centre of the vehicle and excessive quantities of stores will not be loaded into vehicles which are also carrying troops.

3. **Alertness.**—The importance of alertness has already been stressed. Troops will be continuously on the alert holding their weapons at all times. Spare Bren magazines will be in the soldiers' pouches and NOT in boxes. Vehicle sentries will have primed grenades to hand ready to throw.

4. **Drill.**—When the vehicle is forced to stop:—

(*a*) The vehicle commander will shout 'DEBUS RIGHT' or 'LEFT' to indicate the direction in which troops will muster.

(*b*) Sentries will throw grenades and open fire immediately on the CT position.

(*c*) Troops will debus over both sides of the vehicle and run in the direction indicated.

(*d*) As soon as troops are clear of the vehicle sentries will debus and join the remainder.

(*e*) At this stage of the battle the aim must be to collect the fit men as a formed body for counter action. Wounded troops must be dealt with after counter action has been taken.

5. **Training.**—This drill must be practised frequently by vehicle loads, e.g. infantry sections and platoons. Where miscellaneous vehicle loads are made up before a journey, two or three practices must be held before the convoy moves off.

Section 7.—CONCLUSION

1. This Chapter has dealt basically with the problems of the road ambush and road movement generally as they affect sub-units of the infantry battalion. No attempt has been made to discuss problems peculiar to the protection of RASC supply convoys, civilian food convoys and the escorting of VIPs.

2. It is considered, however, that the principles are the same for all types of convoy. The following points, therefore, are reiterated:—

(*a*) The necessity for clear orders and detailed briefing by the Convoy Commander before moving off.

(*b*) The positioning and role of scout cars.

(*c*) The need for constant alertness on the part of all ranks.

(*d*) The need for security in planning road movements.

3. The danger of road ambush by the CT must not be allowed to become a bogey. Troops must be fully trained in IA drills and should be taught that when well prepared they are more than a match for the CT under any circumstances.

4. The outward appearance of the road convoys of a unit is a good indication of its state of operational efficiency. The CT intelligence has its observers everywhere who can read and interpret the signs of a good unit as well as we can. Thus, the more prepared and aggressive our troops are, the less likely they are to be ambushed.

CHAPTER XIV

INTELLIGENCE

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

1. The importance of intelligence in the campaign against the CT cannot be over-emphasised. Although the CT mostly carry arms and wear uniforms, they are essentially an underground organisation, and rely on stealth, security and avoidance of concentration to offset their lack of numbers and of heavy support.

2. The main counter to this technique is a first class intelligence organisation, in which everyone, not only the specialist intelligence agencies, must play their part. All troops must realise the importance of reporting as accurately as possible every piece of information which they obtain, both about the CT and the topography of the country over which they are operating. In particular it must be remembered that though a piece of information may appear by itself to be of little or no importance, it can be of considerable value when added to other information already available.

3. Since there is no state of war in MALAYA, the basic responsibility for maintaining law and order is still that of the Police. In the same way the responsibility for producing intelligence still rests with the Special Branch of the Police. In view of the size and importance of the problem, however, a special intelligence organisation has been built up.

Section 2.—OWN ORGANISATION

1. **The Director of Intelligence (D of I).**—The D of I is directly responsible to the D of O for all intelligence matters connected with the emergency. He directs and co-ordinates all intelligence activities—Civil, Police and Military.

2. **The Combined Intelligence Staff (CIS).**—This is a body consisting of four representatives of the Civil Service, the Police, the Army and the RAF, working directly under the D of I. The CIS are responsible for the production of such intelligence appreciations as may be asked for by the D of O. They are not themselves an Intelligence producing agency, but co-ordinate intelligence products obtained from various sources and make recommendations to the D of O's Committee.

3. **The Federal Intelligence Committee (FIC).**—This consists of representatives of various Government Departments (e.g. Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Labour, etc.) the Services and the Federal Police. It meets monthly under the Chairmanship of the D of I. Its main purpose is the free exchange of intelligence and information. It is not a policy making body, but is empowered to make recommendations to Government.

4. **The Special Branch of the Federal Police.**—This is the principle intelligence producing agency in Malaya. In the present Emergency, its main task is the collection, collation and dissemination of intelligence relating to the MCP. Special Branch Staff are located at Federal Police HQ, at all Police Contingent HQ and Police Circle HQ and at some Police District HQ.

5. **Service Intelligence Staffs.**—The General Staff (Intelligence), G(Int) in Malaya is organised as follows:—

(*a*) *At HQ Malaya Command Level.*—G(Int) carries out supervision of Intelligence in the Command and is the military channel for reporting incidents and information concerning our own troops, normal tactical intelligence (G(Int) (*a*)), security and counter intelligence (G(Int) (*b*)) and intelligence organisation (G(Int) (*x*)). On the G(Int) (*a*) side, it works in close co-operation with Special Branch (see also (*c*) below), with the IO forming part of the Federal Joint Ops/Info Room.

(*b*) *At Brigade and Battalion Level.*—The G(Int) staff at this level are integrated with the Police to form the staff of joint operations rooms (normally Police Contingent/Brigade and Police Circle or Independent District/Battalion), which record all tactical intelligence and transmit it, through Police channels, to the Federal Joint Ops/Info room at Police HQ in Kuala Lumpur.

(*c*) In addition a special organisation has been added to G(Int) HQ Malaya Command known as the 'Special Military Intelligence Staff (Malaya)' (SMIS). This consists of GSOs 2 (Int), GSOs 3 (Int) and Military Intelligence Officers (all known as MIOs), with a small clerical staff. The role of these officers, who are intelligence trained, is to work in the Special Branch of the Police at all levels, undertaking that part of Special Branch work which deals with tactical intelligence and the Order of Battle of the MCP (including the charting of all CT). This organisation not only assists the Special

Branch, by permitting its officers to concentrate more upon its normal counter-intelligence role, but establishes a channel for the passing of operational intelligence to the Army. This organisation has been built up in Malaya as a result of experience in the emergency and has proved the best answer to the problem posed by the situation in which Special Branch remains responsible for obtaining, collating and disseminating intelligence, whilst the Army is the main operational user.

Section 3.—INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

1. The main sources of intelligence are:—

(*a*) SEP.

(*b*) CEP.

(*c*) Captured documents.

(*d*) Identification of dead CT.

(*e*) Information supplied by agents and informers and by the general public.

(*f*) Reports by SF patrols, particularly regarding:—

(i) Wireless.

(ii) Food cultivation.

(iii) Food Dumps.

(iv) Camps.

(v) Tracks.

(vi) Arms and ammunition.

(vii) Mines and explosives.

(viii) Equipment.

(ix) Tactics.

(*g*) Visual air reconnaissance.

(*h*) Air photography and interpretation.

SEP * (n)

2. A surrendered CT is an extremely valuable source of information and can be of considerable use to Police Special Branch and for military operations. The following points must be borne in mind:—

(*a*) *Secrecy*.—The fact that a surrender has taken place must be kept secret so long as it may be possible to turn it to our advantage.

(*b*) *Handling.*—The fewer people who question a newly surrendered CT the better it is for his subsequent use. Interrogation will normally be carried out by a Police Special Branch Officer.

3. **Responsibilities.—**

(*a*) All SEPs are at all times the responsibility of the Police. The method of using them must be arranged mutually between the respective Military/Police Commanders.

(*b*) The nearest Police Special Branch Officer will normally decide whether an SEP may be used on operations. If he is not available the Military Commander who takes the surrender is responsible for ensuring that the best immediate use is made of the SEP. He must always remember that an SEP must NOT be used on immediate follow-up operations if he is likely to be of use to Special Branch; e.g. a SEP who is willing to go back alone to gain information or to procure further surrenders.

4. It is possible that on occasions the time factor appears to be so vital that sufficient time is not available for a Special Branch Officer to get to the SEPs location in order to carry out the initial interrogation. In this case the Military Commander may carry out the initial interrogation subject to the provisos in paragraph 3 above. A questionnaire is given at Appendix *A*.

CEP * (n)

5. The principles of handling are the same as in the case of SEP, but a CEP may ONLY be used on operations for a period of 48 hours after capture. The time factor in this case is therefore of primary importance. A questionnaire for CEP is given at Appendix *B*.

6. No military personnel may promise immunity from prosecution to CEP to obtain their co-operation.

Captured Documents

7. Any member of the SF who acquires CT documents will hand them over to the nearest Police Officer of the rank of Police Lieutenant or above. Where documents are found in CT packs care must be taken to see that they are not mixed but retained in the original packs as an aid to identification.

Identification of Dead CT * (o)

8. The other sources of intelligence mentioned are of obvious value. On many occasions, however (particularly in deep jungle, which is becoming of increasing importance) identification of dead CT, most of whom are now charted by Special Branch, will be the main, if not the only, means of establishing the MCP organisation in the area. It must therefore be borne in mind by SF at all times that whilst the killing of individual CT is in itself a worthwhile object, the identification of the body may be of even greater value.

9. The most reliable method of identification is by SEP already working with the SF. This can be done either by:—

(*a*) A SEP with the patrol which kills the CT.

(*b*) Bringing a SEP to the body.

(*c*) Evacuating the body to the nearest police station.

(*d*) Photographs or descriptions.

10. Methods (*a*) and (*b*) above will be rare; evacuation of the body will therefore normally be desirable. This can be achieved by one of the two following methods:—

(*a*) *By the patrol carrying the body out.*—Owing to the speed at which bodies decompose in this climate, ground evacuation will only be used when the carry is likely to take less than 8 hours.

(*b*) *By helicopter.*—Helicopters will only be used for this purpose when the carry by ground troops is more than 8 hours. Requests for helicopters will be made in the normal way (See Appendix *E* to Chapter XVII) but should include:—

(i) *Index letter G* (*Load*).—Number of bodies to be carried.

(ii) *Index letter H* (*Time and Duration*).—Latest time at which the helicopter will be of use.

(iii) *Index letter K* (*Special Instructions*).—Whether additional wrappings are required (only one is normally carried). Place to which bodies are to be taken, normally nearest Police Circle HQ.

11. If evacuation should prove impossible photographs, finger-prints and a description of the body must be taken. The important points are enumerated below.

12. **Photographs.—**

(*a*) If no camera is carried by the patrol one can be obtained through normal air supply channels.

(*b*) For successful photography of the body:—

(i) The face should be washed and hair brushed back.

(ii) A full face photograph should be taken.

(iii) The photograph should be taken at short range.

(iv) A minimum of two photographs should be taken.

13. **Fingerprints.—**Fingerprint outfits are issued to units and full instructions are included in each box. The main principle to be observed is cleanliness, both of the equipment and of the fingers whose prints are being taken.

14. **Description.—**The following are the principal characteristics required for a description:—

(*a*) Sex.

(*b*) Race.

(*c*) Apparent age.

(*d*) Height, build and facial features.

(*e*) Teeth, old scars and deformities.

Details should be as full as possible.

15. **General.—**The body must be minutely searched and all documents and other articles carried by the CT must be recovered (see paragraph 7 above).

Information from the Public

16. All members of the public who have information to give should be passed on to the Police, who alone will handle agents and informers.

17. On no account will military units run their own agents or informers.

SF Patrols

18. A great deal of tactical information is provided by SF patrols, whether sent out expressly for that purpose or acquired in the course of other duties.

19. The value of this source is immeasurably greater if:—

(*a*) Correct briefing takes place beforehand.

(*b*) Adequate training and thought has been given to the skills of careful observation and recording of important information.

(*c*) Proper de-briefing and reporting takes place as soon after the patrol's return as possible (see Appendix *C*).

20. SF reports on all the subjects enumerated at paragraph 1 (*f*) of this Section must be passed without delay to local joint operations rooms for onward transmission through Police channels where appropriate. Special notes on certain subjects are given in the succeeding paragraphs, and a proforma to assist in assessing the age of food dumps is at Appendix *D*.

CT Wireless Activity * (p)

21. It is of great importance that all captured CT wireless equipment should be recovered for inspection. In addition it is essential that any information concerning the CT use or suspected use of wireless should be reported as quickly as possible.

22. Units finding a wireless set, either transmitter/receiver or receiver, will take the following action:—

(*a*) Send a signal containing the following information:—

(i) Type of set, i.e. transmitter/receiver or receiver.

(ii) Make, name and number of set.

(iii) Grid reference where found.

(iv) Frequencies shown on dials at time of capture.

(v) Direction in which aerial was running (including compass bearing if possible).

(*b*) This signal will be sent with priority OP IMMEDIATE and security grading of SECRET as follows:—

(i) *By Police Units.*—Direct to Operations Information Branch at Federal Police HQ.

(ii) *By Military Units.*—Direct to HQ Malaya Command marked for G(Int).

(iii) In both cases a copy will be sent to Brigade/Contingent HQ.

(*c*) Send a written report in quadruplicate in confirmation, with the following additional details:—

(i) Signs of recent use.

(ii) Description of the aerial (e.g. length and height).

(iii) Description of the camp where the set was found.

(*d*) Send the equipment itself as soon as possible to G(Int) Branch (c/o Federal Police HQ). Care must be taken to ensure that the frequency dials are carefully read before the set is moved and if possible locked to prevent change during transit. The set must NOT be tampered with in any way.

23. **Wireless Interference.**—In order that wireless interference can be checked and identified the following action will be taken:—

(*a*) An immediate report on the interference will be made if possible by phone or by OP IMMEDIATE signal. This will include frequency and call sign of the interference and will be sent as in paragraph 22 above. In both cases the telephone number is Kuala Lumpur 7771 Extension 41.

(*b*) This initial report will be followed by a further report in writing as at Appendix *E*.

(*c*) Units will continue to monitor such interference until otherwise instructed.

Documents relating to wireless

24. Documents relating to wireless activity and those found in close proximity to wireless sets, will be forwarded through the usual channels but must be passed as quickly as possible.

Food Cultivation * (q)

25. With the improvement in Food Control the CT are being forced to carry out jungle cultivation as a main source of food supply. Such cultivations can be divided into two types:—

(*a*) *Aboriginal Cultivations.*—The CT in deep jungle make use of aborigines for cultivation work and it is difficult to distinguish which cultivations are CT inspired. Experts such as Protector of Aborigines can usually say whether the amount of cultivation is just sufficient for the local aborigines, or if it is so large that CT must be living off it as well; but guidance can also be found in the type of crop grown, e.g. Chinese types of vegetables, and the orderliness of the cultivation. If the crops are in neat rows and well tended they are probably destined for the CT.

(*b*) *Chinese Cultivations.*—These occur mainly away from the main mountain range and closer to the populated areas. The areas may be very small, but are usually orderly and may be surrounded with pig fencing.

26. It is clear that in order to deprive the CT of this source of food the destruction of the crops is of great importance. The means of destruction are:—

(*a*) Helicopter Spray.
(*b*) Pack Spray or CMU pellets distributed by ground troops.
(*c*) By ground troops by hand.

27. Normally the crop will have to be destroyed by hand. Where the area is so large that the patrol will be excessively delayed, helicopter spraying can be requested. If this is impossible for topographical or other reasons, pack sprayers or CMU pellets may be dropped to the ground troops. Clearance for the destruction of crops in aboriginal areas must first be obtained from the Protector of Aborigines or District Officer.

28. Patrols discovering cultivations will report:—

(*a*) Grid reference.
(*b*) Size of clearing.
(*c*) Type, e.g. Aborigine, Chinese or undetermined.
(*d*) Condition, e.g. Stage 1—Just cultivated.
Stage 2—Cut and cleared.
Stage 3—Prepared and rowed.
Stage 4—Growing crops tended.
Stage 5—Growing crops untended.
Stage 6—Harvested.
Stage 7—Disused and overgrown.

Arms and Ammunition

29. SF recovering arms and ammunition from the CT will report:—

(*a*) Description of weapon and identification numbers.
(*b*) Quantity and calibre of ammunition.
(*c*) Date of manufacture of ammunition, and whether serviceable or not.
(*d*) Whether the ammunition has been refilled, i.e. whether it has been recapped or whether the cap shows that it has previously misfired and has been reconditioned. (In the case of grenades improvised fuses will be classified as refills).

30. All arms and ammunition recovered from the CT will be handed over to the nearest Police Officer.

Mines and explosives

31. Where possible all mines and explosives should be recovered for technical examination. If this is not possible owing to danger in handling, a full report should be rendered stating whether the equipment was serviceable or not and quoting any identification marks or numbers. The method of disposal should also be given.

Section 4.—AIR RECONNAISSANCE AND PHOTOGRAPHY

Introduction

1. The natural difficulties of the Malayan topography make observation from the air of more than ordinary value, whilst the inability of the CT to prevent it makes it unusually easy.

2. Air OP/Light Liaison pilots have become expert at spotting traces of CT occupation in jungle and provide much of the basic intelligence for deep jungle operations.

3. In some cases the configuration of the ground, meteorological conditions, or the need for security, will prevent thorough visual reconnaissance. On such occasions PR, allied with photographic interpretation, is employed.

4. Apart from the normal use of PR for target study and briefing, it is used for survey work and in providing a basic block cover for the whole Federation.

5. The detailed organisation is explained in the succeeding paragraphs.

Co-Ordination

6. Air recce is co-ordinated by a GSO 3 (Int/Air Recce) on the staff of HQ Malaya Command, supervised by G(Int).

7. This GSO 3 works in the closest touch with:—

(*a*) The Air OP/LL Squadron (visual reconnaissance).

(*b*) The RAF squadrons employed on PR.

(*c*) JAPIC (FE) and APIU (FE) (both in Singapore) and the APIS under command of HQ Malaya Command.

8. His task is to:—

(*a*) Collate and disseminate intelligence derived from visual reconnaissance and PR.

(*b*) Receive and give appropriate priorities to demands for PR.

(*c*) Supervise photographic interpretation.

Visual Reconnaissance

9. At present there is one AOP/LL Squadron in Malaya, with HQ at Kuala Lumpur and flights in various parts of the Federation.

10. Although it is a RAF unit, under the operational control of HQ Malaya Command, the actual direction of flying for visual reconnaissance is at the level of brigade HQ/flights. Flights are responsible for a stated area and carry out air reconnaissance on a general programme, to which are added specific requests from the Brigade, or Brigades, in the area. They also receive intelligence direction from MIOs.

11. Air reconnaissance reports are forwarded to the requesting unit or formation with a copy to G (Int/Air Recce) at HQ Malaya Command. This information is also plotted on maps at each flight HQ.

Photographic Reconnaissance and Interpretation

12. **Introduction.**—PR in Malaya is used in order to:—

(*a*) Bring maps up-to-date, to supplement existing maps and to provide detailed topographical information.

(*b*) Provide a basic block cover of the whole country.

(*c*) Assist in planning air strikes.

(*d*) Provide and augment tactical intelligence, particularly in the deep jungle.

13. **Organisation.**—

(*a*) Co-ordination is carried out by G (Int/Air Recce) at HQ Malaya Command (see paragraphs 6–8 above).

(*b*) Flying is carried out by the PR Squadron on the authority of Air HQ Malaya on demand by G (Int/Air Recce).

(*c*) Interpretation and mosaicing is carried out by an APIS, augmented by a detachment of JAPIC (FE), at HQ Malaya Command.

14. **Requests.—**

(*a*) Requests are made from State Operations Rooms through the military formation or unit concerned (normally brigade HQ) direct to G (Int/Air Recce) at HQ Malaya Command on the proforma shown at Appendix *F* to this Chapter. In cases of urgency, requests are submitted in signal form as at Appendix *G*, followed by the normal proforma request in confirmation.

(*b*) Owing to the very restricted opportunities for PR imposed by the meteorological conditions, requests have to be made as far ahead as possible.

(*c*) On receipt of requests, G (Int/Air Recce) screens them and allocates priorities (under the direction of a priorities committee composed of G (Ops) and G(Int) HQ Malaya Command and Air HQ Malaya and passes on the request for flying.

(*d*) G (Int/Air Recce) is responsible for following up the requests and altering priorities to suit changing circumstances.

(*e*) On receipt of the photographs, G (Int/Air Recce) pass them for interpretation to APIS and JAPIC (FE), again allotting any necessary priorities for work.

15. **Dissemination.—**

(*a*) The whole of Malaya is covered by basic block cover in the form of annotated mosaics each covering an area 20,000 yards by 10,000 yards at a scale of 1/10,000.

(*b*) SWECs and DWECs (in Contingent and Circle Operations Rooms respectively) hold a complete set of mosaics of the basic block cover of their area.

(*c*) 'Library' sets of this cover are also held by the APIS.

(*d*) The result of specific requests for photographic cover (as at paragraph 14 above), together with all existing intelligence on the area, are passed by G (Int/Air Recce) to the demanding body:—

(i) In the form of annotated mosaics and stereopairs, with a written report on the area where possible.

or (ii) By signal giving pinpoints of new activity, which can be transferred to the earlier cover.

(*e*) Where required, verbal briefing for operations from air photographs is carried out by the interpreter from the APIS/JAPIC.

Conclusion

16. The fullest use is made of the potentialities of visual and photographic air reconnaissance to produce intelligence on CT camps, cultivations, routes, etc. in the jungle.

17. SWECs and DWECs obtain local help from the Air OP/LL flight in their areas and hold basic block photographic cover. Further specific information is produced by G (Int/Air Recce) at HQ Malaya Command on demand.

18. G (Int/Air Recce) is responsible for co-ordination of work and the collation and dissemination of the product of air reconnaissance.

19. It is important to remember that, though the Army is the main user of intelligence from air reconnaissance, and the brigade/battalion IO is normally employed in joint operations rooms on this work, the intelligence material (including air photographs) is the property of the operations room, and must be left behind if the military unit or formation moves. This is essential in order to:—

(*a*) Give the incoming unit the best possible intelligence take over.

(*b*) Avoid wasteful re-flying and re-interpretation.

Section 5.—MILITARY SECURITY AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

1. As the MCP does not possess the normal organisation of a first class enemy, it must exploit every resource of intelligence to redress the balance of inferior force. Thus, in addition to the direct screen of the Min Yuen, the MCP has established a network of agents and informers throughout the Federation whose task is to gather information and pass it quickly to the CT.

2. The GSI (*b*) staff is responsible for the application of:—

(*a*) Preventive measures to deny the CT all opportunity of gaining knowledge of our intentions.

(*b*) Detective measures concerned with the investigation of breaches of security or covert activities detrimental to the Security of the Armed Forces.

Military Security

3. There is clear evidence that:—

(*a*) Many successful ambushes have been the direct result of lack of security.

(*b*) CT movement out of an area due to be the scene of impending operations has taken place because of bad security, particularly careless talk.

4. In operational areas contractors and their employees, who are all vulnerable to CT pressure, quickly become aware of ration strengths, the units engaged, the names and personalities of senior officers and, unless great care is exercised in ordering rations, can forecast with some accuracy future unit changes of locations.

5. Security is many sided and the CT do not rely on one source only for information. All ranks are prone to careless talk, usually through vanity, thoughtlessness or ignorance. To counter the innumerable instances of insecurity of material, loose methods of safeguarding secret papers, inefficient guards, unauthorised entry to WD premises and other breaches of security there is only one remedy: proper security training. The supervision of this training is the task of the Unit Security Officer, assisted by the G(Int) (*b*) staff, and the security agencies, to ensure that all ranks become security minded.

Counter Intelligence

6. It is unfortunately only too true of the G(Int) (*b*) staff and security, as it is with the police and crime, that most of its time is taken up in the investigation of breaches of security that have already occurred.

7. The G(Int) (*b*) staff sets up certain standing controls, organises a system of passes and permits, and arranges with the help of Special Branch, for thorough vetting and verification of all employees, but these merely limit the problem. They may make it difficult for an informer or agent to gain access to military establishments or, having got in, to be able to do much harm, but they cannot exclude the agent or nullify the work of those already inside.

8. The object of standing controls is, by a process of elimination, to throw into relief incidents or persons that seem to be suspicious and to make them the subject of investigation.

9. Properly trained, security minded personnel will not only prevent information from getting to the CT but, in adhering to

standing security controls, will be quicker to observe any suspicious departures from them and assist the counter intelligence effort.

10. Military security and counter intelligence investigations within the Army are conducted by Field Security Sections, under the direction of the G(Int) (*b*) staff, and in certain cases other specialist organisations play their part. It can never be overstressed, however, that to be effective the work of the G(Int) (*b*) staff must be backed by sound unit security and an awareness of the issues involved, plus the need for prompt action by the units themselves as defined in current security measures.

Section 6.—CONCLUSION

1. The following points which are special to the emergency in Malaya should be borne in mind when dealing with Intelligence:—

(*a*) The basic responsibility is still that of the Special Branch of the Federation Police, assisted by the other agencies, co-ordinated by the Director of Intelligence.

(*b*) Intelligence material, whether SEP, CEP, dead bodies, documents or equipment, must be handed to the Police and dealt with in accordance with Police instructions.

(*c*) Collation of intelligence takes place at Police Contingent, i.e. State Capital, level.

(*d*) The role of the MIOs of SMIS is to undertake within Special Branch that part of Special Branch work dealing with tactical intelligence, thereby:—

(i) Permitting Special Branch officers to concentrate more upon clandestine activity.

(ii) Ensuring that the military units receive the intelligence they need in the appropriate form.

2. As the CT tend to thin out, and increase the security of their elements in contact with the masses, so the chances of contacting and eliminating them depends more and more on good intelligence, and in close co-operation between intelligence and operations staffs.

3. The topography of Malaya, combined with the increasing CT policy of withdrawing MRLA units and high level organisations to deep jungle, have made visual air reconnaissance, PR and Photographic Interpretation of even more than usual value to intelligence staffs.

4. Although their lack of speedy communications makes it difficult for the CT to take quick advantage of breaches of security, such as telephone conversations, unclassified correspondence and signals, careless talk, movements of troops, etc., it is certain that they do so in the end. For this reason, and because breach of the basic security rules is bad training for war, special attention must be paid to this problem. Deception and concealment of plans must also be practised to the fullest extent.

5. At Appendix *H* to this Chapter are details of the routine intelligence publications by which intelligence is disseminated.

Appendix A

SURRENDERED ENEMY PERSONNEL

INITIAL QUESTIONNAIRE

1. For convenience, this questionnaire is divided into two parts, Part I deals with the questions which it is suggested should be asked before deciding whether or not the SEP can be used on operations. Part II contains the questions which it is suggested should be asked to decide whether or not the SEP has any information of an operational nature.

PART I

Suggested questions are:—

(*a*) Name, race and dialect.

(*b*) Length of time SEP has been underground.

(*c*) Rank and unit.

(*d*) Are there any CT who wish to surrender. If there are, is the SEP prepared to go back and persuade them to surrender.

(*e*) Is the SEP prepared to go back underground to work for the SF.

Note:—If the SEP agrees to do either (*d*) or (*e*) above he will NOT under any circumstance be used on operations without permission from the ASP Circle Special Branch. The SEP should be held as secluded as possible until he is handed over to Special Branch.

PART II

If the SEP does NOT agree to paragraphs (*d*) or (*e*), or if Special Branch have decided that he will be of no value, it is suggested that the SEP is asked the following questions to decide how he should be used on operations.

(*a*) How many occupied camps does he know to which he can lead patrols. Are they occupied now, if so by whom. How long will it take to reach them.

(*b*) When does he think his absence will be noticed.

(*c*) When are the persons in the camps likely to know of his surrender.

(*d*) Any routes likely to be used by CT coming into, or leaving, the camps.

(*e*) Does he know of any arms dumps and the details.

Note:—The targets should then be selected in the order of priority.

(*f*) Further detailed questions on selected targets.

Appendix B

CAPTURED ENEMY PERSONNEL

INITIAL QUESTIONNAIRE

1. The following questions are suggested for an initial interrogation of CEP. In this connection it is pointed out that the CEP will NOT be promised a reward or immunity in any form, for any information he may give.

2. Suggested questions:—

(*a*) Name, race, dialect.
(*b*) Length of time in the jungle.
(*c*) Rank and unit.
(*d*) Can CEP lead patrols to any occupied camps.
(*e*) By whom are camps occupied.
(*f*) When will CEP's absence be notified.
(*g*) Does CEP know of any arms dumps.

Appendix C

DEBRIEFING AIDE MEMOIRE FOR PATROLS

1. The purpose of this Aide Memoire is to guide those who have to debrief patrol commanders.

2. It suggests a number of questions but it must not stop 'de-briefers' from asking other questions they may think relevant.

3. The proper channel of reporting answers is through the daily sitrep. Only in exceptional circumstances are supplementary reports needed.

Hints on Debriefing

(*a*) Make the person who is being debriefed comfortable.
(*b*) Do not make him write the answers. You must do the work while he relaxes.
(*c*) Debrief as soon as possible while the knowledge is still fresh in his mind.
(*d*) Avoid asking questions which suggest the answer.
(*e*) Patrol commanders will answer these questions better if they know what is needed before they go out.

Topography

1. Was the intelligence briefing accurate? If not, what inaccuracies were discovered?

2. Was the map accurate? If not, what were the inaccuracies?

3. If air photos were used, was the interpretation of use?

4. What was the state of tracks followed?

5. Did the tracks show signs of recent use?

6. Were any other tracks or game trails seen? Where?

7. Where rivers were crossed or followed, give location of:—

(*a*) Bridges (include type).
(*b*) Fords.
Were they in recent use?

8. If any aborigines or squatters were contacted out of their known locations, state:—

(*a*) Name of ladangs.
(*b*) Name of tribe and headman.
(*c*) Number of aborigines.
(*d*) Were they friendly?
(*e*) Whether previous Government contact or not?
(*f*) Have they moved recently? If so why?
(*g*) Did they give any information?

Appendix C—*continued*

Contacts

1. Where contacted? (Time, date, place, grid Ref.).
2. How many CT. Of what races? Sex?
3. Any known persons? Can you describe any of them?
4. How were they dressed?
5. Were they carrying packs?
6. How were they armed? (weapons seen and estimated from volume of fire).
7. What were the CT doing? If moving, in what direction?
8. Any equipment or documents recovered? To whom have they been given?
9. Any casualties? To own troops or CT?
10. Have the CT casualties been identified? If not, what has happened to the bodies?
11. Any SEP, or CEP? What have you done with them?

Camps

1. Where and when was the camp discovered?
2. How was it sited, e.g. valley, hillside, hilltop?
3. How many huts or buildings?
4. What type were they?
5. Estimate their accommodation.
6. How long ago were they built?
7. When were they last used? By how many?
8. Were any defences constructed? Describe layout including sentry posts, warning signals, booby-traps, dugouts, etc.
9. How many approach or escape routes? Give their directions.
10. Any food dumps in the camp?
11. Any weapons, ammunition or armourers' tools?
12. Any signs of a printing press?
13. Any signs of wireless sets being used?
14. Any documents? If so, where were they found?
15. What was done to the camp?

Cultivation Areas

1. Give time, date and map reference of place of discovery.
2. What was its size and shape?
3. Any steps taken to camouflage crops?
4. What kinds of crops?
5. How old were they?
6. When were they last tended?

Appendix C—*continued*

7. Any signs of habitation in the area?
8. Any tracks?
9. What was done to the cultivation?
10. In the case of aboriginal ladangs can you estimate the food produced in excess of the aborigines own requirements?

Supply Dumps

1. Location time and date?
2. What was in it?
3. What was the condition of the store?
4. How was it concealed?
5. When was it last visited?
6. Estimate the age of the dump.
7. Has it been added to since it was first laid down?
8. What was done to the stores?

Appendix D

NOTES ON COMMUNIST TERRORIST FOOD DUMPS *(m)

METHOD OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TWO TYPES OF DUMPS. THE PRINCIPAL METHODS ARE:—

Long-Term	*Short-Term*
(*a*) Size and contents—	
Contain a considerable quantity of food and other stores, particularly tinned food. May include a high proportion of clothing or medical stores.	Will be quite small, perhaps one or two sacks of rice and a few tins of food. Unlikely to contain a preponderance of clothing or medical stores.
(*b*) Method of storage and camouflage—	
Considerable care taken to preserve food, i.e., rice in sealed tins or acid jars, much tinned food. Dump buried in ground or on shelves with a proper roof. Much care taken to camouflage dump.	Not much care taken. Dump up a tree or hidden in a patch of lallang or belukar and covered with sacking or other covering.
(*c*) Distance from source—	
Normally some distance into the jungle.	Fairly close to the jungle fringe.

The long-term dump is unlikely to be worth ambushing. The short-term dump may well be.

Definitions

The following definitions are used.

Etching

(*a*) This is the effect of chemical reaction on the inside of a tin container. The inside of a tin is normally either straightforward tin plate or tin plate treated with lacquer; the latter produces a golden brown finish. On tin plate etching shows as dull streaks with a leaden look (streaking up to $\frac{1}{4}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide). On lacquer the effect is to cause pitting of the lacquer.

Blown

(*a*) A tin is described as 'blown' when decomposition has produced gases which swell out the ends of the tin. The end of the tin bulges out slightly pressure removes the bulge but on release of pressure the bulge reappears.

Translucent and Opaque

(*c*) Translucent means that light can partially pass through the article (e.g., a very old piece of celluloid which it is impossible to see through clearly), opaque means that no light passes through (e.g., the same piece of celluloid painted on one side).

ASSESSMENT OF HOW LONG FOOD HAS BEEN IN DUMP

SERIAL (*a*)	ITEM (*b*)	CERTAINLY LESS THAN SIX MONTHS IN THE DUMP (*c*)	PROBABLY MORE THAN SIX MONTHS IN THE DUMP (*d*)	CERTAINLY MORE THAN SIX MONTHS IN THE DUMP (*e*)
1.	Rice (in sealed containers).	(*a*) Grains slightly translucent-pearl coloured; (*b*) Grains not brittle; (*c*) Fresh smell; (*d*) No sign of larvae, grubs, weevils, cocoons, etc.	(*a*) Grains opaque and yellowish white; (*b*) Grains brittle and some grains partially eaten by insects; (*c*) Weevils, larvae, grubs, cocoons, etc., present (alive or dead); (*d*) Musty smell.	Chemical and physical changes same as column (*d*) but much more advanced.
2.	Sugar (in sealed containers).	(*a*) Crystals separate easily; (*b*) No sign of stickiness; (*c*) No smell.	(*a*) Slight 'crust' starting to form around the edge of the container and just above the level of the sugar.	(*a*) Thick 'crust' on top; (*b*) Sticky; (*c*) Slightly sweet smell.
3.	Tinned Condensed Milk (with no cross on tin).	(*a*) White to yellow in colour; (*b*) Milk flows easily; (*c*) Tin clean and shiny internally.	(*a*) Yellow to yellowish brown in colour; (*b*) Thick and difficult to pour; (*c*) Inside of tin dull and etched.	As for column (*d*) but in addition (*d*) A deposit around side of tin just above milk level; (*e*) Heavy sediment at the bottom of the tin.
4.	Tinned Fish.	(*a*) Inside of tin clean and shiny.	(*a*) Inside of tin dull and etched; (*b*) Contents pulpy and not fresh to taste.	(*a*) Inside of tin dull heavily etched; (*b*) Contents pulpy and almost unrecognisable as fish; (*c*) If in tomato juice, separation of juice into semi-clear liquid and thick deposit.
5.	Tinned Goods general:—			
	(*a*) Labels;	Labels fresh looking and sticking well to the tin.	Labels tending to lift and having blistered appearance.	.....
	(*b*) Blown;	.....	.....	Blown tins.
	(*c*) External surface;	Bright and shining.	Dull with pronounced rusting around any dents and scratches.	Extensive rusting.
	(*d*) Top or bottom of tin scored with a cross.	Little signs of rusting around cross.	.....	.....

NOTE:—This table (1) Takes into account probable deterioration before food reaches a dump.
(2) Must be applied with common sense—the age must not be assessed purely on one particularly good or bad specimen.
(3) Applies only to long-term dumps: contents of short-term dumps are almost certain to have been there for less than six months.

Appendix E

SECRET

To HQ MALAYA COMMAND (4 copies)
(For attention G(Int))

Subject:—

REPORT ON RADIO INTERFERENCE

Further to my Signal .....

Herewith report in accordance with paragraph 6 (*b*) of Director of Operations' Instruction No. 22.

A. When reported by a signal station, own frequency in kilocycles.

B. Interfering stations' frequency in kilocycles or metres.

C. Type of transmission, i.e. CW or RT.
If the latter, details of language spoken.

D. Whether a permanent interference or whether spasmodic.

(i) If spasmodic, dates and times at which interference was experienced.

(ii) If permanent, date and time of commencement of interference.

E. Strength of signal, i.e. strong, moderate, week.

F. Whether message is cipher, code or clear. (This may not be known to the initiator of the report).

G. Enclose copies of any intercepts recorded, with times of recordings.

H. Any other information which may be of use in identification.

SECRET

Appendix F

REQUEST FOR AIR PHOTOGRAPHS

G (INT/AIR RECCE) HQ MALAYA COMMAND

L	Demander's Reference No.		G 41
M	Vertical or Oblique		VERTICAL
N	Map Series and Sheet No.		RECCE EDITION GSGS 4690 SHEET 2E//11
O	Air Cover Block No. or Grid References of the Corners of the Area		PARTS OF KD 7 AND 8
			QY 2090—4090—2080—4080
	Identifying Feature		TOLAK
P	Purpose for which cover is required. Include all possible detail. Include local intelligence but AOP and SITREP detail is not required.		DETAILED PLANNING OF NEW OP TO DETERMINE EXTENT OF CT RECULTIVATION SUBSEQUENT TO OFFENSIVE OP APR 52. LOCAL SOURCES INDICATE NUMEROUS SMALL CULTIVATED AREAS IN DEEP JUNGLE
	Type and extent of Interpretation required		SPOT HEIGHTS AND ALL POSSIBLE CT ACTIVITY
Q	Scale Required		1: 10,000
R	Number of Copies	Mosaics	1
		Loose Prints	2
		Plots	2
S	Delivery Date and Time		9 SEP
T	Final Date after which cover is not required		20 SEP FOR OP BUT DO NOT CANCEL
	Degree of Priority (X, Y or Z)		(LEAVE BLANK)
	Delivery Address		1 MALAY INF BDE
U	Special Instructions for Delivery		1 SET OF LOOSE PRINTS DIRECT TO CPO KEDAH

4th August, 1954.

J. BLAGGS,
Appointment IO.

Appendix G

URGENT REQUEST FOR AIR PHOTOGRAPHS

Example of urgent request for Air Photographs (*to be written on normal message form*).

Actual detail as from example in Appendix *A* which should follow as confirmation.

FROM FEDDIV SECRET
TO G (INT/AIR RECCE) MALCOMD
INFO 1 MIB

PR DEMAND (.) L (.) G 41 (.) M (.) VERTICAL (.) N (.) RECCE GSGS 4690 SHEET 2 E/11 (.) 0 (.) TOLAK QY 2090—4090—2080—4080 (.) P (.) EXTENT OF CT RECULTIVATION SUBSEQUENT TO OFFENSIVE OP APR 52 (.) Q (.) 1/10,000 (.) R (.) 1 MOSAIC 2 LOOSE PRINTS (.) S (.) 9 SEP (.) T (.) 20 SEP (.) U (.) ONE SET PRINTS DIRECT TO CPO KEDAH ////////////////

Appendix H

ROUTINE INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS

1. **Daily SITREP.—**

A daily summary of events in the Federation issued down to units.

2. **Contingent Joint Police/Military Weekly Int Summary** (including one on the Paragon areas, and one on the Thai-Malay Frontier).—

Contains:—

Pt. I. Statistical Summary of events.
Pt. II. Activity CT and Own by Police Circles.
Pt. III. Int Review by MCP areas.
Pt. IV. Comment.

This summary is issued down to units in the Contingent and to higher Formation HQ.

3. **SF Weekly Intelligence Summary.—**

Compiled at Federal Police HQ from daily Sitreps and Contingent WISUMs and contains:—

Pt. I. Comment.
Pt. II. Situation in the States.
Pt. III. Information.

Once a month an extra section is issued which contains a monthly report on the situation by the D of I.

4. **Secret Abstract of Intelligence.—**

A monthly publication by the Police Special Branch detailing trends in MCP policy and tactics. Issued to police officers (down to Circle level) and military units.

5. **Subversive Activities Review.—**

A monthly report to the Colonial Secretary on the Emergency situation, prepared under the supervision of the D of I.

Copies go to Div and Indep Bde Comds and all relevant material is incorporated in the Federal WISUM (see paragraph 3 above).

CHAPTER XV

TRAINING FOR OPERATIONS

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

1. Field-Marshal Slim's two remedies for the abnormal difficulties of the jungle were training and experience, because unless experience is based on sound and constant training it is apt to be costly.

2. Contacts with CT are sudden, rapidly fought encounters between small patrols, where the essential requirements for success are strong junior leadership and a high standard of individual shooting.

3. A high standard in these qualities can only be achieved and maintained by constant training. There can be no valid argument against the fact that training must take place throughout the whole year whatever the intensity of operations.

4. The aim of this Chapter is to show what training should be carried out before and during operations in Malaya.

Section 2.—INITIAL JUNGLE TRAINING

1. Battalions earmarked for Malaya from other theatres send advance parties on a Basic Jungle Warfare Course at the FARELF Training Centre KOTA TINGGI. These advance parties help COs to train their battalions in Jungle Warfare on a four week training course with assistance from FARELF Training Centre.

2. Instruction for basic Jungle Training must include the following subjects:—

(*a*) CT background, methods and organisation.
(*b*) The organisation and roles of SF, Police, Special Branch and the Home Guard. The Army's role in Malaya.
(*c*) How to live in the jungle, including hygiene, health and first aid.
(*d*) Jungle discipline and silent movement.
(*e*) The establishment of jungle bases.
(*f*) Patrol formations.
(*g*) Jungle navigation.
(*h*) IA drills (including silent signals).

(*j*) The planning and laying of day and night ambushes in various types of country.

(*k*) Jungle shooting, training and practise on the MALAYAN Range and Jungle lane.

3. It must be realised that this short four week course aims to provide battalions with sufficient specialised knowledge of Jungle Warfare as applicable to the Malayan Emergency to enable them to be operational. Continuous training thenceforth is necessary for battalions to be fully effective.

Section 3.—TRAINING DURING OPERATIONS

General

1. The following sections attempt to provide the answer to two questions:—

(*a*) What subjects should be taught to improve anti-CT technique.

(*b*) What proportion of time should be spent on training.

2. A large portion of this section will be devoted to shooting because:—

(*a*) It is not dealt with in other chapters.

(*b*) The best plan, the best leadership and the most skilful fieldcraft will avail nothing if the men cannot shoot to kill when they meet the CT.

Shooting

3. **General.**—The best basis for a good shooting unit is that all officers and senior NCOs must be keen practical shots themselves.

4. **Shooting Cycle.**—It cannot be over-emphasised that the essential preliminary to success in Jungle Shooting is the ability to shoot in the lying position. But to perfect the soldier for Jungle Shooting it is necessary to wean him from the prone position and practise him in the kneeling and standing positions. He must be brought up to a standard where he can shoot accurately at the most fleeting targets in these positions. There is nothing incompatable in these two main phases of training. If properly taught and coached on the Classification Range a man will have learnt to align quickly and to release the trigger steadily without dwelling in the aim.

5. The logical sequence of weapon training is therefore:—

(*a*) *Stage 1.*—Pre-Classification training.

(i) Holding, aiming and trigger pressing lessons.

(ii) Miniature Range Shooting.

(iii) 30 yards Range Shooting.

(*b*) *Stage 2.*—Classification Course Instructional and Classification (Rifle and LMG).

(*c*) *Stage 3.*—Shooting on the MALAYAN Range. Practices to be fired on this range are shown at Appendices *A* and *B* to this Chapter.

(*d*) *Stage 4.*—Jungle Lane Shooting.

(*e*) *Stage 5.*—Competition shooting.

6. **Good Instruction and practise.**—The constant need for shooting practise cannot be overemphasised. It should be carried out at every available opportunity, on whatever form of range happens to be available. A little ingenuity will always provide a suitable range for some form of practise, whether it is for shooting at bottles floating down a stream or for shooting on a home made MALAYAN Range. The standard of instruction and the degree of enthusiasm shown by the instructors is particularly important. Full use should be made, within the battalion, of instructors who have been Hythe trained or have attended one of the Platoon Weapons courses which are run in Malaya.

In this connection it is important that BRITISH battalions, when earmarked for Malaya, should send NCOs on Hythe weapons courses before coming out to Malaya.

7. **Short Range Shooting.**—The importance in Malaya of the quick deadly accurate shot has already been emphasised. Continual practise will be required on:—

(*a*) The MALAYAN Range.

(*b*) The Jungle Lane.

(*c*) The Ambush Range.

8. **MALAYAN Range.**—The aim of the MALAYAN Range is to train and practise the soldier in taking a quick aimed shot from the standing and kneeling positions at fleeting moving targets. Every company must have a range where firing can be carried out at ranges up to 100 yards. Targets will be figure targets. In order to carry out timed practices at snap or moving targets, there must be a trench in which markers can move and present targets with safety. The alternative is a system of pull-up, and moving targets

operated by wire. The trench system is by far the best, because it is a more reliable way of presenting targets, and because it allows more variation in placing them. Figure one shows a lay-out for a MALAYAN Range.




Figure 1.

Such a lay-out enables two practices to be carried out simultaneously: one at stationary targets at *A*, and one at snap or moving targets at *B*. Both practices must be fired at the same range, and checking and pasting are done at the same time. The trench need not be straight but can zigzag in order to allow targets to appear in unexpected places. Details of the practices to be carried out are given in Appendix *A* (Rifle and M1/M2 Carbine) and Appendix *B* (Owen and L2A1 Carbine). *(*g*).

9. **Jungle Lane.—**

(*a*) The aim of the Jungle Lane is to practise men in quick and accurate shooting, at targets representing CT, while the firers are on the move themselves down a jungle track.

(*b*) A narrow winding track must be found, or cut, in jungle. The firer advances down this track at the ready position, as on patrol. At intervals, various types of targets appear. There is no need for any of these targets to be moved or controlled by hand. They can be placed so that as the firer turns a corner, or comes to a certain point, the target comes into his vision to his front or flank. If snap or moving targets are made to be controlled by hand, an instructor following behind the firer must operate the wire so as to present the target at the right moment.

(*c*) The advantage of the first method is that the firer has to pick out a silent and stationary target; it is therefore a better test of his powers of observation than a pull-up target. The advantage of hand-controlled targets is that they can be made to appear for a definite timed exposure. The best solution is to have a proportion of static targets, with a variety of hand-controlled targets, appearing at ground level or at man height round the side of a tree, or moving at any angle desired. For

scoring purposes, Figure 11 targets should have the "vital area" inscribed, as on the MALAYAN Range, and Figure 12 targets should have with the circle inscribed in the centre. This is important, to bring out that only a killing shot is a good shot.

(*d*) CT fire can be simulated by firing a carbine or LMG in a pit hear the target, firing it by means of a wire controlled by the instructor moving behind the firer. This is a good variation from static targets.

(*e*) It is vital that scores are properly marked and recorded, so that each man's progress can be assessed.

10. **Ambush Range.**—The object of having an ambush range is to practise fire control and shooting from an ambush position, in conditions representing, as nearly as possible, an operational ambush. The requirements, which are easy to fulfil are:—

(*a*) *Ambush Position.*—This should be large enough for about a section and needs careful selection. Natural cover will be required and therefore the position should be left untouched as far as possible.

(*b*) *Killing Ground*—The killing ground should look as natural as possible from the ambush position, but trenches need to be dug in order that targets and markers can be moved about. If the ground allows, there should be several trenches at different angles so that targets may approach and withdraw from different directions. A possible layout is shown at Figure 2.




Figure 2

(*c*) *Safety Precautions.*—Care must be taken to ensure that sufficient earth is thrown up at the right places to give ample protection for the markers. If the ground does

not favour natural protection, pulley-raised targets should be used.

(*d*) *Ingenuity.*—Exercises run on the ambush range depend on realism for success. The following points are useful:—

(i) All movement by troops in the ambush position must be fully operational, e.g. position taken up silently; camouflage, and clear orders.

(ii) A wait should be imposed to introduce realism. Targets should appear without any warning. Once fire has opened targets must move rapidly.

(iii) The range should be used by day and night.

11. **Post-Operational Shooting.**—After every operation a man should complete the following tasks:—

(*a*) His weapon should be inspected by the unit Armourer.

(*b*) His weapon must be zeroed.

(*c*) He must group.

(*d*) He must fire rapid, snap and moving practises on the MALAYAN Range.

(*e*) If there is time he should be taken down a jungle lane.

12. **Competition Shooting.**—The Malaya Command Rifle Meeting is held annually in about August and provides a good opportunity to compare standards and increase the competitive spirit. While units may have difficulty, because of operations, in training teams for open range shooting, their efforts will be rewarded by an increase in the general standard of shooting within their units. Competitive shooting is a first class breeding ground for firing point instructors and coaches.

13. **Conclusion.**—The standard of shooting required for success in Malaya can never be set too high. This standard can be achieved only by careful, continuous training. Time for this training can be found by battalions while on operations, as was shown by one company of an operational battalion in Malaya in 1953 which produced 97 per cent marksmen and 3 per cent First Class Shots when it fired its annual course.

Section 4.—JUNIOR LEADER TRAINING

1. **General.**—Operations in Malaya largely consist of small patrols. The success or failure of these operations therefore depends

on the standard of junior leaders. At the same time this form of operations is a first class training ground for junior leaders.

2. **The Requirement.**—The type of junior leader required is a mentally tough, self reliant hunter, determined to close with, and kill, the CT. He must be trained, and train his men, to be past masters in patrolling because this will be his constant task.

3. **Selection and Training.**—The Company Commander plays the major part in the selection and training of the junior leader. By operating with each platoon in turn he can give help and advice to junior leaders, earmark future leaders and can generally do more in a few days to improve junior leadership than a cadre could do in three weeks. This is particularly applicable to British battalions who have a high percentage of NS NCOs, with the attendant turnover. During retraining cadres should be run.

Section 5.—JUNGLE WARFARE TECHNIQUE

1. The following are the most important four subjects which must be practised and rehearsed constantly:—

(*a*) *Ambushing.*—The laying of ambushes must be practised by day and night, in different types of terrain, e.g. jungle and rubber. CT and labourers must be represented. (Chapter XI gives full details of Ambush methods).

(*b*) *Immediate Action Drills*—

(i) The automatic and split second reaction to a chance encounter must continually be practised again and again under different conditions of terrain and varying circumstances. Details of IA drills are shown in Chapter X, but it should be remembered that these are basic drills which should be improved upon, varied and interpreted according to conditions, terrain and individual commander's preference. IA drills must never be allowed to deteriorate into stale formulae.

(ii) CT must always be represented.

(iii) The basis of all IA drills is vigorous offensive action and this fact must be brought out on all training.

(*c*) *Counter Ambush.*—Counter ambush drills are given in Chapter X. Counter ambush action when in MT is given in Chapter XIII. These must be practised with CT represented.

(*d*) *Attack on CT Camps and Cultivations.*—These attacks come under two headings:—

(i) *The Immediate Attack.*—This is described in Chapter X, Section 3. It is in fact an IA drill which requires good training if it is to be carried out at the necessary speed.

(ii) *The Deliberate Attack.*—This is described in Chapter XII. For complete success it requires careful preparation, training and rehearsal. CT must be realistically represented in positions which they would take up for their security.

2. **Other subjects.**—The following subjects require continual practise before and during operations. Improvements and variation of methods should be continually striven for in order to raise the standard.

(*a*) *Patrol Formations.*—The correct distance between individuals and groups will vary in accordance with terrain.

(*b*) *Observation.*—A vitally important subject. However tired a man may be he must never be allowed to plod along, eyes on the ground. This is a matter of training and discipline. A patrol which is not alert walks with death.

(*c*) *All round protection.*—The need for all round protection is more important in the jungle than anywhere else.

(*d*) *Silent movement.*—A vitally important subject because a noisy patrol will never achieve anything. British troops in particular require a lot of training before they reach the required standard, but once they have achieved it they can move as silently as any other troops in the world. Particular attention should be paid to halting, *listening* and observing.

(*e*) *Keeping direction.*—Chapter IX deals fully with navigation. Direction keeping comes with training and experience.

(*f*) *Tracking.*—Officers should be on the lookout for men who show a special aptitude for tracking. They should be earmarked for special training. Efforts should be made to train men to develop a 'tracker's eye'.

Section 6.—TIME FOR TRAINING

1. The question of how much time should be spent on training can best be answered by showing what must be done every time a company comes out of the jungle.

2. **Rest.**—The first day should be a complete rest for the whole company.

3. **Programme.**—At least four days are required for the following, in order of priority:—

(*a*) zeroing and shooting;
(*b*) administration;
(*c*) jungle training.

4. These few days give the Company Commander his only real opportunity to improve the operational efficiency of his platoons and therefore these three items must be covered in a carefully balanced programme.

5. **Shooting.**—It is essential that each platoon should fire every day on the Company's MALAYAN Range. The allotment of time for re-zeroing and shooting training on the MALAYAN range to sections or platoons will thus determine the times at which other, less important, tasks can be carried out. For example while one platoon is shooting in the early morning the other two will be carrying out some of the administrative tasks or jungle training. When necessary many administrative tasks can be carried out after dark.

6. For the sequence of shooting see Section 3 paragraph 11 of this Chapter.

7. **Administration.**—A considerable number of administrative points have to be covered, for example:

(*a*) Hot baths, haircuts and medical inspection.
(*b*) Cleaning, inspection and checking of all arms, ammunition, wireless equipment and compasses, inspection and exchange of clothing and personal equipment.
(*c*) Washing of clothes and application of DBP.
(*d*) Miscellaneous items such as pay, reading of battalion orders, etc.

8. **Jungle Training.**—Although the company has just come out of the jungle, it nevertheless requires practice in the four jungle battle drills mentioned in Section 5 para 1, i.e. Ambushes, IA Drills, Counter Ambush and Attack on a CT Camp. The best value will only be obtained from these practices if the CT are represented and the exercise is properly umpired and criticised.

9. **Games.**—Facilities for games will vary considerably in different company areas and because of different types of operational commitment. Every opportunity, however, should be taken to run inter platoon football, cross country and other competitions. Improvisation will usually provide facilities for basketball and badminton where no football fields exist. These games must be planned in advance as part of the programme.

10. Five days have now elapsed. The Company could now go out on another operation, but if the last one was of about three weeks duration, another two days—making seven in all, should be given. Not only does this allow the Company Commander another two days in which to weld his whole company together, but it gives officers and men that extra freedom from the physical strain and mental tension of operations.

11. This therefore produces a proportion, for one month, of three weeks on operations and one on training.

12. An alternative arrangement would be to operate with two platoons in the jungle and one in base on training. This has its advantages but the disadvantages are that the Company Commander will never have all his company together, and in some areas it is not operationally possible.

Section 7.—COURSES AND CADRES

1. Throughout the year units should send a steady flow of students on courses. A list of courses available in FARELF is contained in the 'Brochure of All Arms Courses Available in FARELF', issued to all units.

2. Battalion cadres on the following should take place during the year.

(*a*) Junior Leader.
(*b*) MMG (less MALAY Battalions).
(*c*) 3-in Mortar.
(*d*) 120 mm. BAT (Training Scale of 2 per British and Gurkha battalion will be issued).
(*e*) Weapon Training.
(*f*) Signals.
(*g*) Driver operator.

Section 8.—TRAINING FOR WAR

1. The policy of GOC Malaya Command as regards training for war, as approved by GHQ FARELF, is that training for war can only be carried out on a very limited basis, restricted to theoretical training for officers and the training of shadow support companies in infantry battalions. It is not possible to carry out unit training for war.

2. Operations in Malaya are excellent training for the infantry soldier and the junior leader.

3. **Gas Training.**—HQ Malaya Command Policy:—

(*a*) Every Lt Cols' command will have at least four individuals qualified as instructors.

(*b*) Personnel of all units of the Imperial Forces will carry out two days training per year. Eight sets of training equipment are held by G (Trg) HQ Malaya Command for this purpose.

Section 9.—CONCLUSION

1. The special nature of operations in Malaya emphasises the vital importance of quick deadly accurate shooting and the need for good junior leaders, on whom so much depends. These two essential pillars on which to build success can be acquired only by continuous training before and during operations.

2. Every unit has its quiet periods when investments may not appear to be paying large dividends, measured in terms of CT killed, but all of a sudden the ideal chance presents itself, and it is then that success hinges, not on luck, but on sound training and marksmanship.

Appendix A

MALAYAN RANGE—PRACTICES

(Rifle and M1/M2 Carbine)

Practice 1

Grouping.—5 rounds. Fig. 11 target with 1-in square patch as aiming mark. Standard required 4-in group. HPS 25.

Practice 2

Timed.—5 rounds. Fig. 11 target with rectangles 2-in × 4-in, 4-in × 6-in inscribed in centre of target. Time 15 seconds. Scoring 4,3,2. HPS 20.

Practice 3

Snap.—10 rounds. Five differently coloured Fig. 11 targets. Ten 4 seconds exposures timed at the Firing Point. (Reduced to 2 seconds as proficiency increases). Firer engages a colour as ordered by the instructor and fires one round each time a target is named. Scoring 3,2. HPS 30.

Practice 4

Snap.—10 rounds. Fig. 12 target with 6-in circle inscribed in centre of target. Ten 4 seconds exposures (reduced to 2 seconds as proficiency increases). One shot each exposure. Scoring 3,2. HPS 30.

Practice 5

Moving Target. 5 rounds. Length of run 15 yards. Target appears at walking speed. Firer engages with one shot and target breaks into running speed. Firer then fires 1 or 2 more shots. This process is repeated on the return run of the target. Scoring 3,2. HPS 15.

NOTES

(*a*) Total number of rounds 35
HPS 120

(*b*) Practices should initially be carried out at 25 yards, and increased up to 100 yards as proficiency increases.

(*c*) In practices 3 and 5, Fig. 11 targets will be marked with two lines 6-in apart, forming a "vital area" 6-in wide down the centre of the target from top to bottom. Scoring—3 points per hit in the vital area, 2 points per hit elsewhere on the target.

(*d*) Standing position will be used up to 50 yards range, and standing or kneeling at ranges over 50 yards.

Appendix B

MALAYAN RANGE

(Owen and L2A1 Carbines Practices)

Practice 1

Grouping.—5 single rounds. Fig. 11 target with 1-in square patch as aiming mark. HPS 25. Standard required 4-in group.

Practice 2

Timed.—12 rounds in 3-4 bursts. Fig. 11 target with rectangles 2-in by 4-in, 4-in by 6-in inscribed in centre of target. Time:—6 seconds (reduced to 4 seconds as proficiency increases). Scoring 4,3,2. HPS 48.

Practice 3

Snap.—15 rounds. Five differently coloured Fig. 11 targets. Five 3 seconds exposures (timed at Firing Point (reduced to 2 seconds as proficiency increases).) Firer engages a colour as ordered by Instructor, and fires one burst each time a target is named. Scoring 3,2. HPS 45.

Practice 4

Snap.—15 rounds. Fig. 12 targets with 6-in circle inscribed in centre of target. Five 3 seconds exposures (reduced to 2 seconds as proficiency increases). One burst each exposure. Scoring 3,2. HPS 45.

Practice 5

Moving target 15 rounds. Fig. 11 target. Length of run 15 yards. Target appears at walking speed. Firer engages with one burst, and target moves on at running speed. Firer then engages with another burst. This process is repeated on the return run of the target. Scoring 3,2. HPS 45.

NOTES

(*a*) Total number of rounds 62
HPS 208

(*b*) Practices should initially be carried out at 25 yards and as proficiency increases the ranges will be increased up to 100 yards.

(*c*) The grouping practice at 25 yards can also be utilised to "straighten up" the weapons for direction by tapping the foresight into the direction of error as shown by the MPI.

(*d*) In practices 3 and 5, Fig. 11 targets will be marked with two lines 6-in apart, forming a "vital area" 6-in wide down the centre of the target from top to bottom. Scoring 3 points per hit in the vital area, and 2 points per hit elsewhere on the target.

(*e*) Standing position will be used up to 50 yards, and standing or kneeling at ranges over 50 yards.

CHAPTER XVI

WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS IN MALAYA

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

1. This chapter gives patrol commanders basic information about wireless communications in Malaya and some simple rules to follow when establishing communications in the jungle.

2. A more detailed outline of current techniques phrased in simple language will be found in the pamphlet 'Some Notes on Wireless in Malaya' which has been produced by the CSO Malaya and is issued to all units in Malaya. Further copies can be obtained from G (Trg) HQ Malaya Command. If the best results are to be obtained by Signal platoons it is essential that this pamphlet is thoroughly studied by all Regimental Signal Officers and NCOs.

3. The necessity for silence in the efficient conduct of operations in the jungle militates against the use of 'Voice' over patrol wireless sets. Morse Telegraphy is both silent in operation and often much more effective under the difficult wireless conditions in Malaya. It is therefore essential that the maximum number of signallers know the morse code at a speed of not less than eight words per minute.

Section 2.—WIRELESS SETS IN USE IN MALAYA

1. Units in Malaya are issued with the following sets:—

(*a*) WS 68T (To be replaced by A510).
(*b*) WS 62.
(*c*) WS 19.
(*d*) WS R 209.
(*e*) WS 88.

2. These sets are used as follows:—

(*a*) *WS 68T.*—This is the patrol commanders set and is used to communicate with either company or battalion headquarters dependent on the signal layout. It can be carried by one man but is bulky and uncomfortable. Together with his personal kit the operator has to carry a load of some 50-54 pounds and he should be assisted whenever possible. The set is designed for Voice and Telegraph. It is powered by a dry battery which, suitably conserved, can be made to last about 5 days on patrol.

(*b*) *WS A510.*—This is an Australian set which has been specially designed for jungle operations. It operates on frequencies between 2 and 10 megacycles per second. It is crystal controlled which simplifies tuning. The receiver and sender, which are separate, fit into two basic pouches and the total weight of the complete station is 20 lb. 9 oz. Its performance is much better than the WS 68T and is for most purposes as good as the WS 62. It can be used for Voice and Telegraph transmissions. The dry batteries with which it is powered will last for eight hours under normal conditions.

(*c*) *WS 62.*—This is the set for company headquarters. It is powered by wet batteries which require periodical recharging. This represents no difficulty at company headquarters. Although the set is light, the extra equipment required—batteries, charging engine, petrol, oil, distilled water—makes it unsuitable for patrol work. For deep jungle operations a number of WS 62 have been modified for working with dry batteries and may be made available on special authority.

(*d*) *WS 19.*—The WS 19 is a heavy, robust set designed to be operated in a static position or in a vehicle, and is normally used at battalion headquarters or in a scout car. It can be operated for long periods without wandering off frequency or requiring attention.

(*e*) *WS R 209.*—This is a receiving set only and is issued to enable the operator at battalion headquarters to search for stations that are 'off net'. It is battery operated.

(*f*) *WS 88.*—This set, although not of value for sky wave operation, is useful for training, convoy control, and communication with aircraft. It is small, light, and easy to operate, but can only be used for Voice.

Section 3.—AERIALS

1. The standard aerial for infantry wireless sets is a rod, from which is radiated a horizontal or ground wave. Due to the nature of the terrain and the vegetation in Malaya the ground wave is quickly absorbed or screened, or both.

2. It is therefore necessary to radiate a sky wave which is reflected back to the distant station from the upper atmosphere. For efficient sky wave radiation a wire aerial cut to a length proportional to frequency is required. A table of such lengths is at

Appendix *B* to this chapter. The simplest type of sky wave aerial is in the form of the letter L, with the longer side horizontal and the shorter one making the lead into the set. (See Appendix *A* Fig. 1). This is the type of aerial normally erected by the jungle patrol. The following points regarding this aerial must be borne in mind:—

(*a*) The aerial should be of good copper wire.

(*b*) It must be held clear of vegetation by insulators.

(*c*) Vegetation should whenever possible, be cleared from above and below the aerial (the earth acts like the reflector in an electric torch).

(*d*) It must be cut to a length proportional to the frequency in use.

(*e*) It should be about 20–25 feet off the ground.

(*f*) Direction is unimportant.

3. The method of tuning this type of aerial with WS 68T is given in Appendix *A* to this chapter.

4. Other types of aerial are described in 'Notes on Wireless' and should be studied with a view to their use in special circumstances.

5. In particular it should be noted that by far the most efficient aerial is the JAMAICA. It is not practicable to erect this on patrol but it should be put up at every battalion and company HQ as it greatly improves the strength of the received signal. This is of considerable importance when patrol sets are perforce poorly sited and are transmitting a weak signal to their control station.

Section 4.—FREQUENCY ALLOCATION

Due to the large number of units using the very limited frequency band of the WS 68T, it is essential that units work only on their allotted frequencies in order to avoid interference with others. Control sets should therefore be set up accurately on the current frequency by crystal calibrator or wavemeter.

Section 5.—GROUND/AIR COMMUNICATIONS

1. Ground/Air communications present little difficulty.

(*a*) Supply dropping aircraft net easily to a patrol's 68 set providing the frequency is known to them.

(*b*) An ASST provides a wireless set reserved for air support. It consists of a number of tentacles each in a 15 cwt. truck containing the following wireless sets:—

(i) VHF Set. To communicate with aircraft.

(ii) No. 52. To communicate with HQ Malaya Command.

(iii) No. 19. For local liaison with the unit which the tentacle is supporting.

(*c*) A tentacle can either remain at Brigade Headquarters or can operate as a 'Split' tentacle with the 52 and 19 sets at Brigade Headquarters, and the VHF and 19 sets with Ground or Air Liaison Officer in support of a particular unit.

(*d*) Aircraft control during airstrikes can be exercised from an Auster with its HF set netted to the frequency used by the ground troops, and a VHF set netted to the frequency used by the striking aircraft.

(*e*) Austers and Dakotas can both use the 88 set for communication with the ground.

2. **Communication with Helicopters.**—Helicopters (S55 only) are netted on 3710 Kcs and can communicate with ground troops if previous warning has been given before the helicopter takes off. As the helicopter is crystal controlled *ground stations* must net to the helicopter.

Section 6.—SCALE OF EQUIPMENT IN SIGNAL PLATOONS

1. The scale of wireless sets issued to Infantry Battalions in Malaya is at present:—

	Brit/Gurkha Bns.	*KAR, FIJI, MALAY and Federation Bns.*	*Remarks*
WS 19 ...	2*	2*	*Plus 1 in each Scout car on charge.
WS 62 ...	14	12	
WS 68T (or A510) ...	24	20	
WS 88 ...	16	12	
WS R 209 ...	1	1	

2. All telephone communication is provided by the Civil Telecommunications Department.

Section 7.—CONCLUSION

1. It is essential that intelligent men are selected for training as infantry company and platoon operators. They should also possess the necessary physique to carry their load for long periods over difficult country. Officers and NCOs should, by example, encourage operators in the use of correct procedure as faulty procedure delays transmission and occupies time on the air.

2. Success of patrol communication depends, in the first instance on the training of signallers. Secondly, on the preparation and checking of sets and batteries, and thirdly on intelligent selection of sites by commanders. Once signallers are committed to a jungle operation they will be on their own without technical supervision from their signal officers.

3. Wireless communication in Malaya although often difficult, is rarely impossible. With thorough training an operator soon learns to have confidence in his set and in his own ability to establish communications under the conditions and over the ranges involved.

Appendix A


METHODS OF TUNING SIMPLE SKY WAVE AERIAL FOR WS 68T

1. Normal methods of tuning for maximum rise on meter with meter switch at AE.

2. (*a*) Search for incoming signal with receiver.
   (*b*) Reduce to minimum with LF gain, and tune accurately.
   (*c*) Tune aerial for maximum signal.
3. (*a*) Meter switch to MA.
   (*b*) Aerial switch to 8.
   (*c*) Press pressel switch.
   (*d*) Rotate aerial tuning dial until slight but definite dip observed on meter.
   (*e*) If no dip is observed, put aerial switch to 7 and repeat.
   (*f*) Carry on until dip is obtained.
   (*g*) Net set in normal manner to tuning and netting call.
   (*h*) Retune aerial with new frequency.


FIG 1

SINGLE SKY WAVE AERIAL



A+B = LENGTH GIVEN IN APPX 'B'

C & D CHAIN LINK INSULATORS


B
C
A

Appendix B

AERIAL LENGTHS

Length A and B for simple sky wave aerial for.—

(*a*) WS 68T

Frequency	Length A and B	Frequency	Length A and B	Frequency	Length A and B
3,000 Kcs.	156 ft.	3,800 Kcs.	123 ft.	4,600 Kcs.	102 ft.
3,100 ,,	151 ,,	3,900 ,,	120 ,,	4,700 ,,	100 ,,
3,200 ,,	146 ,,	4,000 ,,	117 ,,	4,800 ,,	98 ,,
3,300 ,,	142 ,,	4,100 ,,	114 ,,	4,900 ,,	96 ,,
3,400 ,,	138 ,,	4,200 ,,	111 ,,	5,000 ,,	94 ,,
3,500 ,,	134 ,,	4,300 ,,	108 ,,	5,100 ,,	92 ,,
3,600 ,,	130 ,,	4,400 ,,	106 ,,	5,200 ,	90 ,,
3,700 ,,	126 ,,	4,500 ,,	104 ,,		

(*b*) WS 62 and 19

Frequency	Length A and B	Frequency	Length A and B	Frequency	Length A and B
3.0 Kcs.	234 ft.	5.5 Kcs.	128 ft.	8.0 Kcs.	88 ft.
3.5 ,,	200 ,,	6.0 ,,	117 ,,	8.5 ,,	83 ,,
4.0 ,,	175 ,,	6.5 ,,	108 ,,	9.0 ,,	78 ,,
4.5 ,,	156 ,,	7.0 ,,	100 ,,	9.5 ,,	74 ,,
5.0 ,,	140 ,,	7.5 ,,	94 ,,	10.0 ,,	70 ,,

Appendix B

AERIAL LENGTHS

Lengths A and B for single sky wave aerial for—

(a) WS 9ST

Frequency	Length A and B	Frequency	Length A and B	Frequency	Length A and B
3,000 Kcs.	198 ft.	3,800 Kcs.	123 ft.	4,600 Kcs.	102 ft.
3,100 „	191 „	3,900 „	120 „	4,700 „	100 „
3,200 „	186 „	4,000 „	117 „	4,800 „	98 „
3,300 „	182 „	4,100 „	114 „	4,900 „	96 „
3,400 „	178 „	4,200 „	111 „	5,000 „	94 „
3,500 „	174 „	4,300 „	108 „	5,100 „	92 „
3,600 „	170 „	4,400 „	106 „	5,200 „	90 „
3,700 „	166 „	4,500 „	104 „		

(b) WS 62 and 19

Frequency	Length A and B	Frequency	Length A and B	Frequency	Length A and B
3.0 Kcs.	234 ft.	5.5 Kcs.	128 ft.	8.0 Kcs.	88 ft.
3.5 „	200 „	6.0 „	117 „	8.5 „	83 „
4.0 „	175 „	6.5 „	108 „	9.0 „	78 „
4.5 „	156 „	7.0 „	100 „	9.5 „	74 „
5.0 „	140 „	7.5 „	94 „	10.0 „	70 „

CHAPTER XVII

AIR SUPPORT IN MALAYA

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

General

1. This Chapter is intended to give a working knowledge of:—
   (*a*) The support which the Royal Air Force can give to the ground forces in Malaya.
   (*b*) The most important points to be considered in planning and executing joint ground/air operations.
   (*c*) The methods of submitting requests for air support.

Types of Support

2. (*a*) Offensive Support.
   (*b*) Transport Support.
   (*c*) Helicopter Support.
   (*d*) Air Observation Post/Light Liaison (AOP/LL) Flights.
   (*e*) Photographic Reconnaissance (PR).
   (*f*) Psychological Warfare (PW) Support.

Planning

3. **General.**—When an operation is being planned for which any form of air support may be required, it is important that the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) at HQ Malaya Command is kept informed. The necessary aircraft can then be earmarked and air support obtained with greater certainty.

4. **Offensive and Helicopter Support.**—If offensive or helicopter support is to form part of a plan, it will often be of assistance if representatives from the JOC are called to attend unit or formation planning conferences to assist in the planning of air support. If support on a large scale is planned, JOC representatives should always be asked to attend.

5. **Transport Support.**—Only a few aircraft are normally available for immediate support. When large numbers of troops are to be supplied by air, the JOC should be informed early of the date and duration of the operation, and of the number to be supplied by air.

Section 2.—COMMAND, CONTROL AND LIAISON

Command and Control

1. Command of the air forces allotted for the support of the Federal Government in the Emergency is exercised by the Air Officer Commanding, Malaya; his operational control of these air forces is exercised through the JOC.

Joint Operations Centre

2. HQ Malaya Command and Air Headquarters Malaya each contribute staff to the JOC which works basically in the same way as the JOC at a normal Army/Tactical Group Headquarters in war. It is however concerned entirely with direct support as there is no air opposition.

3. The duties of the Army Staff (GSO 2 (Air)) are to:—

(*a*) Plan Joint operations with the RAF Staff.

(*b*) Receive and assess demands for air support from the ground forces and to allot priorities when necessary.

(*c*) Inform the demanding units of the air effort allocated to them.

(*d*) Keep the RAF informed of projected ground operations and of the results of operations conducted with air support.

(*e*) Provide GLOs (see para. 8) with briefing material and keep them informed on current and future operations.

4. The duties of the RAF Staff (Squadron Leader Operations and Intelligence Officer) are to:—

(*a*) Decide on the suitability of tasks and allocate priorities.

(*b*) Plan joint operations with the Army Staff.

(*c*) Allocate aircraft and issue the RAF operation orders.

(*d*) Collect, collate and disseminate RAF intelligence.

5. GSO 2 (Air) and Squadron Leader Operations are always on call. Units may communicate direct with GSO 2 (Air) on matters of urgency.

Liaison

6. Army/RAF Liaison is maintained by RAF representatives from the JOC (usually a Squadron Leader Operations) and Ground Liaison Officers (GLOs) at RAF units.

7. **RAF representatives, JOC.**—The RAF representative from JOC is required to:—

(*a*) Visit SF units and advise on air matters when requested.

(*b*) Assist in joint planning of Army/Air operations.

(*c*) Form, with a GLO, an Air Control Team (ACT) when required.

8. **GLOs.**—GLOs are army officers specially trained in Land Air Warfare. They are normally based at RAF airfields where their duties are to:—

(*a*) Present the ground forces requirements to the RAF.

(*b*) Portray the ground situation to their RAF commander, pilots, and aircrews.

(*c*) Assist in the interrogation of aircrews on return from missions.

(*d*) Report results of missions to the military commander concerned.

(*e*) Form an ACT when required, with or without an RAF representative.

9. In addition to their duties at RAF airfields, GLOs are in support of Army formations, the police and civil authorities. In conjunction with or in the absence of RAF representatives their duties are to:—

(*a*) Keep in the operational picture and brief the JOC on the ground situation as necessary.

(*b*) Paint the air picture to the ground troops.

(*c*) Be available to give air support advice to formation and unit commanders.

(*d*) Check that the various aspects of Army/Air operations are functioning satisfactorily and inform the JOC of any difficulties.

G Int/Air Recce

10. Co-ordination of PR demands, processing and interpretation, and of visual air reconnaissance is carried out by a GSO 3 Int/Air Recce at HQ Malaya Command.

11. This Officer is directed by G (Int) and works in close conjunction with APIS, detachment JAPIC and the JOC.

Section 3.—OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT

Aircraft and Armament

1. The following aircraft are available:—

(*a*) VAMPIRES . . (Jet fighter/ground attack).
(*b*) HORNETS . . (Fighter/ground attack).
(*c*) LINCOLNS . . (Medium bomber).
(*d*) SUNDERLANDS . . (Flying Boat).

2. These aircraft are variously armed with 1,000 lb., 500 lb., and 20 lb. bombs and 60 lb. rocket projectiles (RP). They can also strafe with 20 mm cannon or .5-in or .303-in machine guns. Lincolns can carry 4,000 lb. bombs for special operations.

Types of Offensive Air Support

2. Offensive Air Support may take any of the following forms:—

(*a*) *Air Strikes.*—Air strikes consist of bombing, rocket and/or strafing attacks directed against CT targets in the jungle. The object of such attacks is to surprise and kill CT.

(*b*) *Harassing Attacks.*—Harassing attacks aim primarily at lowering CT morale. The purpose of this type of attack is to maintain a continuous pressure on the CT by having aircraft in the area for long periods, by day and by night dropping bombs round the clock. Harassing attacks may be classed as:—

(i) Short Term (up to 3 days).
(ii) Long Term (up to 10 days).

(*c*) *Close Support.*—This is active air support of troops in actual contact with the CT; opportunities for this type of air action are rare in Malaya.

(*d*) *Air Alert.*—Air Alert Missions are to provide cover for Helicopters operating in deep jungle and for VIPs and special convoys.

(*e*) *Psychological Warfare.*—Psychological Warfare Operations include the use of Voice Aircraft and leaflet dropping.

3. For particular operations the Air Striking Force can use the following:—

(*a*) Bombs fitted with special VT fuzes.

(*b*) 1,000 lb. bombs with delayed action fuses of ½, 1, 6, 12, 36, 72 and 144 hours.

(*c*) Flare dropping at night.

4. **Aims of Offensive Support.**—Offensive support is normally called upon to achieve one or more of the following aims:—

(*a*) To destroy camps and inflict casualties.

(*b*) To harass and lower morale.

(*c*) To drive CT out of an area and into our own ambushes.

(*d*) To move CT on to ground of our choosing.

(*e*) To disperse large parties of CT.

(*f*) To protect an area or convoy route by air cover.

(*g*) To deceive CT as to own troops' intentions and locations.

Application of Offensive Support

5. **Independent Strikes.—**

(*a*) These are strikes carried out against a concentration of CT such as a known occupied camp. It may sometimes be desirable when attacking targets of this nature that the RAF should be cast in the primary role.

(*b*) The most effective attack that can be carried out in these circumstances is one in which 5–9 Lincolns flying in close formation drop a comprehensive pattern or carpet of bombs which completely envelopes the target area.

(*c*) Accuracy of bombing is vital in this type of attack. This can be achieved in one of two ways:—

(i) By the use of a smoke marker dropped by an AOP Auster aircraft.

(ii) By a timed run from a known datum.

Of the two methods described the former is more accurate (See Auster Target Marking System at Appendix *M*).

(*d*) Hornets can also be used against pin-point targets, but because of the lighter armament carried by these aircraft it is preferable that the targets selected should be

smaller in size. As a guide the following figures are given as the optimum sizes for targets of this nature:—

LINCOLNS 500 × 500 yards square.
HORNETS 50 × 50 yards square.

Ideally a Hornet target should be small enough to be described by a six figure map reference.

(*e*) Other requirements from the air aspect are:—

(i) Positive information regarding the presence of CT in the target area.
(ii) Target screened from all ground and air action likely to compromise the effect of a surprise attack.
(iii) Initial reconnaissance by AOP or PR aircraft.
(iv) Selection of the best time of day from the weather aspect.
(v) Immediate follow up by ground forces whenever possible.

6. **Harrassing Strikes.**—These are strikes carried out by the RAF in the supporting role.

(*a*) *Uses.*—They might be used to:—

(i) Maintain pressure on CT, possibly following an independent strike.
(ii) Break up concentrations and possibly to bring CT into contact with ground forces.
(iii) Lower morale and assist in bringing about surrenders, e.g. attacks on cultivations which show signs of occupation.
(iv) Attack CT areas not easily accessible to ground forces, e.g. swamp areas.
(v) By night to lower morale.

(*b*) Air requirements for harassing attacks are:—

(i) Sure information that CT are in the target area.
(ii) Target to be as small as possible to ensure that the attack is concentrated and effective, never larger than 6 map squares and ideally about 4 map squares.
(iii) Use of the voice aircraft and leaflet dropping whenever possible.
(iv) For maximum effect harassing attacks should be for as long as possible.

7. **Air Escort.**—Air alert missions are flown when the CT threat justifies it to escort.

(*a*) VIPs and other important convoys.

(*b*) Helicopters in deep jungle.

8. **Close Support Strikes.**—These are strikes in support of ground forces in actual contact with the CT.

9. **Selection of Targets.**—The following factors should be considered:—

(*a*) What can the air do which the ground forces cannot?

(*b*) What can the ground forces do better if they have air support?

(*c*) What is the air support required to achieve?

(*d*) Timing and local weather conditions which may prevent aircraft attacking, e.g., low cloud, heavy rain.

(*e*) Positions of own troops in relation to the target.

(*f*) *Safety precautions.*—Normally Lincolns require 1,500 yards and other aircraft 1,000 yards between the edge of the target and own troops. In some circumstances 500 yards may be accepted by the RAF.

(*g*) *Police clearance.*—Police clearance is required for ALL targets, unless troops are actually in contact.

(*h*) *Size of target.*—The smaller the target the more concentrated and effective the attack.

10. **Requests for Offensive Air Support.—**

(*a*) Offensive Air Support Requests will be submitted direct to JOC HQ Malaya Command in accordance with the guide to the preparation of requests given in Appendix *A*. Copy of all requests will be sent to higher formation HQ, who have the right of veto or amendment, and to GLOs TENGAH and BUTTERWORTH.

(*b*) Requests will normally be given precedence 'OP IMMEDIATE'.

(*c*) The words 'ASSU NET' will be included at the beginning of the text.

11. JOC will pass acceptances and refusals direct to units, copy to formation HQ concerned.

12. **Snap Reports.**—Immediately aircraft return from a strike, the GLO will obtain a quick debrief from the crew and will signal a snap report to the JOC and the unit and formation HQ concerned. Snap Reports will include the following information:—

(*a*) RAF operation order number and target number if applicable.

(*b*) If all armament fell in target area. If not, grid reference of area hit outside target area.

(*c*) Time on and off target.

(*d*) Additional information, including grid reference of anything seen in target area, e.g. unexploded bombs. Reports of unexploded bombs should include approximate location, direction of bombing run, number of bombs in the stick which failed to explode and any other information likely to assist a demolition party.

13. **Follow Up Reports.**—Follow Up Reports should be prepared as soon as circumstances allow giving more detailed information in accordance with Appendix *O*. These reports should be submitted by the unit concerned to its formation HQ for forwarding to HQ Malaya Command copy to Air HQ Malaya. HQ Malaya Command requires two copies. Copies of unit reports should be sent to GLOs concerned.

Section 4.—TRANSPORT SUPPORT

General

1. Transport Support includes:—

(*a*) Air supply drops.

(*b*) Communication flights.

(*c*) Operational airlifts—freight and personnel.

Air Supply

2. **Notice Required.—**

(*a*) Normal air supply requests will reach addressees by 1100 hrs on the day prior to the drop. Additions will not be allowed after this time unless essential.

(*b*) Genuine emergency requests will be accepted later and may be passed by telephone to HQ Malaya Command GSO 2 (Air) or Duty Officer but NOT to 55 AD Coy RASC Kuala Lumpur.

3. **Selection of DZs.—**

(*a*) *Size.*—DZs should be as large as possible. The minimum requirement is that the marking should be visible to the aircraft and clear of overhanging branches.

(*b*) *Aircraft circuit.*—Supply aircraft release their packs at approximately 250 feet. They must fly a straight course before and after each drop before circling to carry out the next drop. Whenever possible a DZ should be sited where there is no hill within a mile radius, which is 300 feet higher than the DZ.

4. **DZ Marking.—**

(*a*) A letter will be displayed in fluorescent panels in the centre of each DZ for identification and for use as an aiming point.

(*b*) When several units or sub-units are to receive drops in the same area, care must be taken that each DZ has a different identification sign; the same letter with a varying number of bars is acceptable.

(*c*) As the aircraft is seen or heard approaching, the troops on the DZ should put up smoke to attract the attention of the pilot. The No. 80 grenade is most suitable for this purpose.

(*d*) In addition, continuous smoke will be put up throughout the drop to enable the pilot to keep the DZ in view. This is best done by keeping a fire burning on the edge of the DZ.

5. **DZ Signals.—**

(*a*) If the aircraft finds a DZ marked with the correct letter and smoke at or near the grid reference given in the demand, the pilot will carry out the drop even if he has no wireless contact with the DZ.

(*b*) Ground troops should try to establish wireless contact with the aircraft as soon as it approaches the DZ.

(*c*) If wireless contact is not possible the Verey Light Code shown in Appendix *H* will be used.

(*d*) If wireless contact is gained, the pilot can readily give information on the surrounding country or accept messages for transmission to base or headquarters.

6. **Safety Precautions during Dropping.**—The DZ must be clear of men during dropping. Free dropping is particularly dangerous to men on the ground.

7. **Unidentified DZs.**—If an aircraft is unable to identify a DZ, the pilot will fly low over the headquarters of the unit concerned. The headquarters should then communicate with the aircraft by RT on the DZ frequency.

8. **Tactics.**—If for operational reasons, aircraft are required to avoid any particular areas during a drop, to make dummy runs, or to give a positional fix, this should be stated in the air supply request.

9. **Rations.**—

(*a*) *Types available.*—

(i) The field operations scale ... This is a complete ration for 1 man for 1 day.
(FARELF Ration Scale
No. 21—BT
No. 22—GT
No. 23—MT
and SARAWAK Rangers).

(ii) The field operations scale with tinned equivalents in lieu of fresh items ... To be demanded as 'fd ops TE'.

(iii) *Ration Packs.*—See Chapter XXI Section 2.

(*b*) *Requests.*—

(i) The field operations ration should only be requested for two days as after that time it becomes unfit to eat. The field operations tinned ration has all perishable items replaced by the equivalent tinned items. There is no need for troops to be fed on pack rations throughout an entire operation, e.g.:—

'.....BRITISH fd ops 41 for 2 days (.) BRITISH fd ops TE 41 for 2 days (.) BRITISH 24 hr. for 2 days (.).....'

(ii) Where not more than three BRITISH personnel are on operations with ASIAN or AFRICAN troops, the small quantities of food involved make it impracticable to drop the BRITISH field operations ration. In such cases, the field operations ration requested will be the same as that of the main body of troops, e.g. GURKHA, AFRICAN or MALAY, e.g.:—

'. . . .MALAY fd ops 23 for 1 day (.) MALAY 2 men 20 for 3 days (.) BRITISH 24 hr. 3 for 3 days (.).....'

(iii) Example of a request is shown at Appendix *B*.

10. **Dollarfed System.**—Where a unit/sub-unit operates from a base that has to be supplied by air and it is possible to purchase locally the perishable supplies enumerated in paragraph 31 (*b*) of the MALAYA Standing Administrative Orders, SECOND EDITION, the code word 'DOLLARFED' will be used in air supply demands. As the dollar per day does not include meat, units will demand either fresh or preserved meat as required, e.g.:—

'GURKHA DOLLARFED 31 for 4 days including 1 days fresh meat, 3 days tinned meat.'

11. **Ordnance Clothing.**—Clothing will not normally be requested in excess of 10 per cent of any one drop.

12. **Unit Complaints.**—Unit complaints, other than losses of NAAFI stores will be made immediately direct to HQ Malaya Command and not to 55 AD Coy RASC Kuala Lumpur.

13. **Losses of NAAFI Stores on Air Supply.**—

(*a*) On receipt of NAAFI Stores supplied by air, the stores will be checked against the NAAFI invoice enclosed in the parachute pack.

(*b*) All deficiencies and breakages will be noted and details will be notified by units DIRECT to HQ Malaya Command on the form shown below, within one month of date of loss. If circumstances warrant it HQ Malaya Command may authorise reimbursement to unit funds from Imprest.

HQ Malaya Command
'Q' (MAINT)
NAAFI STORES LOST ON AIR SUPPLY

1. UNIT .....
2. DATE OF AIR DROP .....
3. DZ LETTER .....
4. ORIGINATOR's No. and DTO OF AIR SUPPLY DEMAND .....
5. NAAFI INVOICE No. (if recovered) .....
6. DEFICIENCIES .....
7. ACTUAL VALUE OF LOSS .....
8. STATEMENT CONCERNING LOSS

Date ....
O C

(*c*) Claims will be met only if satisfactory evidence is produced to show that the stores were not lost due to negligence on the part of:—
(i) The receiving unit, or
(ii) The personnel engaged in the transporting and delivery of the stores.

(*d*) The above procedure will in no way affect the payment of NAAFI bills. Units will continue to pay bills regardless of whether or not they have received the stores.

14. **Recovery of Air Despatch Equipment.—*(t)**

(*a*) The recovery of air despatch equipment is of great importance and upon such recovery may rest continuance of the present scale of air supply. Particularly important is the recovery of nylon parachutes which are in very short supply. This type of parachute is used to drop breakable equipment such as wireless sets, medical and NAAFI stores.

(*b*) On operations there are occasions when air despatch equipment cannot be recovered, and has to be destroyed. Every effort must be made to keep the destruction of air despatch equipment to a minimum. Recovery should always be effected whenever possible.

(*c*) Porters may be hired to carry recovered air despatch equipment. The rates of payment to such porters payable through unit Imprest accounts are:—

(i) Per day without food$3
(ii) Per day with food$2

See Chapter XIX. Section 4 paragraph 3.

(iii) The head man is entitled to 50 cents a day extra.

(*d*) Equipment recovered after air supply will be disposed of as follows:—

(i) Units will hand all recovered equipment to the nearest RASC Unit and obtain a receipt.

(ii) RASC Units will despatch immediately on receipt all recovered equipment to 55 AD Coy RASC Kuala Lumpur.

(*e*) To assist and encourage the recovery of air despatch equipment a copy of a memorandum will be included in each air supply pack, giving a brief statement of the financial aspect of air despatch losses together with notes for the dropping zone commander on the recognition of serviceable and unserviceable parachutes. Also included are notes on the employment of porters. This memorandum will be written in the language appropriate to the unit receiving the air supply drop.

Communication Flights, other than by Auster

15. **Requests.—**

(*a*) Requests for communication flights which cannot be met by AUSTERS will be submitted to the JOC, HQ Malaya Command in accordance with the Guide to the Preparation of Requests for Communication Flights in Appendix *C*.

(*b*) JOC will decide what aircraft is most suitable for the task and will inform applicants of acceptance or refusal.

16. **PIONEER Aircraft.**—A flight of PIONEER aircraft is based at KUALA LUMPUR for communication flights.

17. **Performance.—**

(*a*) *Range and Speed.*—The PIONEER has a range of 250 miles at a speed of approximately 100 mph.

(*b*) *Load.*—The load is normally three passengers, but four lightweight passengers may sometimes be carried. The available pay load is approximately 600 lb. If an aircraft is required to night-stop away from base, an inspection is necessary and a crew man has to be carried. It will be necessary to know in advance the weight of each passenger and baggage when more than three need to be carried or when a night stop is planned.

(*c*) *Landing Grounds.*—Although the PIONEER is capable of landing and taking off in a very short distance, at present it will only land at recognised landing grounds including Auster airstrips.

18. **Tasks and Priorities.**—Tasks for these aircraft in order of priority are as follows:—

(*a*) Liaison and intercommunication flights for senior commanders or their principal staff officers.

(*b*) Flights that would otherwise have to be made by helicopter.

(*c*) Flights in support of helicopter operations with the aim of saving helicopter hours.

(*d*) Flights that release Auster aircraft for their primary role of tactical reconnaissance.

19. The PIONEERS will not be used for long flights between large terminal airfields where other RAF transport aircraft, Malayan Airways or Federation Air Services aircraft are available.

Operational Airlifts

20. **Freight.**—Requests will be submitted as far in advance as possible in the same way as those for air supply drops, except that:—

(*a*) Requests will begin with the word 'AIRLIFT'.

(*b*) Paragraph 'Y' will give:—

(i) Receiving airfield.

(ii) Latest date/time by which it is operationally essential for stores to be received.

21. **Personnel.**—Requests will be submitted as far in advance as possible in the same way as those for communication flights, except that requests will begin with the words 'PERSONNEL AIRLIFT'.

Section 5.—HELICOPTER SUPPORT

Availability

1. The helicopter force consists of one squadron of medium and one squadron of light helicopters. *(S)

Roles and Priorities

2. The allotment of fixed priorities to the various roles for which helicopters can be used is neither practicable nor desirable. A flexible system based on control by a staff which is aware of the importance of each current operation and which understands the problems and priorities of civil, police and army users will be adopted.

3. As a guide to the JOC and those requesting helicopter sorties, priorities should be allotted as follows:—

(*a*) Tactical movements of troops, to include offensive operations against the CT.

(*b*) Casualty evacuation.

(*c*) Movement of Commanders, Staff Officers and Intelligence material (e.g. evacuation of CT dead, for identification) vital to the success of operations.

(*d*) Interchange of police garrison of jungle forts where this is accepted as a helicopter task.

(*e*) Crop Spraying.

(*f*) Civil and SF requests affecting the Emergency, which can be carried out in no other way in the time available.

(*g*) SF requests for reconnaissance, air target marking and communications flights which could only be carried out by other means with excessive waste of time and effort.

(*h*) Similar Civil requests for reconnaissance and communications flights.

(*j*) SF requests for supply and salvage.

(*k*) Civil requests for supply and salvage.

(*l*) SF and Civil requests for reconnaissance, supply or evacuation in the event of serious disaster. This may take over-riding priority.

4. S.55.—

(*a*) *Load and Distance.*—The following tables give planning figures for the performance of S.55 helicopters:—

Serial (*a*)	From (*b*)	To (*c*)	Distance to be flown before re-fuelling (*d*)	Available Load (lb.) (*e*)
1	Large LZ	Large LZ	100 miles	1,000
2	Large LZ	Small LZ	70 miles	850
3	Large LZ	Small LZ	30 miles	1,000
4	Small LZ	Small LZ	30 miles	850

Notes:—These figures are for LZs at a height of approximately 2,000 feet. Loads decrease by about 150 lb. for every 1,000 feet increase in height above 2,000 feet.

(*b*) *Fuel.*—Fuel consumption is approximately 35 gallons per hour.

(*c*) *Speed.*—For planning purposes the average speed of an S.55 is one nautical mile per minute.

(*d*) *Rate of Effort.*—An aircraft normally carries enough fuel to fly for 70 minutes without refuelling and can carry out approximately 9 sorties in one day to an LZ 10–15 miles away.

(*e*) *External Loads.*—Loads of up to 800 lb. can be carried externally attached to the hook slung under the aircraft.

(*f*) *Winching.*—

(i) Only two S.55 fitted with winches are normally available for operations.

(ii) Winching cannot be carried out with the aircraft flying at a height of more than 80 feet above the ground. Winching in primary jungle or in trees above 70 feet high is therefore not feasible. For all winching operations a clearing not less than 15 yards in diameter is required to prevent the winch hook getting snagged.

(iii) Up to approximately 50 feet the maximum load is 400 lb. Between 50 and 80 feet the load is reduced to 200 lb.

(iv) Load must be attached and detached quickly and a clear 'go up' signal given immediately the load is ready for hoisting.

Specification for Helicopter Landing Zone

5. **Dimensions.—**

(*a*) A clear area 30 yards in diameter.

(*b*) A further area 10 yards wide and cleared to 2 feet above the ground all round the clear area will be prepared (see sketch at paragraph 9). The entire LZ will thus be 50 yards in diameter.

(*c*) No branches must overhang this 50 yards clearing.

6. **Ground.—**

(*a*) *When Landing.*—Ground will be level and firm. The surface will be clear of all loose rubbish, tree stumps, etc. This is most important as the S.55 helicopter has a ground clearance of only 10½ inches.

(*b*) *When Hovering.*—Operations can be carried out with the helicopter hovering. The same 50 yards clearing is required and the helicopter will hover 2 feet above the surface obstructions. Owing to pilot fatigue and the high engine power required during hovering, loading or unloading of the aircraft must be carried out as fast as possible. Every effort must be made to prepare the ground for landing the aircraft.

(*c*) The ground will not be cleared by burning, nor should any fires be alight while a helicopter is landing or hovering.

7. **Approaches.—**

(*a*) For permanent and normal operational LZ, angles of approach and exit will not be greater than 30° measured from the edge of the clearing. If there are trees higher than approximately 120 feet at the edge of the proposed LZ, an approach (or exit) lane through these trees is required.

(*b*) In an extreme emergency it will be possible to use an LZ when the approach angle is up to 45°.

(*c*) Permanent LZs, e.g. police stations or jungle forts, should be of the same dimensions as in (*a*) but approach angles should if possible be 10° for at least 500 yards in order to facilitate the carriage in or out of maximum loads.

8. **Markings.—**


(*a*) LZ will be marked with the letter 'L' at the best touch down point.

(*b*) For security reasons, operational LZ in isolated areas will be marked in this manner only immediately before use. LZ in safe areas such as padangs, football grounds, etc., may be marked permanently.

(*c*) If for any reason, helicopters should not land on an LZ the marking letter 'L' will be replaced by the letter 'X'.

(*d*) When a clearing is not in deep primary jungle wind direction should be indicated by smoke.

9. Below is a diagramatic sketch of a LZ.



Helicopter Support Requests

10. Requests for helicopters will be submitted to the JOC in accordance with the specimen at Appendix *D*. A guide to preparation of requests is at Appendix *E*.

11. It is important that full details are included in the request in order that:—

(*a*) Priorities can be allotted.
(*b*) Flight plan can be made.
(*c*) Aircraft can be used economically.
(*d*) Fuel requirements can be estimated.
(*e*) Further tasks can be planned.

12. Requests often exceed the availability of aircraft. When requests cannot be met on the date required, the JOC will offer alternatives.

13. Once helicopters have been given their task, last minute variations may well upset the flight plan. Units to whom helicopters have been allotted may, in emergency, ask a pilot to vary or increase a task without prior reference to the JOC. The pilot may accept at his own discretion.

14. The actual load to be carried on any sortie is at the discretion of the pilot. Under no circumstances will this load be exceeded.

Emplaning and Deplaning

15. Drills for emplaning and deplaning are given in Appendix *F*.

Organisation on LZs

16. **LZ Commander.**—An English speaking officer or NCO (where possible the force commander) will be detailed as LZ commander on each LZ. He will invariably go on the first lift into a LZ and will travel in the helicopter piloted by the senior pilot accompanied by his navigator. He should be prepared to discuss with the senior pilot, on the aircraft intercommunication system, the selection of an alternative LZ should the original selection not be suitable. Once on the ground he becomes LZ commander with duties as follows:—

(*a*) To act as the sole link between the helicopter pilots and ground troops.
(*b*) To give final detailed briefing to pilots.

(*c*) To supervise emplaning and deplaning.

(*d*) To improve LZ when necessary, by cutting down trees, bushes, lallang, etc.

(*e*) To select in conjunction with the pilot the best touch down point on the LZ and mark it with the letter 'L' in fluorescent panels.

(*f*) To marshal aircraft into a LZ after the first lift, paying particular attention to tail and under fuselage clearance.

(*g*) To organise the ground defence of the LZ while the lift is in progress, and the orderly dispersal of troops from the LZ to their task.

17. **Marshalling.**—Details of hand signals to be used are contained in Appendix *G*.

18. **Security of LZs.**—Air escort will normally be provided for helicopters using an unprotected LZ.

19. **Fuel.**—Stocks of AVGAS are maintained at a number of points throughout the country. When further supplies are required, HQ Malaya Command will notify quantity and location to the formation HQ concerned who will arrange to provide.

20. **Communications.**—See Section 9, paragraph 6.

Section 6.—CASUALTY EVACUATION BY AIR

Evacuation by Helicopter

1. **Availability of Helicopter.**—A helicopter will be available at short notice for casualty evacuation.

2. **Factors affecting requests for evacuation.**—

(*a*) The casualty's need for urgent medical attention.

(*b*) Availability of other means of evacuation and time involved.

(*c*) Likely effects of the air journey on the patient.

(*d*) Possibility of making a suitable LZ in time. If the casualty occurs some days march into deep jungle it will always be quicker to clear a new LZ.

(*e*) It should always be possible to find a LZ near the point where the patrol carrying the casualty emerges from the jungle. Commanders at all levels must bear this fact constantly in mind.

3. **Procedure for Evacuation.**—If helicopter evacuation will be the quickest means of evacuation the procedure will be as given below:—

4. **Action by Patrol Commander.**—

(*a*) The patrol commander will pass to unit HQ:—

(i) Personal details of the casualty.
(ii) Description of injuries.
(iii) Grid reference of proposed LZ.
(iv) Time by which casualty will be at LZ.
(v) Time by which the LZ is expected to be ready.

(*b*) The patrol commander will inform his unit HQ immediately the casualty has arrived at the LZ.

5. **Action by Unit HQ.**—

(*a*) Immediately information has been received that the casualty has occurred a request for a helicopter will be passed to the JOC by fastest means. The following is the minimum information required:—

(i) Nature of casualty and whether sitting or lying.
(ii) Grid reference of LZ with description if possible.
(iii) Time the LZ is expected to be ready.
(iv) Destination of casualty.

(*b*) Unit HQ will then place a request, through formation HQ for an AUSTER to reconnoitre the proposed LZ. If the LZ is suitable, this fact will be reported by fastest means to JOC and to unit HQ.

6. **Method of Evacuation.**—

(*a*) A helicopter will be detailed to RV at the AUSTER strip nearest to unit HQ. Where possible the RMO of the unit will be picked up and be taken in by the helicopter to see the casualty.

(*b*) If the LZ is found to be unsuitable, the AUSTER will search for a better one. The pilot will inform the patrol commander either by RT or message drop. Troops will NOT move until told to do so by the pilot, otherwise contact may be lost and much time wasted.

(*c*) The helicopter will carry out the evacuation escorted by the AUSTER if required. The final decision on the suitability of the LZ and the load to be carried will be made by the helicopter pilot.

(*d*) If for any reason a helicopter cannot undertake the evacuation, the patrol commander will be told as soon as possible and the next quickest method of evacuation begun immediately.

Routine Evacuation by Ambulance Aircraft

7. Routine evacuation of casualties is carried out once per week by ambulance VALETTA from BUTTERWORTH, TAIPING, IPOH and KUALA LUMPUR to SINGAPORE. Requests for the use of this Service will be passed through medical channels to HQ FEAF.

Emergency Evacuation by AUSTER or Transport Aircraft

8. On some occasions emergency evacuation can be carried out more expeditiously by AUSTER or Transport aircraft than by helicopter. Such occasions will be when distances are great or when the casualty is close to a landing ground or airfield. Requests for AUSTERS will be made to the Army formation concerned. Requests for transport aircraft will be made to the JOC.

Section 7.—AIR OBSERVATION POST/LIGHT LIAISON (AOP/LL) FLIGHTS

Command and Control

1. (*a*) The AOP/LL Squadron is a RAF unit under command of Air Headquarters Malaya.

(*b*) The Squadron is under the operational control of HQ Malaya Command who issue the executive orders for operations in support of the ground forces.

(*c*) Flights are detached in support of Army formations and are under the operational control of those formations.

Tasks

2. The main tasks are as follows:—

(*a*) *Reconnaissance.*—Most of the air reconnaissance for CT cultivation and camps is undertaken by AUSTERS. There are four types of reconnaissance.

(i) *Visual Reconnaissance.*—There are two types of visual reconnaissance: square and area reconnaissances—

(*aa*) *Square Reconnaissance.*—These are 10,000 yards square map squares. One square can be reconnoitred in one 1½ hour sortie (not counting flying time to the square and back). Flights carry out a continual search of Malaya by this method although formations lay down priorities.

(*bb*) *Area Reconnaissance.*—These are reconnaissances of particular areas chosen usually as a result of existing intelligence reports and are designed to search a special area in which it is suspected that the CT is active. This type of reconnaissance usually produces the best results. Security is NOT necessarily prejudiced by the presence of aircraft over a certain area.

(ii) *Topographical Reconnaissance.*—This enables commanders to look at the area in which they are operating. Unless they are accustomed to flying, map reading will at first be difficult and passengers will be well advised to mark obvious landmarks on the map before take-off. Commanders should not expect too much from these flights. It is only after considerable practice that signs of CT activity can be seen. These flights should be limited to one hour. Passengers should always take a map with them.

(iii) *Contact Reconnaissance.*—Contact reconnaissances are carried out for the following reasons:—

(*aa*) To pinpoint a lost patrol and give it its grid reference.

(*bb*) To guide a patrol to a given point.

(*cc*) To act as a wireless relay station.

When a contact reconnaissance has been requested the patrol should send out a tuning and netting call as soon as it hears the aircraft and, in the case of (*aa*) and (*bb*) above, be prepared to put up smoke when the pilot

orders it. All AUSTER aircraft carry a 62 set and when required can also use an 88 set. The satisfactory range of the latter set is limited to about 2,000 yards.

(iv) *Photographic Reconnaissance.*—The AUSTERS can only take air photographs with a hand-held camera of a particular point; generally only obliques and low obliques. Vertical runs and mosaics cannot be undertaken.

(*b*) *Target Indication.*—On suitable targets an AUSTER is sometimes required to mark the target with a smoke marker to give an aiming point for bombers. See Appendix *N*.

(*c*) *Air OP.*—With guns and mortars and for shore bombardment by HM Ships.

(*d*) *Supply Drops.*—

(i) Free or parachute drops can be made of single loads weighing up to 50 lb. Maximum weight per sortie is 200 lb., in four 50 lb. loads.

(ii) The deciding factor in requesting an AUSTER air drop as opposed to a VALETTA supply drop is the time factor, together with the weight and nature of the stores. An AUSTER air drop can very often be laid on at shorter notice than a VALETTA supply drop. AUSTERS can either free drop or parachute drop, though the latter cuts down the weight of stores that can be carried and increases the time needed for preparation.

(iii) By arrangement with the Flight Commander it is possible for a unit to store, ready for dropping, a number of the particular kind of rations that the unit uses, in his Flight location. This enables an emergency supply drop to be carried out almost at once.

(iv) The drill for the troops on the ground accepting an AUSTER air drop is the same as for a proper VALETTA supply drop.

(*e*) *Helicopter Escort.*—This task normally embraces the reconnaissance of a suitable LZ, the escort of the helicopter to and from the LZ and any other flight away from civilisation. It will be given highest priority when demanded in connection with casualty evacuation.

(*f*) *Evacuation of Casualties.*—Casualties can be evacuated in a Neil-Robertson Stretcher or a blanket. Loading and unloading is difficult and uncomfortable. Medical advice should be sought for lying patients with broken bones. A helicopter should normally be used in preference to an AUSTER.

(*g*) *Message Dropping.*—The first man to recover a message bag dropped by an AUSTER should wave it round his head so that the pilot can see that the message has been received.

(*h*) *Air Search.*—Search for crashed aircraft.

(*j*) *Communication Flights.*—Communication flights will be arranged only when other means of transport cannot reasonably be used and will be subject to the requirements for aircraft for operational purposes.

Requests for AUSTER Flights

3. Requests for AUSTER flights will be passed to the Army formation which a particular flight supports giving as much warning as possible. Flight Commanders will usually affiliate a pilot to a particular battalion. The best results will be obtained by the unit in close liaison with this pilot.

4. The following information is required when making a request:—

(*a*) *For Pilot Reconnaissance.*—
(i) Area.
(ii) Particulars of Task.
(iii) Intelligence Background.
(iv) Latest time information required.

(*b*) *For Topographical Reconnaissance.*—
(i) Time and place for passenger.
(ii) Passenger's Rank and Name.
(iii) Area.
(iv) Task.

(*c*) *For Contact Reconnaissance.*—
(i) Time and Place for passenger, if any.
(ii) Passenger's Rank and Name.
(iii) Approximate Grid Reference of patrol.
(iv) Task (including whether English speaking operator is available with patrol).
(v) Intelligence background and position reports.
(vi) Frequency and call sign of patrol.

(*d*) *For Communication Flights.*—
(i) Time of Departure.
(ii) Place of Departure.
(iii) Passenger's Rank and Name.
(iv) Time of return if necessary.

5. Requests for air observation of gun or mortar fire should be originated by a representative of the fire unit.

6. Requests for AUSTER supply dropping should only be made if RAF VALETTAS cannot carry out the task.

7. There are generally insufficient aircraft to meet all demands. By varying the time of take-off, it may be possible to get considerably more flying time into each day. Aircraft are often required for other sorties and should not be kept waiting.

8. **Passengers.**—Intending AUSTER Passengers should note that:—

(*a*) They must wear long trousers.
(*b*) They must carry a weapon and ammunition.
(*c*) The total weight of passengers baggage including personal weapon must not exceed 30 lb.

Section 8.—PARACHUTE OPERATIONS

General

1. 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (22 SAS) is a unit specially trained and equipped for operations in deep jungle and also for parachuting.

2. The majority of 22 SAS is normally deployed in the jungle and no more than one squadron (a maximum of 60 troops) is likely to be available for parachute operations at short notice.

Capabilities

3. 22 SAS can carry out parachute descents into:—
(*a*) Primary jungle.
(*b*) Padi or clearings free of logs and stumps.
(*c*) Matured rubber.
(*d*) Oil palm, cocoanut and other plantations.

4. The following types of surface are not suitable for parachute descents:—

(*a*) Secondary jungle.

(*b*) Bamboo (scattered clumps of young bamboo in primary jungle are acceptable).

(*c*) Clearings with logs, stumps, etc.

(*d*) Dead or wild rubber.

(*e*) Rocky ground.

(*f*) Stream beds—dry or flowing.

(*g*) Areas which have been subjected to air attack.

5. After descents parachutists may need from 20 minutes to 2 hours in which to reorganise for operations in a formed body. The time varies according to the surface of the DZ. Slopes offer no special obstacles to parachute landings, but very steep slopes and ridges do present special flying/parachuting problems and early information on this point will assist the mounting of the operation.

Characteristics

6. The chief characteristics of parachute troops are:—

(*a*) They can be introduced into areas not readily accessible from the ground or where there are no helicopter LZs.

(*b*) Their use does not compromise the target for an operation and can achieve surprise, especially where the local inhabitants are acting as a CT intelligence screen.

(*c*) They can provide an immediate follow up after an air attack, but the DZ must be clear of the bombed area.

(*d*) They are vulnerable during descent until they have reached the ground and have shed their harness when the abseil equipment has to be used. This process may take from 20 to 30 minutes. *(*h*)

Employment

7. Parachute troops may be employed:—

(*a*) To assist in jungle search and rescue.

(*b*) To provide patrols or ambush parties either independently or in conjunction with other troops, in areas where there are no helicopter LZs, or when no helicopters are available.

(*c*) For direct assault on CT camps, under similar conditions to (*b*) above.

Timing

8. Parachute troops can normally be ready to emplane for operations within the following times of a request for their use being agreed:—

(*a*) One troop (10–15 men) .. .. 6 hours.

(*b*) One squadron (maximum of 60 men) .. 24 hours.

9. A parachute operation requiring the employment of more than one squadron would take some days to mount as additional men would have to be withdrawn from deep jungle operations.

10. No parachute descents will be made after 1500 hours.

Requests

11. Requests for the employment of parachute troops will be submitted to HQ Malaya Command by formation HQ, giving as much as possible of the information required by the Guide to the Preparation of Requests given at Appendix *K*.

Command and Control

12. In all parachute operations the senior available officer of 22 SAS (normally the Commanding Officer) will be present at the take-off airfield. He will remain there from the time of arrival of the parachute troops at the airfield until it is confirmed that they have all dropped or that the parachute operation is cancelled.

13. When parachute troops operate independently the senior officer 22 SAS will be in command of the operation. With him will lie the responsibility for the cancellation, postponement or execution of the operation.

14. When HQ Malaya Command places parachute troops in support of another commander, he will command all troops engaged in the operation. The senior officer 22 SAS will be responsible for advising the superior commander if he considers that circumstances have made the parachute operation unduly hazardous or otherwise inadvisable. The ultimate responsibility for the cancellation, postponement or execution of the parachute operation will then lie with the superior commander.

15. **Liaison.**—22 SAS will provide a liaison officer with the superior commander.

Communications

16. 22 SAS will be responsible for establishing communications between:—

(*a*) The senior officer 22 SAS at the take-off airfield.
(*b*) The liaison officer with the superior commander.
(*c*) The parachute troops after they have dropped.

Section 9.—COMMUNICATIONS AND VISUAL SIGNALS

1. **Methods of Communication.**—Air support communications are carried out by:—

(*a*) Command wireless nets, telephone or teleprinter.
(*b*) Air support signals troop (ASST).
(*c*) Ground/Air Visual Signals.
(*d*) Ground/Air Voice Communication.

2. **Air Support Signals Troops (ASST).**—The ASST provides a wireless net reserved exclusively for air support signals traffic. A tentacle is allotted to each army formation headquarters and to GLOs on RAF airfields. Tentacles with GLOs include a mobile wireless station with HF sets for ground to ground and VHF sets for ground to air communication. Mobile stations can work independently of the static tentacle.

3. **Ground/Air Visual Signals.**—Ground/Air visual signals are provided in the following ways:—

(*a*) Verey light or Aldis lamp code, details of which are given in Appendix *H* to this chapter.
(*b*) Ground/Air panel system, details of which are contained in Appendix *J*.

4. **Ground/Air Voice Communications.**—In the absence of an ACT, ground troops can communicate on HF with the following aircraft:—

(*a*) LINCOLNS.
(*b*) VALETTAS.
(*c*) AUSTERS.
(*d*) HELICOPTERS S 55.

5. When troops wish to have communication with these aircraft, requests will include the necessary information for net identification sign, call signs and HF frequency to be used.

6. S 51 helicopters have only VHF equipment.

7. S 55 helicopters have both VHF and HF voice communication. As HF frequency cannot be changed in the air, a standard frequency (3710 Kcs) is allotted for communication between helicopters and ground forces or light aircraft. Prior to leaving base helicopters can tune to unit frequencies if necessary.

8. The HF transmitter in S 55 helicopters is not normally switched on unless it is known that ground troops or light aircraft wish to communicate with them. In order to warn the helicopter pilot that they wish to speak:—

(*a*) Ground troops will fire a white verey light as in Appendix *H* Ground/Air Light Signal Code.

(*b*) Light aircraft will fly on a parallel course with helicopter and rock wings.

9. **Call signs.—**

(*a*) Call sign 96 FOX is reserved for use by AUSTERs.

(*b*) Call sign 96 GEORGE is reserved for other aircraft, equipped with HF communication, that support ground troops. In particular this call sign is used by LINCOLNS when communicating directly with ground troops.

(*c*) VALETTAS when carrying out supply drops use as a call sign the DZ letter of the supply drop, on which they are engaged.

(*d*) Naval Air Squadron Helicopters used the call sign SIMBANG.

10. **Netting.—**

(*a*) Aircraft will normally net to ground stations.

(*b*) Ground stations will always net to helicopters.

Section 10.—PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Voice Aircraft

1. **Availability.**—DAKOTA, VALETTA and AUSTER aircraft specially fitted for broadcasting messages from the air are available to support the Federation Government PW policy. These aircraft are known as Voice aircraft and are based at RAF Kuala Lumpur.

2. **Method of Operating.—**

(*a*) Messages can be broadcast to pin-point and area targets. Areas are covered by the aircraft flying in a series of overlapping circles or on a series of parallel lines.

(*b*) Broadcasting is limited to one hour maximum for any one target during which time an area of approximately 40 map squares can be adequately covered. AUSTER aircraft are limited to 45 minutes broadcasting over a target but because of the reduced speed of the aircraft the area covered is much smaller.

(*c*) A number of different targets can be dealt with in one sortie but the AUSTER must land after 45 minutes broadcasting in order to change batteries.

3. **Employment.**—See Chapter III Section 10.

4. Voice Aircraft should not be used in an area where there is likely to be an air strike in the near future.

5. **Control.**—The operational control of Voice Aircraft is exercised by Air Headquarters Malaya.

6. **Requests for Voice Aircraft.**—

(*a*) Requests are submitted through police channels to Federal Police HQ, Kuala Lumpur for approval by the Voice Aircraft Committee on which the RAF is represented. All requests are prefixed with the word 'Hailer'. A guide to preparation of requests is at Appendix *L*.

(*b*) In cases of special emergency justifying an immediate Voice aircraft broadcast, originators may submit requests by signal prefixed 'Hailer Blitz'. Subject to weather, aircraft availability and acceptance of the request by the Voice Aircraft Committee, such requests will be met as soon as possible and aircraft may be recalled from other operations to carry them out.

7. **Leaflets.**—Leaflets may be dropped from all multi-seat aircraft but normally the Valetta air supply detachment at Kuala Lumpur and the various AOP/LL Flights carry out these tasks.

8. Demands for leaflets will be made as shown in Chapter III Section 10, paragraph 7.

Appendix A

GUIDE TO PREPARATION OF REQUESTS FOR OFFENSIVE SUPPORT

Index letter (incl in msg) (*a*)	Detail (incl in msg) (*b*)	Remarks (*c*)
A (TASK) ...	(i) Unit.	(i) To allow direct comn on queries.
	(ii) Map Sheet.	
	(iii) Grid refs of tgt.	
	(iv) Background to op and info on which based.	(iv) The more and better the info, the bigger the air effort likely to be put on.
	(v) What the strike is expected to achieve.	(v) On this depends type of ac and armament and tactics employed.
B (TIME AND DURATION)	(i) Time required on tgt.	(i) Alternative time if possible.
	(ii) Duration of strike.	(ii) Short sharp attack or is tgt required to be occupied for a period.
	(iii) Time after which no air action acceptable.	(iii) In case of unavoidable delays, ac on other tasks, bad weather.
C (POSN OF OWN TPS) ...	(i) Grid refs or at least distance and direction from tgt.	(i) Affects direction of attack and armament.
	(ii) Intentions of own tps after strike.	(ii) Affects tactics and armament.
D (SPECIAL INSTRS) ...	(i) Sigs to indicate tgt or own tps.	(i) Usually not necessary, unless own tps close to tgt. Sigs may be requested by RAF on certain tgts.
	(ii) Action by ac at end of strike.	(ii) Lt sigs or 'flag wag' over given area.
	(iii) Police clearance.	(iii) Whether given or requested. Which OCPD responsible.
	(iv) Any other special requirements.	(iv) If rubber huts, etc. in area, whether clear for attack.
	(v) Frequency Serial No. and if required NIS and any special call signs.	(v) Direct communications required as safety precaution.

Appendix A

GUIDE TO PREPARATION OF REQUESTS FOR OFFENSIVE SUPPORT

Index letter (not in msg) (a)	Detail (not in msg) (b)	Remarks (c)
A (TASK) ...	(i) Unit.	(i) To allow direct comm on quality.
	(ii) Map Sheet.	
	(iii) Grid refs of tgt.	
	(iv) Background to op and info on which based.	(iv) The more and better the info, the bigger the air effort likely to be put on.
	(v) What the strike is expected to achieve.	(v) On this depends type of ac and armament and tactics employed.
B (TIME AND DURATION)	(i) Time required on tgt.	(i) Alternative time if possible.
	(ii) Duration of strike.	(ii) Short sharp attack or is tgt required to be occupied for a period?
	(iii) Time after which no air action acceptable.	(iii) In case of unavoidable delays, ac on other tasks, bad weather.
C (POINT OF OWN TGT) ...	(i) Grid refs or at least distance and direction from clear tgt.	(i) Affects direction of attack and Ammunition.
	(ii) Intentions of own tps after strike.	(ii) Affects tactics and armament.
D (SPECIAL INSTRS) ...	(i) Sign to indicate tgt or own tps.	(i) Usually not necessary, unless own tps close to tgt. Sign may be required by RAF on certain tgts
	(ii) Action by ac at end of attack.	(ii) If ship or "flag" over given attn.
	(iii) Perfor clearance.	(iii) Whether given or required. Which OCPD responsible.
	(iv) Any other special instructions.	(iv) If rubber bats, etc. in area, whether clear for attack.
	(v) Frequency Serial No. and if required NIS and any special call signs.	(v) Direct communication as many required as safety precaution.

Appendix B

GUIDE TO PREPARATION OF REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPLY

1. Requests will be submitted by signal through normal signals channels. Precedence up to 'OPERATION IMMEDIATE' may be used if considered necessary.

2. Requests will be addressed to:—

(*a*) For action ... ... MALCOMD (Two copies for G(Air) and Q(Maint) if sent other than by wireless)
GLO RAF
Kuala Lumpur
55 AD Coy RASC
16 Fd Amb
COMPOL Q (when stores for Police are required).

(*b*) For information ... Next higher formation.

3. The text of requests will begin with the word 'AIRDROP'. The code letters V, W, X, Y will be used as shown below:—

(*a*) *'V'—Supplies Required—*

(i) Full details of supplies and stores required, in the following order:—
RASC Supplies
ORD Supplies
MED Supplies
ENGR Stores
NAAFI Requirements
UNIT Stores, mail and papers—if unit is able to deliver to 55 AD Coy RASC KL. Weight signalled must be accurate dead weight of stores. Stores must be delivered to the Air Despatch unit by 1200 hrs on the day before the drop.

(ii) Requirements for all forces/units/sub-units other than those of the unit placing the demand will be shown after the requirements order laid down in 3 (*a*) (i) above. This covers other Military units, Sarawak Rangers, Police (including Home Guard and SEPs), JCLOs and Aborigines.

(*b*) *'W'—DZ and Grid References—*

(i) Map sheet number, grid letters and six figure grid reference of the DZ. These may be encoded in SLIDEX. If encoded ensure this is correctly done and repeat encoding twice in text.

(ii) Grid references may be sent in later if they are not known when the original demand is despatched.

(*c*) *'X'—Recognition Aids—*

(i) DZ letter—to be shown on ground with fluorescent panels.

(ii) Any aid to facilitate recognition of DZ from the air, e.g. 'Clearing in valley on EAST bank of river'.

(iii) Wireless frequency and location of HQ or wireless control station. Frequency given from serial number in current HQ Malaya Command Signal instruction. Control station must be prepared to assist aircraft if in difficulty during air supply drop.

Appendix B—*continued*

(*d*) *'Y'—Time and Date Drop required*—

(i) As far as possible a margin of time will be given, e.g. '180900–181100 GH OCT or 1100–1400 or 1400—dark. 0900–1100 are first sorties and generally reliable for TOT.

(ii) HQ Malaya Command will signal actual time drop will be made only if it is NOT planned for the time requested. GLO RAF Kuala Lumpur will notify units of any last minute changes.

4. SPECIMEN AIR SUPPLY REQUEST.—

Specimen air supply request is shown below. The following points should be noted:—

(*a*) Figures followed by full stops are spelt.

(*b*) Types of ration (BRITISH, GURKHA, AFRICAN or MALAY) are written in full.

(*c*) ORD clothing will be demanded by sizes.

Precedence-Action Op Immediate	Precedence-Info Deferred	Date-Time-Group 191800 GH APR
From 2/7 GR		
To MALCOMD GLO RAF Kuala Lumpur 55 AD COY RASC 16 FD AMB COMPOL Q		Security Classification Unclas Originator's Number Q 7 Special Instructions

AIR DROP (.) VICTOR (.) GURKHA fd ops 50 for 2 days (.) GURKHA compo 49 for 3 days (.) BRITISH 24 hr 1 for 3 days (.) rum cigs matches to scale (.) tommy cookers one hundred (.) insect repellant 2 pints (.) ORD (.) jungle boots size 7—ten (.) 6—four (.) ponchos three (.) Kukris three (.) jackets bush size 3—two (.) 4—twelve (.) MED (.) adhesive plaster 1 roll (.) NAAFI (.) duty free rum 10 bottles (.) for SARAWAK RANGERS (.) RASC (.) MALAY Compo 2 for 5 days (.) cigs matches to scale (.) FOR ABOS (.) rations 12 for 5 days (.) FOR 3 MALAY (.) RASC (.) MALAY fd ops tea 15 for 2 days (.) MALAY 2 men 15 for 3 days (.) rum cigs matches to scale (.) ORD (.) socks size 2 prs five (.) trousers size 3—two (.) MED (.) bandages 2 in qty. twelve (.) NAAFI (.) orange crush 5 bottles (.) FOR POLICE 5 FF (.) MALAY 2 men 30 for 5 days (.) socks size 2 prs ten (.) on repayment (.) ikan bilis 1 kati (.) FOR ABOS WITH POLICE (.) rations 40 for 5 days (.) gifts sponsored by BILES of PAHANG SWEC (.) 2 piculs salt (.) 20 small hand mirrors (.) WILLIAM (.) map 3 1 8 reference later (.) XRAY (.) DOG 3 bars white smoke freq No 364 (.) YOKE (.) 220900 to 221100 GH MAY.

Appendix C

GUIDE TO THE PREPARATION OF REQUESTS FOR COMMUNICATION FLIGHTS

Index letter (included in message)	Detail required	Remarks
L	Time of departure.	
M	Place of departure and destination.	Include interim stops.
N	Details of passengers.	Rank and name required.
P	Time of return.	If necessary, otherwise omit.
Q	Purpose of journey.	In order that priorities can be arranged.
R	Weight of passengers and luggage.	If night-stop required, or more than three passengers.
S	Special Instructions.	

Appendix D

SPECIMEN HELICOPTER REQUEST

Precedence-Action	Precedence-Info	Date-Time-Group
Op Immediate	Op Immediate	241200 GH

From 1 GORDONS
To MALCOMD
Info
Gurdiv 26 Bde GLO KUALA LUMPUR

Security Classification
Unclass

Originators Number
OPS 5

ASSU NET (.) HCPTR (.) SLX 13 54 (.) RESTD (.)

EASY (.) 1 GORDONS and 3 FF (.) 3H/9 (.) OCCUPIED CAMP FOR 30 FOUND VK 950430 240800 GH (.) ONE CTK IDENTIFIED AS 8 PL 3 REGT (.) CT FLED NORTH (.) CAMPS IN AREA VK 9651 TO WHICH CT HAVE MOVED AFTER PREVIOUS CONTACTS (.) ONE PL FOLLOWING UP FROM SOUTH (.) ONE PL MOVING EAST FROM KEPOH 9253 (.)

FOX (.) TO MOVE TPS FROM LABIS TO AMBUSH CAMP AREA VK 9651 (.)

GEORGE (.) 20 EQUIPPED BRIT TPS (.) 400 LB RATIONS AND AMN (.) EACH LIFT NINE MILES (.)

HOW (.) 270830 GH (.) FOOTBALL FIELD LABIS 844417 (.) ONE DAY (.) NOT LATER THAN 1200 GH (.) NO ALTERNATIVE DATE (.)

JIG (.) VK 952521 (.) 75 YDS DIAMETER (.) APROACHES 30 DEGREES (.) PRIMARY JUNGLE (.) 670 FEET (.) LZ USED FOR TRG 04 JAN (.) NOT SECURE (.)

KING (.) CALL SIGN 43 (.) TAC HQ VK 844417 (.)

Appendix E

GUIDE TO THE PREPARATION OF REQUESTS FOR HELICOPTER SUPPORT

Index letter (included in message) (*a*)	Detail (included in message) (*b*)	Remarks (*c*)
E (INFORMATION) ...	(i) Unit. (ii) Map sheets. (iii) Background to operation and info on which based. (iv) Own troops locations.	(i) To allow direct communication on queries. (iii) Priorities will be decided on this information. (iv) Other troops involved in the operation.
F (TASK) ...	(i) Purposes for which Helicopter(s) is/are required.	
G (LOAD) ...	(i) Details of load. (ii) Distances of lifts.	(i) Number of Troops, weight and nature of cargo. (ii) To permit planning of fuel loads and number of lifts.
H (TIME AND DURATION)	(i) Time Helicopters required. (ii) RV. (iii) Duration of requirement. (iv) Alternative times and dates.	(i) Make allowance for loading time. (ii) Grid reference and description.
J (LZs) ...	(i) Grid references of LZs. (ii) Dimensions. (iii) Approaches. (iv) Type of country. (v) Height above mean sea level. (vi) If LZ secure.	(i) If recorded LZs give serial number, other details not required. (vi) If LZ NOT secure air escort will normally be arranged.
K (SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	(i) Local command frequency. (ii) Any other special instructions.	

Appendix F

EMPLANING AND DEPLANING DRILLS—HELICOPTER

General

1. **Emplaning.—**

(*a*) The normal load for the first sortie into an LZ is three troops in the first helicopter and four in each of the accompanying helicopters. Depending on the type of LZ, five troops may be carried in each helicopter on subsequent lifts.

(*b*) Troops should be seated in the helicopter as far forward as possible and should be warned not to hold on to the edge of the door when emplaning.

(*c*) Where an LZ is not secure, one occupant of the first helicopter should have an automatic weapon ready for action with the safety catch on, and should be under the orders of an officer.

2. **Deplaning.—**

(*a*) On sighting the LZ, the pilot will warn the troops to stand by to deplane, by means of a red light which is positioned over the exit door.

(*b*) When the helicopter is in the LZ, the pilot will give a long continuous blast on the hooter, which is the signal to deplane. It is imperative that troops should deplane immediately this signal is heard.

(*c*) The last man out should tap the pilot's leg to indicate deplaning completed.

(*d*) The method of deplaning again depends on the type of LZ. The knotted scrambling rope will always be outside the helicopter for the first lift into an unknown LZ, but at all times, the pilot will endeavour to get as close to the ground as possible if he is unable to land.


3. **Lifting out troops from an LZ.—**

(*a*) The number of troops lifted out in each helicopter depends entirely on the size of the LZ and the exit path. Obviously an LZ that has been well cleared will enable the operation to be completed in a shorter time as more troops can be lifted out in each sortie.

(*b*) The pilot will indicate by hand signal how many he will lift out.

(*c*) Troops should be lined up ready for emplaning as near the touch down point as possible.

4. **Seating.**—Seats are numbered off as follows:—



Emplaning and Deplaning Troops

5. **Details of Load.**—These drills are designed for a detachment of five fully equipped troops comprising:—

Detachment Commander.
Bren Gunner.
Two Riflemen.
Wireless Operator.

The drills will be modified to suit the composition of each party.

6. **Emplaning.**—

(*a*) *Order of emplaning.*—

No. 1 (Wireless Operator) carrying set sits on seat 7, and deposits wireless on seat 8.
No. 2 (Rifleman) carrying the wireless operator's personal weapon to seat 3.
No. 3 (Bren) to seat 2.
No. 4 (Rifleman) to seat 1.
No. 5 Detachment Commander to seat 4.

(*b*) The Detachment Commander taps the pilot's leg to indicate emplaning is complete. The door strap is made secure by No. 4 and all safety belts are fastened.

7. **Deplaning.**—Order of deplaning.

No. 4 (Rifleman) unhooks door strap and deplanes.
No. 3 (Bren) follows.
No. 2 (Rifleman) follows, carried Wirless Operator's personal weapon.
No. 1 (Wireless Operator) follows.
No. 5 Detachment Commander taps pilot's leg to indicate last man going out.

8. **Notes.**—

(*a*) Door will remain open.
(*b*) NO smoking during flight.
(*c*) Yellow handles will NOT be touched.
(*d*) Matchetes if carried will be on belts.
(*e*) Heads should be lowered whilst deplaning.
(*f*) Weapons should be placed between legs during flight.
(*g*) Magazines should be removed from weapons during flight and replaced just before deplaning.
(*h*) Troops will deplane facing towards the front of the aircraft.
(*i*) Ears should be plugged with cotton wool.

Emplaning and Deplaning—3-in Mortar Detachment

9. **Details.**—These drills are designed for a detachment comprising:—

Detachment Commander.
Loader.
Layer.
3-in Mortar complete.
24 HE bombs.

10. **Emplaning—Internal Stowage.**—

No. 1 (Layer) carrying base plate, sights and aiming post, emplanes and sits on seat 5.

No. 2 (Loader) carrying barrel emplanes and sits on seat 2.

No. 3 Detachment Commander carrying bipod emplanes and sits on seat 1, hooks up door strap and taps pilot's leg.

No. 4 (Carrier) helps load ammunition onto plane. Does NOT emplane.

11. **Deplaning—Internal Stowage.**—

Detachment Commander deplanes first carrying bipod.

No. 2 deplanes with barrel.

No. 1 remains on plane and passes out remainder of kit and ammunition. He taps pilot's leg before getting out.

12. **Loading/Emplaning—External Carriage.**—

(*a*) 3-in Mortar complete with 24 bombs wrapped in sacks or burlap is placed in the net on the ground. The aircraft is guided by hand signals and brought down over the load.

(*b*) The Detachment Commander attaches the loops of the net to the quick release hook. The hook must be tested by pulling down hard on the loop of the net.

(*c*) The mortar detachment climb into the aircraft, fasten belts, secure door strap and tap pilot's leg.

13. **Unloading/Deplaning—External Carriage.**—Detachment deplanes by means of scrambling. As soon as the load net touches ground, the pilot is signalled to release the hook and the load is released.

Winching War Dogs and Handlers

14. **Equipment.**—Canvas dog harness is required fitted with:—

(*a*) Two webbing handles for the handler to steady the dog.

(*b*) Four metal rings through which ropes are passed and then over the winch hook.

15. The following should be noted:—

(*a*) Dog harness is held by helicopter squadron and by all battalions.

(*b*) Normal dog tracking leads are required.

(*c*) 'Mae West' life jacket Mk 3 or Mk 9 (provided with the aircraft) is required for dog handlers.

16. **Drill.**—Dog in harness is fixed to winch hook.

17. Handler in 'Mae West' is hooked up, holding dog across the front of his body. When leaving aircraft, handler will adopt a sitting position, with the dog lying across his knees.

18. Troops on the ground will assist in hooking up and unhooking handler and dog.

Appendix G

HAND SIGNALS FOR MARSHALLING HELICOPTERS

'GO UP'.



'GO DOWN'.



'STEADY'



'MOVE TO PORT' (hands pushing to the side).



MOVE TO STARBOARD' (hands pushing to the side).



'COME FORWARD' (hand beckoning).



'MOVE BACK' (hands pushing away).



'QUICK RELEASE-CARGO SLING' (throat cutting motion).



'CANCEL—LANDING PROHIBITED' (waving of arms).

Appendix H

GROUND/AIR LIGHT SIGNAL CODE

Airstrikes, Air Supply and Helicopters

1. **Ground to Air.—**

(*a*) Single RED	'Short delay'.
(*b*) GREEN	'Carry on' or 'Land here'.
(*c*) Series of REDS ...	'Cancel drop' or 'Cease attack and return to base if no instructions being received on RT' or 'Do NOT land'.
(*d*) WHITE	To attract attention, or 'Your message understood'.

2. **Air to Ground.—**

(*a*) Single WHITE and Single GREEN	'DZ or LZ unacceptable'.
(*b*) Single WHITE ...	'Short delay'.
(*c*) Series of GREENS ...	'Starting attack' or 'Starting drop' or 'Landing'.
(*d*) Series of WHITES ...	Operation abandoned' or 'Strike or drop completed'.
(*e*) Single GREEN ...	'Acknowledged'.
(*f*) AMBER downward identification light (Lincolns at night)	'Am on my bombing run'.

Air Escort to Convoys

3. **Ground to Air.—**

(*a*) RED	'Cease Attack'.
(*b*) GREEN	'Convoy being attacked please strafe in direction this light'.
(*c*) WHITE	To attract attention or 'Your message understood'.

4. **Air to Ground.—**



(*a*) Series of WHITES ...	'Abandoned escort'.
(*b*) Series of GREENS ...	'Road clear ahead'.
(*c*) Single WHITE ...	'Road Block or obstruction ahead'.
(*d*) Single GREEN ...	'Acknowledged'.

Any Aircraft


Three RED	DISTRESS.

Appendix J


GROUND/AIR PANEL CODE

Signal	*Meaning*
	1. SOS—Ground Party lost and in need of positional fix.
	2. Ground party in need of supply drop (food and medical supplies).
	3. Ground party has suffered casualties and in need of assistance (supply drop and ground help).
	4. Require wireless set.
	5. Require wireless battery.
	6. Require wireless set and battery.


Appendix J— *continued*




7. Ground party in action with CT in direction of arrow and in need of air support. (All own troops behind the arrowhead, and horizontal bars denote distance of CT, one bar for each 100 yards).



8. Require small arms ammunition.



9. Cancel airstrike or supply drop not required.



10. Helicopter required for casualty evacuation. (Signal to be displayed at best touch-down for helicopter).

Appendix K

GUIDE TO THE PREPARATION OF REQUESTS FOR PARACHUTE TROOPS

Index letter (included in request) (*a*)	Detail (*b*)	Remarks (*c*)
A (INFORMATION)	(i) Map Sheets.	
	(ii) Summary of information on which request is based.	
B (OWN TROOPS) ...	(i) Locations of other troops.	
	(ii) Intentions of other troops.	
	(iii) Controlling HQ and locations.	
C (TASK) ...	(i) Area of parachute descent.	(i) Including type of country.
	(ii) Aim to be achieved by parachute troops.	
	(iii) Earliest and latest dates/times of descent.	
	(iv) Estimated duration of operation for parachute troops.	
	(v) Size of parachute force required.	
D (SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	(i) Ground troops frequency.	
	(ii) Prevailing weather conditions.	(ii) Particularly cloud to be expected at the relevant time of day.
	(iii) Any special requirements.	

Appendix K

GUIDE TO THE PREPARATION OF REQUESTS FOR PARACHUTE TROOPS

Index letter (included in request) (a)	Detail (b)	Remarks (c)
A (UNDERSTANDING)	(i) Map Sheets.	
	(ii) Summary of information on which request is based.	
B (OWN TROOPS)	(i) Locations of other troops.	
	(ii) Intentions of other troops.	
	(iii) Controlling HQ and locations.	
C (TASK)	(i) Area of parachute descent.	(i) Including type of country.
	(ii) Aim to be achieved by parachute troops.	
	(iii) Earliest and latest dates/times of descent.	
	(iv) Estimated duration of operation for parachute troops.	
	(v) Size of parachute force required.	
D (SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	(i) Ground troops liaison.	
	(ii) Prevailing weather conditions.	(ii) Particularly cloud to be expected at the relevant time of day.
	(iii) Any special requirements.	

Appendix L

GUIDE TO PREPARATION OF REQUESTS FOR VOICE AIRCRAFT

Index letter (incl in msg)	Detail (incl msg)	Remarks
A (TASK) ...	(i) Name and appt, telephone number to whom enquiries can be addressed.	(i) May be originator of request Joint Ops Room, etc.
	(ii) Map sheet.	(ii) Map sheet No.
	(iii) Grid refs of target.	(iii) Map Squares, co-ordinates of corners of target or 'Circle × yds. from Grid ref.....' may be used.
	(iv) SEP for exploitation.	(iv) Name of SEP, if any, who is well known to CT in target area.
	(v) Points to be exploited.	(v) Designation of local CT unit if known. Any detail which would help to induce surrenders, sickness, food shortages, locally hated leaders. It is essential that in (iv) and (v) above Chinese Commercial Code Nos and Contingent wanted List Nos of all terrorists mentioned are given.
B (TIME) ...	(i) Time required on target (TOT).	(i) If time is not specially important put SOONEST.
	(ii) Time after which Broadcast is not acceptable (NAA).	(ii) If time is not specially important put DO NOT CANCEL.
C (SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	(i) Police clearance.	(i) Clearance to be obtained from local Special Branch.
	(ii) Language.	(ii) e.g. Chinese Mandarin or Malay Kelantan.
	(iii) Public targets in neighbourhood.	(iii) e.g. Villages or towns in vicinity of target or *en route* to target which could be hailed with strategic message, if time permits. Language and dialect should be given.

GUIDE TO PREPARATION OF REQUESTS FOR VOICE AIRCRAFT

Index letter (incl in msg)	Detail (incl msg)	Remarks
A (TASK) ...	(i) Name and asgt. telephone number to whom enquiries can be addressed.	(i) May be originator of request. Joint Ops Room, etc.
	(ii) Map sheet No.	(ii) Map Squares, co-ordinates of centres of target or "Grid ref. ..." yds. from Grid ref. ..." may be used.
	(iii) Grid refs of target.	
	(iv) SEP for exploitation.	(iv) Name of SEP, if any, who is still known to CT agy/pty/area.
	(v) Points to be exploited.	(v) Description of local CT unit if known. Any detail which would help to induce surrender, eg known local strategic local by leaflets, if is essential that in (iv) and (v) above Chinese Communist Code Nos and Contingent wanted Lia Nos of all terrorists mentioned are given.
B (TIME) ...	(i) Time required on target (TOT).	(i) If time is not specially important put SOONEST.
	(ii) Time after which Broadcast is not acceptable (NAA).	(ii) If time is not specially important put DO NOT CANCEL.
C (SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	(i) Police clearance.	(i) Clearance to be obtained from local Special Branch.
	(ii) Language.	(ii) e.g. Chinese Mandarin or Malay Kelantan.
	(iii) Public targets in neighbourhood	(iii) e.g. Villages or towns in vicinity of target of an route to target which could be bazed with strategic message if time permits. Language and dialect should be given.

Appendix N

AUSTER TARGET MARKING SYSTEM

1. The object of this system is to provide the bombing aircraft with a visual aiming point immediately over the target with as little delay as possible between the marker being released and the bombs starting to fall. A further aim is to ensure that the target is not compromised by the presence of aircraft in the area prior to the marker aircraft appearing over the target.

2. **Description of System.—**

(*a*) The AUSTER target marking aircraft circles a known datum which may be 3–5 minutes flying time from the target.

(*b*) The leader of the LINCOLN bombing formation calls up the AUSTER pilot at 8 mins flying time from the target and thereafter at every minute.

(*c*) When at the AUSTER'S flying time to the target plus one minute the AUSTER commences its marking run.

(*d*) The AUSTER locates the target and releases the marker one minute before the LINCOLN TOT, thus ensuring that it is clear of the target before the bombs start to fall.


(*e*) As soon as the marker is observed the Master Bomber in the lead aircraft commences tracking, given alterations of course as required.

(*f*) At the appropriate moment the Master Bomber calls 'Bombs away'. Thereupon each aircraft in the formation proceeds to drop a stick of bombs with pre-set intervals between each bomb. The object of this is to create a pattern or carpet of bombs which should completely envelop the target. The first bomb is aimed to fall short of the target.

3. The success of this system is entirely dependant on accurate marking by the AUSTER for with the Automatically Stabilised bombsight on the LINCOLN aircraft, bombing errors should not exceed plus or minus 50 yards. This error both in line and range is covered by the bombing pattern which is 750 yards × 400 yards. See figs 1 and 2.

Appendix N—*continued*

FIG. 1




AT 4 MINS. FROM TARGET LEADER OF LINCOLN FORMATION CALLS AUSTER PILOT TO COMMENCE MAKING RUN.

Appendix N—*continued*

FIG. 2

APPROXIMATE BOMB PATTERN 400 × 750 YARDS (14 × 1,000 LB. BOMBS)



Appendix O

AIR STRIKE FOLLOW UP REPORT

Type of Air Strike

1. Date of air strike ..... 2. Operation .....
3. Aircraft used .....
4. Targets, Timings and Description.

Target	*Location*	*Time on Target*	*Nature of Target*
No. 1			CT Camp.
No. 2			Primary Jungle.
No. 3			Belukar.
No. 4			Mangrove Swamp.
No. 5			

Effect of Air Strike

5. Object of Strike.
6. General effects including physical damage to CT or his property.
7. General conclusions.
8. Recommendations.

Tactical Observations

*9. No of bombs (*a*) actually falling in target area (if known) .....
(*b*) falling outside target area .....

*10. **Nature of Bomb Damage.—**

(*a*) Bomb craters? ..... (YES or NO).
(*b*) Average depth at crater centre ..... feet.
(*c*) Average crater diameter ..... feet.
(*d*) Diameter of area of damage/devastation to trees and foliage around craters. (Better pace this and give as many cases as you can).
..... Yds. ..... Yds. ..... Yds. ..... Yds. ..... Yds.
(*e*) Any evidence of bombs bursting.
Before striking the ground? ..... (YES or NO).
In tree tops? ..... (YES or NO).
(*N.B.*—This would be indicated by area of devastation with NO bomb crater near the centre).
*(*f*) Estimate height of air burst, and diameter of devastated areas of trees and foliage:—

Ht of burst feet					
Diam of devastation: yards †					

† (If necessary write T for tree top; A for above tree top).

*11. Special observations and sketches. Add these on the back of this sheet.
Signed ..... Unit .....

Note:—In items marked * strike out words which are inapplicable.

CHAPTER XVIII

EMPLOYMENT OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY IN ANTI-CT OPERATIONS

Section 1.—ARTILLERY RESOURCES

1. There are three types of artillery available:—

(*a*) *25 pr Gun*—A highly mobile and accurate weapon with a maximum range of 13,400 yards firing supercharge. The terrain in Malaya, however, restricts this weapon to areas served with roads or motorable tracks.

(*b*) *4.2 in heavy mortar.*—A weapon that fires a 20 lb bomb to a maximum range of 4,100 yards. It is, however, inherently inaccurate and fire must not be brought down within 500 yards of our own troops: a greater safety margin is required for overhead fire. It is more transportable than the 25 pr gun and it can be lifted by the S55 helicopter for deep jungle operations.

(*c*) *Searchlights.*—One section of two searchlights.

Section 2.—ALLOTMENT

To obtain the best results from the limited artillery available in Malaya, the most careful consideration of the allotment is necessary. When brigades receive information that guns, mortars or searchlights will be available, battalions should, whenever possible, be invited to submit bids in advance, showing what operations are to be mounted together with the proposed employment of artillery. These bids should be examined and the weapons allotted to that unit whose plan is the most suitable to the employment of artillery. It is most important that a decision as to allotment is made early enough for the artillery task to be decided in the preliminary planning.

Section 3.—THE ADVANTAGES

1. The type of support offered by artillery in anti-CT operations is, in many ways, similar to that given by the RAF. Often however, there are many advantages in using guns or mortars as opposed to aircraft:—

(*a*) The use of guns or mortars is not restricted by bad weather.

(*b*) They can operate equally well by day or night without the give away sign of a searchlight.

(*c*) Artillery is better able to achieve surprise as shells can be brought down on a target without warning.

(*d*) Artillery support can be used much closer to our own troops than support by air bombing: this is particularly the case with guns.

(*e*) Artillery support is generally more accurate than air attack.

(*f*) Artillery is capable of a more sustained effort and when required can give round-the-clock support over several days.

(*g*) Better communications tend to make liaison between the gunner and the infantryman more intimate and in consequence, artillery support is more flexible. Guns or mortars can be called down and lifted in a matter of minutes.

Section 4.—LIMITATIONS IN MALAYA

The nature of the country and the characteristics of the CT modify the normal capabilities of artillery in the following ways:—

(*a*) Observation of fire is very restricted and is usually impossible without the aid of an Air OP.

(*b*) Owing to the difficulty of observation, predicted fire is normal and observed fire the exception. In Malaya predicted fire is less accurate than normal, owing to the inaccuracy of maps in some areas and the absence of an organisation to provide up-to-the-minute meteorological information.

(*c*) In view of these factors, predicted fire should not be brought closer to our own troops than 500 yds. When fire is observed this distance can be reduced to 200 yards in the case of 25 pr guns.

(*d*) The difficulty of observation limits the possibility of using artillery in a destructive role.

Section 5.—TYPES OF SUPPORT

1. Artillery can offer the following types of support to infantry in anti-CT operations:—

(*a*) *Flushing.*—CT in thick or difficult country can be flushed by artillery fire on to troops waiting in ambush.

(*b*) *Harassing.*—Harassing fire can be used to keep CT on the move when their whereabouts is known or to

harrass them generally by methodical searching of an area. Harrassing is most valuable during the hours when CT are normally resting and when operations by infantry have to be halted. To be successful it should be carefully planned in conjunction with infantry operations and must be maintained over long periods.

(*c*) *Destructive Shoots.*—The disadvantage of using artillery to attack CT camps is the requirement for ranging and the relatively small scale of attack possible with the weapons available in Malaya. Methods which can achieve surprise and casualties are:—

(i) Ranging on a datum point, then switching on to the target with maximum fire.

(ii) Preliminary registration of a camp for future destructive shoots. In areas where there are a number of located camps and cultivations it may be worthwhile to register them all (with AOP observation) and then carry out, at a later date, a HF programme on a 'milkround' basis, both to cause casualties and to lower CT morale.

(*d*) *Blocking Escape Routes.*—When troops are engaged in follow up operations, i.e. after an incident, artillery fire can be used to dissuade the CT from using certain of the likely escape routes. This is more likely to be effective in steep hilly country or swamp, where movement is canalised within fairly narrow limits. By use of this technique CT may by driven into ground of our own choosing.

(*e*) *Deception.*—Artillery fire in an area away from that in which troops are operating, may deceive CT as to our intentions giving them a false sense of security and covering the noise of movement made by our own troops.

(*f*) *Illumination.*—Areas can be illuminated for short irregular periods at night by firing star shells. This may prove a deterrent to food suppliers. The searchlight section can give movement light to assist SF by illuminating the boundaries of operational areas e.g. railways, roads and perimeter wire.

(*g*) The searchlight can provide beacons as datum points for bombing aircraft operating at night and as rallying points for surrendering CT, to be used in conjunction with psychological warfare.

(*h*) It is not necessary to ask for searchlights when demanding night air support. This is included by the JOC at HQ Malaya Command in the planning of the strike.

2. The value of artillery in 'showing the flag' must not be forgotten. Guns located in populated areas and firing in view of villagers can have a marked effect on civilian morale. It may also have a deterrent effect on CT supporters. Mortars should not, however, be used for this purpose unless very stringent safety precautions are observed.

Section 6.—ORGANISATION AND ADMINISTRATION

1. Artillery Troops in Malaya are organised on a self contained basis and are able to operate away from their battery headquarters or base for periods of up to two months at a time. After that period they must return to their base for inspection, repair and retraining. Sections can be detached from Troops for limited periods and fire from temporary positions.

2.

Troops consist of	*25 pr*	*4.2-in hy mortar*
Officers	2	1
WO/Sgts	5	3 (British)
OR	50	25 (Malay).
Vehicles	16	7

The above may be either British or Malay. Vehicles include RASC attached.

3. The Troop has its own REME fitters and ACC cooks. It carries tentage and cooking equipment and normally has RASC 3 ton vehicles attached for ammunition supply. Assistance is, however, required from battalions in the following matters:—

(*a*) The supply of rations.

(*b*) The supply of POL.

(*c*) Medical.

(*d*) Pay.

(*e*) Mail.

Assistance from brigade may be required for light aid detachments when repairs beyond the capabilities of the Troop fitters are necessary or when repairs are urgently needed.

Section 7.—AMMUNITION

1. When artillery is to be allotted, the G Staff of the formation concerned should discuss the ammunition requirement with the battery or troop commander, so that the artillery officer is able to arrange for the dumping of the required amount of ammunition.

2. The system of ammunition supply in Malaya is outlined in Headquarters Malaya Administrative Instruction No 15 dated 31st July, 1952. A summary of this instruction is given below:—

(*a*) The responsibility for demanding and handling ammunition is that of the Royal Artillery. It normally devolves on the troop commander.

(*b*) When planning is completed the troop commander advises as to the amount of ammunition required. The formation being supported then places a demand on the nearest ammunition point. Where possible the ammunition point should be given seven days notice of requirements.

(*c*) The ammunition is delivered by rail or RASC transport, that which cannot be carried out on wheels being dumped at a convenient point, usually the headquarters of the battalion being supported. The gun or mortar position is supplied, as required, from this dump by the attached RASC vehicles, which can carry 200 rounds each.

(*d*) Unexpended ammunition and empties are backloaded to the ammunition point under arrangements made by the troop commander.

(*e*) When guns and mortars are in action assistance may be required in the provision of escorts and loading parties.

3. For planning purposes it should be taken that normal expenditure of 25 pr ammunition should average 100 rounds per day per troop. Any expenditure in excess of 3,000 rounds per month per troop requires special sanction. It must be remembered that extravagant use of ammunition and, in particular, high rates of fire, cause excessive wear of guns and fatigue of gun detachments.

Section 8.—AIRCRAFT SAFETY

Attention must be paid to the danger to aircraft from artillery firing. Air sentries must be posted on gun and mortar positions and warning signals must be sent out in accordance with Headquarters Malaya Air Instruction No 5 dated 10th November, 1953.

Section 9.—INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

When any known casualties or surrenders of CT occur as a direct result of artillery support, brigades and battalions should make particular note of this fact in their intelligence reports.

CHAPTER XIX

HANDLING OF ABORIGINES BY SECURITY FORCES

Section 1.—BACKGROUND

General

1. During the Japanese occupation the MPAJA (i.e. the MCP) was forced to operate from the jungle, and became largely dependent on the aborigines for foodstuffs, guides and porters. In 1948, when the Emergency started, large groups of the MCP withdrew to the jungle and were again in contact with the aborigines. For about thirteen years, therefore, virtually the only people who have been in almost constant contact with the aborigines are the (Chinese) MCP. During this period the CT have dominated some groups of aborigines and are using them to assist the 'Revolution'.

MCP Policy towards the Aborigines

2. The 1951 Directives of the Central Politburo of the MCP laid down that there would be a partial withdrawal of MCP forces into the deep jungle for re-indoctrination and re-training. This withdrawal denied to the party their former sources of supply from the inhabited area and resulted in a greater degree of dependence on the aborigines for their basic fresh food requirements, and for intelligence on SF activities in the deep jungle. The MCP therefore formulated a policy towards the aborigines which set out how they were to be handled and organised. This policy aimed at educating them in matters of health and hygiene; giving them simple remedies; improving their planting methods to give a greater yield of produce; introducing them to the affairs of the world (as seen through Communist eyes); and finally the political training of selected aborigines and the arming of them to assist the MRLA.

3. The organisation which educates, indoctrinates, and generally administers the aborigines for the MCP is the 'ASAL Organisation'.

Section 2.—PRESENT SITUATION

1. The manifestations of this MCP policy are to be found immediately a SF patrol penetrates into a CT-dominated aborigine area. To guard against such probing patrols the MCP has established a system of 'Protective Screens' of aborigines round their main camp areas.

2. By no means all the aborigines in the Federation however, have been subverted by the MCP. It is only in those areas where the CT wish to operate in the deep jungle that they have attempted to organise them. There are therefore (from the Emergency point of view) several categories of aborigines, who may be classified according to the extent of MCP influence over them as follows:—

(*a*) Those who are co-operating with the MCP to the fullest extent. This category, is usually armed, and lives in, or very close to the CT base.

(*b*) Those who live in close proximity to the main CT camps and who form part of the Asal Organisation. Their main task is food production and the supply of information on SF movements. These people are forced to co-operate with the CT because they have no alternative except extinction.

(*c*) Those who live at some distance from CT camps. On occasion they may supply food, as a form of insurance against aggression by the CT or by aborigines of category (*a*). They may also form part of the Asal Organisation.

(*d*) Those who live within easy reach of the inhabited areas. Aborigines in this category are not usually under much CT pressure unless they also fall into categories (*a*) or (*b*).

(*e*) Those who are anti-CT and who assist the Government.

Section 3.—GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES

1. The further the MCP withdraw into the deep jungle, the further removed they became from Special Branch sources of information and the more difficult they were to dislodge. As a first step in countering their policy it was decided to extend protection and administration to the main aborigine areas in the form of Jungle Forts manned by the Police. *(J) As a second step, the Department of Aborigines was placed on an emergency footing and greatly expanded. Trained teams from the Department were inserted into these Forts and into the natural outlets where the aborigines normally come out of the jungle to contact civilization. One of the main tasks of these teams is to win over the aborigines and obtain intelligence from them on CT dispositions and activities.

2. A study of the present CT situation in the deep jungle will show that the MCP is very largely dependent on the aborigines for:—

(*a*) Foodstuffs,

(*b*) Tactical intelligence,

(*c*) Topographical intelligence.

3. If it is possible to divorce the CT from his dominated aborigines, he will be left in a precarious position. This is the aim of the Field Teams. By May 1954, some 1,600 aborigines in NW Pahang and in parts of Perak had defected from CT and sought Government protection.

Section 4.—HANDLING OF ABORIGINES

1. Appendix *D* of 'An Introduction to the Malayan Aborigines' by P. D. R. Williams Hunt, which is issued to all units in Malaya, gives full notes on the handling of aborigines by SF. This Appendix should be read by all those who are liable to have any contact with Aborigines. The following notes are given to cover points on which the Appendix is out of date or incomplete:—

2. **Rations.**—The weekly ration issued to an aborigine who is working for the SF is:—

Item	*Amount*
Rice	5 katties
Salt	4 tahils
Coconut Oil	4 tahils
Ikan Bilis	4 tahils
Tobacco	2 tahils
Coffee	4 tahils
Sugar	1 katty
Daun Puchok	8 cents worth.

3. **Wages.**—The daily wage issued to an aborigine working for the SF is $2 (plus rations as 2 above) or $3 less rations. This is paid from unit imprest account. For simplicity, it is always desirable that aborigines employed by SF should be rationed by SF. *(K).

4. **Guides.**—Section 3 paragraph (viii) of Appendix *D* of Williams Hunt's book refers to the positioning of aborigine guides within a patrol formation. The actual positioning of guides is the patrol commanders responsibility. Section 6 of Chapter VIII deals fully with the position of guides with a patrol.

CHAPTER XX

THE EMPLOYMENT OF DOGS ON OPERATIONS

Section 1.—GENERAL

1. To obtain the maximum value from trained war dogs, it is essential to have an understanding of the conditions best suited for their employment. Dogs, like the rest of the animal kingdom are subject to outside influences which have a direct bearing on their behaviour. It follows, therefore, that the performance of any dog, no matter how highly trained, is not constant and it cannot be expected to work efficiently under every type of condition. This is often not fully appreciated, and instances have occurred where adverse criticism has been levelled against a dog simply because the person responsible for its employment was ignorant of its limitations. Full value will only stem from a full knowledge and better understanding of the capabilities and characteristics of the dogs.

2. War dogs are a valuable weapon which, properly used, give us an advantage over the CT. The fullest use should therefore be made of them.

3. Only two types of war dogs are in use in Malaya:—

(*a*) Infantry Patrol Dog.

(*b*) Tracking Dog.

The breed of dog employed is mainly Alsatian but Doberman Pinschers and Labradors are also in use.

Section 2.—THE INFANTRY PATROL DOG

General

1. A patrol dog works by 'air scent' and hearing, and is trained to give silent warning of any individual or group of individuals by 'pointing'. He is not taught to attack and cannot be used as a Tracker. The patrol dog is therefore useful for giving silent warning of ambushes, attempts at infiltration, and the presence of any 'foreign body', before such presence can be detected by a human.

2. The distance at which warning is given depends upon the following factors:—

(*a*) Ability of the handler to 'read' his dog.
(*b*) Wind direction and velocity.
(*c*) Concentration of scent.
(*d*) Humidity.
(*e*) Density of Vegetation.
(*f*) Volume of noise in the vicinity.
(*g*) Condition and fitness of dog.
(*h*) Individual inherent ability.

Operational Employment

3. The infantry patrol dog can be employed in two ways:—

(*a*) On a lead.
(*b*) Loose in front.

In both cases the dog is controlled by a handler.

4. When moving to an operational area the dog is kept at HEEL: while in this position the dog knows he is OFF DUTY and is not on the alert. When ON DUTY the collar is removed and either the 'pilot rope' is put on and the dog told to SEEK, or the dog works loose and the command SEEK is given. Both handler and dog have to be more highly trained to work with the dog loose.

5. The dog 'points' by one or a combination of the following signs:—

(*a*) Raising of head and pricking of ears.
(*b*) Tensing of body.
(*c*) Tail wagging.
(*d*) Keenness to investigate.

Limitations

6. The success of a patrol dog depends on its ability to locate the CT without itself being detected. In all cases a trained patrol dog will detect a hidden CT before a human does. He can be worked either by day or by night, in most kinds of weather and

country; and is not disturbed by the noise of battle. Certain limitations must be stressed:—

(*a*) He is apt to become perplexed when large numbers of people are in a small area, e.g., when opposing forces are in close contact.

(*b*) He is apt to become bewildered when the magnitude and number of extraneous sounds are abnormal, e.g. when the battle is intense.

(*c*) He cannot differentiate between CT and SF. Full briefing to a patrol is essential to prevent 'pointing' on scattered parts of our own troops.

Uses

7. The patrol dog can be used:—

(*a*) On reconnaissance patrols.

(*b*) On fighting patrols.

(*c*) As a sentry outpost.

(*d*) Guarding forward dumps.

(*e*) With static security groups.

(*f*) In isolated positions.

On Patrol

8. On patrol the handler and dog will normally lead. However, if the dog is being worked loose it may be possible for the dog to lead followed by the armed scout of the 'recce group' with the handler (who is constantly in sight and in control of the dog) next. This makes the handler's job a trifle less hazardous. In any case close contact must be maintained between handler and patrol leader. The normal procedure is:—

(*a*) The patrol commander indicates to the handler the mission, disposition of own troops, the general direction of advance and any special local instructions.

(*b*) The patrol is ordered to move out.

(*c*) The patrol dog and handler with one escort armed with an automatic weapon, precedes the patrol at a distance which will permit immediate communication with the patrol commander. At night this would be about an arm's length; in daylight the distance will be greater but within easy visual signalling distance.

(*d*) The patrol dog and handler move off, keeping generally in the indicated direction. He must be allowed to take advantage of wind and other conditions favouring the dog's scenting powers without endangering the patrol.

(*e*) When the dog 'points' the handler indicates by silent hand signal 'CT in sight'.

(*f*) The patrol halts and takes cover.

(*g*) Patrol commander proceeds quietly, utilising available cover, to the handler and dog and makes his plan.

Sentry Outposts

9. The main value of the dog is to give timely warning of approach of, or attempts at infiltration by CT. The handler and dog are placed a short distance from the sentries: this distance will be within easy visual signal in daylight but much closer at night. A simple means of communication between handler and patrol commander at night is a piece of cord or string, which is jerked to alert everyone. When alerted the patrol commander proceeds immediately to the handler to receive any information concerning the distance and direction of CT.

Guarding Forward Dumps, Static Security Groups and Isolated Positions

10. The use of patrol dogs on these rare occasions is the same as for a sentry outpost with local modifications.

11. In all cases the local commander should take the advice of the handler as to the best employment of the dog or dogs. Only knowledge and experience will give familiarity with the powers and limitations of the unit's own particular dogs.

Section 3.—THE TRACKING DOG

General

1. Tracking dogs provided by the War Dog Training Wing (RAVC) FARELF are trained to follow human ground scent. The principle on which the dogs are trained is one of reward by food. The dog is NEVER fed in kennels but only after work, i.e. a successful track. The golden rule is—REWARD ONLY FOR WORK—even when the dog is fully trained it must do a 'track' every day for its food. By using this method of training the interest of the dog in following a 'track' is assured. He knows that if he

fails he will receive no food. This necessitates a high devotion to Training Wing teaching in the dog's handler. On patrol the dog, when not working, should be fed only last thing in the evening after he has successfully followed a short trail laid by a member of the patrol in the bivouac area. Failure to find his quarry should invariably result in the dog being starved.

Operational Employment

2. The most important single factor in the successful employment of a tracking dog is TIME. The dog must be brought to the scene of the incident with all possible speed and NOT USED AS A LAST RESORT. It is suggested that tracking dogs are held at base until a call for their services is made. When this happens they should be taken as near as possible to the scene of the incident by transport or helicopter in order that they may arrive fresh, not tired out by a long forced march. The degree of fatigue a tracker has reached will determine its usefulness.

3. Once it has been decided to use a tracking dog, the less 'fouling' of the area with extraneous scent the better. Objects liable to have been in contact with the person to be tracked should not be touched and movement over the area restricted to a minimum.

Scent

4. Man, in common with animals, gives off a body odour which is specific for each person. This odour is constantly being exuded and traces of it remain in the path of a moving individual. Added to this body odour, there is the scent given off by the wearer's clothes, footwear and those released by the bruising and breaking of vegetation and the crushing of small insects. The dog tracks a combination of scents known as a 'Track Picture'. The analogy is the connoisseur of music following the 'Theme' of a complicated major work. The dog becomes conscious of the scent through the air near the ground over which the individual has passed coming into contact with the delicate membranes lining the nose. It follows that the degree of discernment is directly related to the concentration of 'scent' in the air.

Tracking Conditions in Malaya

5. The ideal tracking conditions may be listed as follows:—

(*a*) Air and ground temperatures approximately equal.

(*b*) A mild dull day with a certain amount of moisture in the air with slow evaporation.

(*c*) Damp ground and vegetation.

(*d*) Ground overshadowed by trees.

(*e*) Blood spilled on trail.

(*f*) A running CT who gives off more body odour than one who has walked away calmly.

(*g*) An unclean CT.

6. Factors which adversely affect the 'Track Picture' include:—

(*a*) Hot sun.

(*b*) Strong wind.

(*c*) Heavy rain.

(*d*) Roads (tarmac) on which cars travel.

(*e*) Running water.

7. In Malaya the heavy growth of vegetation helps to combat the heat and retains more scent than one would expect in a temperate climate. Furthermore, a greater amount of vegetation is damaged by a running CT, thus producing an increased aroma.

8. In primary and secondary jungle, when there is overhead cover from the direct sun with damp ground underfoot, a trail will be followable up to 12 hours 'cold' or more. (A warm 'scent' is one not more than 2 hours old, after which it is said to be 'cold'). A trail made in the late evening, in jungle, will still be fresh if the dog is 'cast' on to it at first light the following morning. This can be of great use when working round New Villages. During the daytime, in sunlight, the following is the probable duration of scent:—

(*a*) Lalang 1–3 hours.

(*b*) Belukar 3–6 hours.

(*c*) Jungle 9–12 hours.

Intelligence

9. Great care must be taken to keep the use of tracking dogs as secret as possible. If CT know they are likely to be tracked by a dog they will very probably make attempts to 'fox'.

10. A dog must NOT be allowed to eat any food left near a trail for two reasons:—

(*a*) A full stomach will make the dog lazy and he will immediately give up the track.

(*b*) The food may be poisoned.

THE CONDUCT OF ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS
IN MALAYA

PART THREE

ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER XXI

OPERATIONAL RATIONS

Section 1.—INTRODUCTION

1. The basic principle adopted in feeding the soldier in Malaya is to provide him, as far as possible, with fresh food of the type to which he is accustomed. If for any reason this is not possible (e.g. turnover of reserve supplies, transport difficulties or operational reasons), resort must be made to preserved food such as canned meats, vegetables, biscuits or Pack Rations.

2. Under certain conditions, it is an advantage to pack in one container a complete day's requirement of tinned foods either for one man or for a group of men, e.g. an infantry section.

3. The problem as regards jungle operations in Malaya is to produce an easily carried and suitable ration for patrols which operate in the jungle over long periods, bearing in mind that it is essential in these conditions that the ration provides both variety and sufficient bulk.

Section 2.—TYPES OF PACKS AVAILABLE IN MALAYA

1. The following types of special ration packs in use in Malaya are described in Appendix *A* to this Chapter. Lists of contents and notes on their use are contained in the appendices shown below:—

Type of Pack	*Detailed composition shown at Appendix*
BT Compo	B
BT 24 hour	C
BT 2 men	D
BT 5 men	E
GURKHA Compo	F
GURKHA 24 hour	G
GURKHA AMBUSH	H
MALAY Compo	J
MALAY 2 men	K
E AFRICAN Compo	L
E AFRICAN 24 hour	M

2. Contents and sizes vary according to the particular use for which packs are designed, e.g.:—

(*a*) *10 men composite Ration Pack* (normally referred to as 'Compo Rations')—designed for bulk or party feeding where it is not possible to issue normal fresh rations.

(*b*) *24 hours and 2 men Rations.*—Designed for individual feeding where bulk or party feeding is impossible for operational or supply reasons.

Section 3.—AIR SUPPLY

1. Fresh rations, as well as ration packs, can be demanded when troops are being supplied by air. As these must be consumed the day they arrive, the proportion normally should be one day's fresh rations to three or four days tinned.

2. In addition to normal items, the demanding unit can arrange for extra cigarettes or other articles to be obtained on payment through NAAFI.

3. Broadly speaking, the Air Despatch Coy RASC is prepared to drop any supplies or amenities which the demanding unit can arrange.

4. For further details see Chapter XVII, Section 4.

Appendix A

GENERAL DATA ON SPECIAL RATION PACKS

Serial No.	Type of pack	Detail of Packing	Gross weight of one pack	Gross weight of one ration	Nutritive value in calories per man	Detailed composition shown at appendix
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1.	BT COMPO (produced in U.K.)	Ten Rations (less Biscuits) in fibreboard case, length 20½", depth 11½", width 12". *N.B.*—When bread is not available or can not be accepted, biscuits service will be issued at the scale of 9 ozs. per ration.	40 lbs.	3 lbs. 2 ozs. without biscuits. 3 lbs. 11 ozs. with biscuits.	4,055	'B'
2.	BT 24 hr. (produced in U.K.)	Ten Rations (complete) in fibreboard case length 27¾", width 12", depth 8".	47 lbs.	4 lbs.	3,704	'C'
3.	BT 2 men (produced in U.K.)	Ten Rations in wooden case 20" x 13½" x 9½".	53 lbs.	4½ lbs.	3,770	'D'
4.	BT 5 men (produced in U.K.)	Five Rations in fibreboard case.	25 lbs.	4 lbs.	4,000	'E'
5.	GURKHA Compo (produced in FARELF)	Ten Rations packed in wooden case 18" x 13½" x 9½".	46 lbs.	3 lbs. 13 ozs.	3,783	'F'
6.	Gurkha 24 hr. (produced in FARELF)	Twelve Rations (each in a tin 6¼" x 4¼" x 3½").	57 lbs.	4 lbs.	4,087	'G'
7.	Gurkha 'Ambush'	Twelve Rations (each in tin 6¼" x 4¼" x 3½") packed in wooden base 18" x 13½" x 9".	44 lbs.	3 lbs. 10 ozs.	3,700	'H'
8.	Malay Compo	Ten Rations in wooden case 19½" x 14" x 9½".	47 lbs.	3 lbs. 10 ozs.	3,665	'J'
9.	Malay 2 men	Twelve Rations in wooden case 19½" x 14" x 9½".	53 lbs.	3 lbs. 10 ozs.	3,750	'K'
10.	East African Compo (produced in FARELF)	Ten Rations in wooden case 18" x 13½" x 9½".	46 lbs.	3 lbs. 13 ozs.	3,700	'L'
11.	East African 24 hr. (produced in FARELF)	Twelve Rations (each in tin 6¼" x 4¼" x 3½" packed in wooden case 18" x 13½" x 9½".	53 lbs.	3 lbs. 14 ozs.	4,000	'M'

Appendix B

BT 10 MEN

Note:—

(1) In order to give variety these packs are produced in four types ('A', 'B', 'C' and 'D').

(2) Where bread is not available or can not be accepted, biscuits service will be issued separately at the scale of 9 ozs per man per day.

(3) These packs are designed to feed:—

(*a*) 10 men for 1 day.
(*b*) 5 men for 2 days.
(*c*) 3 men for 3 days.

Serial No.	Commodity	Amount in individual packs			
		Type 'A'	Type 'B'	Type 'C'	Type 'D'
1.	Rolled Oats (quick cooking variety) ..	9 ozs.	9 ozs.	..	..
2.	Bacon	30 ozs.	30 ozs.	30 ozs.	30 ozs.
3.	Sausage ..	15 ozs.	15 ozs.	15 ozs.	15 ozs.
4.	Tea	6 ozs.	6 ozs.	6 ozs.	7½ ozs.
5.	Matches ..	10 bxs.	10 bxs.	10 bxs.	10 bxs.
6.	Salt	2 pkts.	2 pkts.	2 pkts.	2 pkts.
7.	Water Sterilising Powder	1 tin	1 tin	1 tin	1 tin
8.	Paludrine ..	10 tabs.	10 tabs.	10 tabs.	10 tabs.
9.	Stewed Steak ..	..	96 ozs.	..	..
10.	Steak and Kidney ..	..	..	96 ozs.	..
11.	Meat and Vegetables	..	..	..	160 ozs.
12.	Preserved Meat ..	72 ozs.	..	..	..
13.	Peas Tinned ..	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	..
	Carrots Tinned ..	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	..
14.	Potato Mash Powder	14 ozs.	14 ozs.	14 ozs.	..
15.	Mixed Fruit Pudding	..	28 ozs.	28 ozs.	42 ozs.
	Treacle Pudding ..	..	14 ozs.	14 ozs.	..
16.	Tinned Fruit ..	48 ozs.	..	..	..
17.	Rich Cake ..	20 ozs.	20 ozs.	..	..
18.	Salmon ..	..	..	32 ozs.	..
19.	Chocolate ..	20 ozs.	20 ozs.	20 ozs.	20 ozs.
20.	Boiled sweets ..	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	10 ozs.
21.	Sugar	21½ ozs.	21½ ozs.	21½ ozs.	25½ ozs.
22.	Cheese	16 ozs.	16 ozs.	16 ozs.	16 ozs.
23.	Margarine ..	15 ozs.	15 ozs.	..	15 ozs.
24.	Jam	18 ozs.	18 ozs.	18 ozs.	18 ozs.
25.	Milk Cond. Sweetened	32 ozs.	32 ozs.	32 ozs.	32 ozs.
26.	Sardines ..	..	..	..	22½ ozs.
27.	Latrine Paper ..	60 pcs.	60 pcs.	60 pcs.	60 pcs.
28.	Paper Bags (spare) ..	12 Nos.	12 Nos.	12 Nos.	12 Nos.
29.	Tin Opener ..	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.
30.	Contents Sheet ..	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.
31.	Soap General Purposes	1 tab.	1 tab.	1 tab.	1 tab.

Appendix B

Serial No.	Commodity	Amount in individual packs			
		Type 'A'	Type 'B'	Type 'C'	Type 'D'
1.	Bridal Cloth (plain) ..	9 ozs.	9 ozs.	..	..
2.	Bridal Veil(ny) ..	20 ozs.	20 ozs.	20 ozs.	20 ozs.
3.	Bridal ..	1 dbl.	15 ozs.	15 ozs.	15 ozs.
4.	Bridal ..	6 ozs.	6 ozs.	6 ozs.	12 ozs.
5.	Bridal ..	10 lbs.	10 lbs.	10 lbs.	10 lbs.
6.	Bridal ..	1 pkt.	1 pkt.	2 pkts.	4 pkts.
7.	Bridal Wedding Flow- ..	1 tin	1 tin	1 tin	1 tin
8.	Bridal ..	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	10 ozs.
9.	Bridal Sock ..	..	80 ozs.	..	..
10.	Bread and Butter ..	..	..	24 ozs.	..
11.	Bread and Vegetable ..	..	..	..	160 ozs.
12.	Brocaded Velvet ..	24 ozs.	..	..	..
13.	Bun Tinned ..	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	..
14.	Burnt Tinned ..	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	..
15.	Button Khaki Powder	14 ozs.	14 ozs.	14 ozs.	..
16.	Button Khaki Powder	..	24 ozs.	24 ozs.	48 ozs.
17.	Button Khaki Powder	..	..	14 ozs.	..
18.	Button Khaki Powder	48 ozs.	..	..	..
19.	Button Khaki Powder	20 ozs.	20 ozs.	..	..
20.	Button Khaki Powder	..	..	12 ozs.	..
21.	Button Khaki Powder	20 ozs.	20 ozs.	20 ozs.	20 ozs.
22.	Button Khaki Powder	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	10 ozs.
23.	Button Khaki Powder	12½ ozs.	12½ ozs.	12½ ozs.	25 ozs.
24.	Button Khaki Powder	16 ozs.	16 ozs.	16 ozs.	64 ozs.
25.	Button Khaki Powder	14 ozs.	14 ozs.	..	12 ozs.
26.	Button Khaki Powder	16 ozs.	16 ozs.	16 ozs.	12 ozs.
27.	Button Khaki Powder	32 ozs.	32 ozs.	32 ozs.	12 ozs.
28.	Button Khaki Powder	..	..	..	224 ozs.
29.	Button Khaki Powder	60 pcs.	60 pcs.	60 pcs.	60 pcs.
30.	Button Khaki Powder	12 Nos.	12 Nos.	12 Nos.	12 Nos.
31.	Button Khaki Powder	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.
32.	Button Khaki Powder	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.
33.	Button Khaki Powder	1 tub.	1 tub.	1 tub.	1 tub.

Appendix C

BRITISH 24 HOUR RATION

TYPES A, B, C and D

1. This ration is packed individually in a cardboard container, with tin liner containing 10 × 24 hour rations.

2. Each individual ration is sub-divided into 4 packets consisting of:—

(*a*) Breakfast Packet.
(*b*) Snack Packet.
(*c*) Main Meal Packet.
(*d*) Sundries Packet.

3. **Schedule of Contents.—**

Serial No.	Type of Packet	Type 'A'	Type 'B'	Type 'C'	Type 'D'
1	*Breakfast Packet—*				
	Biscuits Service ..	3 ozs.	3 ozs.	3 ozs.	3 ozs.
	Oatmeal Black ..	1 oz.	1 oz.	1 oz.	1 oz.
	Sausage and Beans ..	5¼ ozs.	..	..	..
	Bacon and Beans ..	..	5¼ ozs.	..	..
	Chopped Bacon ..	..	..	5 ozs.	..
	Ham and Eggs ..	..	..	..	5 ozs.
	Jam	2 ozs.	..	2 ozs.	2 ozs.
	Marmalade ..	..	2 ozs.	..	..
	Tea	¼ oz.	¼ oz.	¼ oz.	¼ oz.
	Sugar	1 oz.	1 oz.	1 oz.	1 oz.
2	*Snack Packet—*				
	Biscuits Sweet ..	2 ozs.	2 ozs.	2 ozs.	2 ozs.
	Chocolate (Blended)	2 ozs.	2 ozs.	2 ozs.	2 ozs.
	Clear Gums ..	1⅛ ozs.	2¼ ozs.	1⅛ ozs.	1⅛ ozs.
	Boiled Sweets ..	2 ozs.	2 ozs.	2 ozs.	..
	Butter Scotch ..	..	1¼ ozs.	..	..
	Mars Bars ..	1⅛ ozs.	..	..	1⅛ ozs.
	Spangles ..	..	..	..	1½ ozs.
	Nuts and Raisins ..	..	..	1½ ozs.	..
	Tea	¼ oz.	¼ oz.	¼ oz.	¼ oz.
	Sugar	1 oz.	1 oz.	1 oz.	1 oz.
3	*Main Meal Packet—*				
	Biscuits Service Plain	3 ozs.	3 ozs.	3 ozs.	3 ozs.
	Preserved Meat ..	5 ozs.	..	..	..
	Ham and Beef ..	..	5 ozs.	..	..
	Liver and Bacon ..	..	..	5¼ ozs.	..
	Steak and Kidney Pie	..	..	..	5 ozs.
	Vegetable Salad in Mayonnaise ..	4 ozs.	..	..	..
	Beans in Tomato ..	..	..	5 ozs.	..
	Spaghetti in Tomato	..	5¼ ozs.	..	..
	Diced Mixed Vegetable	..	..	..	4 ozs.
	Mixed Fruit Pudding	4 ozs.	..	..	..

Appendix C—*continued*

Serial No.	Type of Packet	Type 'A'	Type 'B'	Type 'C'	Type 'D'
4	*Main Meal Packet —contd.*				
	Treacle Pudding ..	..	3½ ozs.	..	..
	Rice Pudding with Sultanas ..	..	..	5 ozs.	..
	Ginger Pudding ..	..	..	5 ozs.	..
	Cheese	1½ ozs.	1½ ozs.	1½ ozs.	1½ ozs.
	Tea	¼ oz.	¼ oz.	¼ oz.	¼ oz.
	Sugar	1 oz.	1 oz.	1 oz.	1 oz.

Serial No.		
5	*Sundries Packet—same for all types—*	
	Milk (in tube)	2 ozs.
	Salt (in dispenser)	5½ grams.
	Chewing Gum (in pkt.) ..	4 tabs.
	Flare Matches (in tube) ..	4 Nos.
	Paludrine	1 No.
	Can Opener	1 No.
	Toiler Paper	10 sheets
	Contents List	1 No.

Appendix D

BT 2 MAN PACK (TYPES A, B and C)

1. Tin rations are contained in a wooden case. These are ten tins (Note 1) each containing the soft packaged items for one man for 24 hours. In addition the case contains the following items packed loose—Tinned Milk, Sardines, Baked Beans, Tinned Meat—each individual tin of these items is equivalent to 2 men's ration for 24 hours, and must be shared out on this basis.

2. The ration consists of:—

Serial No.	Commodity	Type 'A'	Type 'B'	Type 'C'
1.	Service Biscuits	9 ozs.	9 ozs.	9 ozs.
2.	Curry Powder	¼ oz.	¼ oz.	¼ oz.
3.	Lemonade Powder	⅜ oz.	⅜ oz.	⅜ oz.
4.	Raisins	2 ozs.	2 ozs.	2 ozs.
5.	Peanuts	4 ozs.	4 ozs.	4 ozs.
6.	Chocolate	4 ozs.	4 ozs.	4 ozs.
7.	Matches	1 box	1 box	1 box
8.	Rice	4 ozs.	4 ozs.	4 ozs.
9.	Tea	¾ oz.	¾ oz.	¾ oz.
10.	Salt	1 oz.	1 oz.	1 oz.
11.	Salt Tablet	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.
12.	Sugar	3 ozs.	3 ozs.	3 ozs.
13.	CV Tablet	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.
14.	Paludrine Tablet	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.
15.	Latrine Paper	8 sheets	8 sheets	8 sheets

Note 1:—Serials 1—15 are contained in each tin referred to in paragraph 1.

16.	Milk Condensed Sweetened ..	5½ ozs.	5½ ozs.	5½ ozs.
17.	Sardines	2¼ ozs.	2¼ ozs.	2¼ ozs.
18.	Baked Beans	8 ozs.	8 ozs.	8 ozs.
19.	Preserved Meat	6 ozs.	..	..
20.	Steak and Kidney Pudding ..	..	8 ozs.	..
21.	Stewed Steak	..	..	8 ozs.

Note 2:—Serials 16—21 consist of:—

10 x 2¾ ozs. tins Milk
5 x 4½ „ „ Sardines
5 x 16 „ „ Baked Beans
5 x 12 „ „ Pressed Meat
OR 5 x 16 „ „ Steak and Kidney Pudding
OR 5 x 16 „ „ Stewed Steak

being 10 men's ration for one day.

Appendix E

BT 5 MEN COMPO (TYPES A, B C and D)

1. Rations for 5 men for one day are contained in a wooden case.
2. Contents of the case:—

Serial No.	Commodity	Type 'A'	Type 'B'	Type 'C'	Type 'D'
1.	Black Oatmeal ..	5 ozs.	5 ozs.	5 ozs.	..
2.	Tinned Bacon ..	15 ozs.	15 ozs.	15 ozs.	15 ozs.
3.	Tinned Sausage ..	7½ ozs.	7½ ozs.	7½ ozs.	7½ ozs.
4.	Casserole Steak and Onions ..	48 ozs.	..	..	..
5.	Steak and Kidney Pudding ..	..	..	48 ozs.	..
6.	Stewed Steak ..	..	48 ozs.	..	..
7.	Meat and Vegetables	..	..	..	80 ozs.
8.	Processed Peas ..	..	..	10 ozs.	..
9.	Baked Beans ..	..	10 ozs.	..	..
10.	Potato Mash Powder	7 ozs.	7 ozs.	7 ozs.	..
11.	Treacle Pudding ..	..	14 ozs.	..	..
12.	Rice Pudding ..	..	..	16 ozs.	..
13.	Diced Mixed Vegetables	10 ozs.	..	..	..
14.	Luncheon Meat ..	..	16 ozs.	..	16 ozs.
15.	Tinned Salmon ..	16 ozs.	..	15 ozs.	..
16.	Rich Cake ..	..	..	15 ozs.	..
17.	Cheese	8 ozs.	8 ozs.	8 ozs.	8 ozs.
18.	Marmalade ..	..	..	..	9 ozs.
19.	Jam	9 ozs.	9 ozs.	9 ozs.	..
20.	Tea	3¾ ozs.	3¾ ozs.	3¾ ozs.	3¾ ozs.
21.	Sugar	14½ ozs.	14½ ozs.	14½ ozs.	14½ ozs.
22.	Milk Condensed (U.S.)	16 ozs.	16 ozs.	16 ozs.	16 ozs.
23.	Margarine ..	7½ ozs.	7½ ozs.	7½ ozs.	7½ ozs.
24.	Chocolate ..	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	10 ozs.	10 ozs.
25.	Boiled Sweets ..	5 ozs.	5 ozs.	5 ozs.	5 ozs.
26.	Salt	¾ oz.	¾ oz.	¾ oz.	¾ oz.
27.	Matches ..	2 books	2 books	2 books	2 books
28.	Water Sterilising Outfit	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.
29.	Can Opener ..	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.
30.	Paludrine ..	5 tabs.	5 tabs.	5 tabs.	5 tabs.
31.	Latrine Paper ..	50 pcs.	50 pcs.	50 pcs.	50 pcs.
32.	Instruction Sheet ..	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.	1 No.
33.	Soap	1 tab.	1 tab.	1 tab.	1 tab.

Note 24—32 are contained in Polythene Pouch.

Appendix F

GURKHA 10 MEN COMPO RATIONS

Serial No.	*Item*	*Amount*
1.	Rice	210 ozs.
2.	Ghee	17½ ozs.
3.	Dhall	36 ozs.
4.	Dried Chillies	1 3/7 ozs.
5.	Sugar	27½ ozs.
6.	Dried Fruit	5 ozs.
7.	C.V. Tabs.	10 Nos.
8.	Tea	7½ ozs.
9.	Potato Mash Powder	10 ozs.
10.	Curry Powder	1 3/7 ozs.
11.	Salt Refined	10 ozs.
12.	Herrings	28 ozs.
13.	Evaporated Milk (UK)	32 ozs.
14.	Sardines	4½ ozs.
15.	Tinned Vegetables	40 ozs.
16.	Leaflet	1 oz.

Appendix G

GURKHA 24 HOUR RATION

(12 rations are contained in one wooden case)

Serial No.	*Commodity*	*Amount*
1.	Rice	18 ozs.
2.	Dhall	4 ozs.
3.	Biscuits Service	1 oz.
4.	Potato Mash Powder	3 ozs.
5.	Sugar	3 ozs.
6.	Salt Refined	½ oz.
7.	Salt Tablets	5 Nos.
8.	Tea	1 oz.
9.	Fruit Dried	2 ozs.
10.	Curry Powder	⅛ oz.
11.	C.V. Tablets	1 No.
12.	Milk Condensed	4 ozs.
*13.	Mutton Curry or	3½ ozs.
	Sardines	4½ ozs.
14.	Ghee	2 ozs.
15.	Chillies Dried	⅛ oz.

* Cases and tins are marked with either an 'F' or 'M' to denote 'Fish' or 'Meat' type of pack.

Appendix H

GURKHA 24 HOUR AMBUSH PACK RATION

Serial No.	*Commodity*	*Amount*
1.	Biscuits Service	11 ozs.
2.	Groundnuts	2 ozs.
3.	Lemon/Orange Powder	1 oz.
4.	C.V. Tablets	1 No.
5.	Pre-cooked Dhall	3½ ozs.
6.	Salt Tablets	5 ozs.
7.	Fruit Dried (VINE)	2 ozs.
8.	Mutton Curry in Ghee	3½ ozs.
9.	Sardines	4½ ozs.
10.	Eating Chocolate	2 ozs.
11.	Matches	1 box
12.	List of contents	1 No.

In addition to the above a self-heating beverage may be issued dependent on availability, but must NOT be regarded as a part of the pack.

Appendix J

MALAY COMPO RATION PACK

(Ten men for 1 day)

Serial No.	*Commodity*	*Amount*
1.	Biscuits Service	36 ozs.
2.	Tinned Herrings	32 ozs.
3.	Potato Mash Powder	12½ ozs.
4.	Rice	160 ozs.
5.	Tinned Vegetables	32 ozs.
6.	Sugar	40 ozs.
7.	Salt	10 ozs.
8.	Coffee	20 × ⅛ oz. pkts.
9.	Condiment Powder	2½ ozs.
10.	Dried Fruit	20 ozs.
11.	Tinned Milk	32 ozs.
12.	Coconut Oil	17 ozs.
13.	Chocolate	20 ozs.
14.	C.V. Tablets	10 Nos.
15.	Matches	5 booklets
16.	Instructional Pamphlet	1

Appendix K

MALAY 2 MAN PACK RATION

(2 men for 1 day, 1 man for 2 days)

Serial No.	*Commodity*	*Contents*
1.	Biscuits Service	8 ozs.
2.	Fish Curry (in Coconut oil)	8 ozs.
3.	Mutton Halal	8 ozs.
4.	Beans Baked	8 ozs.
5.	Milk Condensed (tubed)	4 ozs.
6.	Rice	34 ozs.
7.	Groundnuts	4 ozs.
8.	Chocolate	4 ozs.
9.	Coffee	½ oz.
10.	Curry Powder	½ oz.
11.	Sugar	8 ozs.
12.	Salt	1 oz.
13.	C.V. Tablets	2 Nos.

Appendix L

EAST AFRICAN COMPO PACK

(10 men for 1 day)

Serial No.	*Commodity*	*Contents*
1.	Rice	120 ozs.
2.	Ghee	16 ozs.
3.	Groundnuts	45 ozs.
4.	Dried Fruit	20 ozs.
5.	Sugar	25 ozs.
6.	Tea	5 ozs.
7.	C.V. Tablets	20 Nos.
8.	Biscuits Service	60 ozs.
9.	Salt	7½ ozs.
10.	Preserved Meat	60 ozs.
11.	Tinned Vegetables	60 ozs.
12.	Baked Beans	48 ozs.
13.	Evaporated Milk	32 ozs.
14.	Contents Sheet	1

Appendix M

EAST AFRICAN 24 HOUR PACK

Serial No.	*Commodity*	*Contents*
1.	Rice	12 ozs.
2.	Biscuits Service	4 ozs.
3.	Preserved Meat	12 ozs.
4.	Groundnuts	4 ozs.
5.	Dried Fruit	3 ozs.
6.	Sugar	2 ozs.
7.	Sweetened Milk	4 ozs.
8.	Ghee	2 ozs.
9.	Salt	½ oz.
10.	Salt Tablets	5 ozs.
11.	Tea	¼ oz.
12.	C.V. Tablets	2 Nos.
13.	Matches	1 tube*

* If not available, use 1 box Safety Matches for every two rations.

CHAPTER XXII

FIRST AID AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

Section 1.—FIRST AID

1. It is essential that every man on operations should understand not only the basic methods of First Aid to the injured, but also general Health, in other words the principles of Preventative Medicine. This in particular applies to senior and junior leaders who are responsible for the health of their men.

2. Many a soldier has been saved from death or permanent disability because immediate First Aid was rendered, and many have died as the result of their comrades lacking the knowledge or the confidence to apply First Aid.

3. **First Aid.**—First Aid saves lives and stops pain. It is but common sense plus a little specialised knowledge.

(*a*) *A Lightly Wounded Man,* if given First Aid, can go on fighting. It is therefore essential to act quickly.

(*b*) *A Badly Wounded Man* looks pale and sweaty. Be prepared for this. Calm him and also the men under your command.

(*c*) *Do not disturb A Wounded Man* too much unless you have to. Nature will tell him how to lie in the safest and most comfortable position.

(*d*) *Look, Think and Then Act.*—There may be three men wounded at once. Treat the most urgent first. Keep under cover. Any fool can be brave and get killed; be brave and don't get killed, and save your friend instead. Look, think and then act.

(*e*) Equipment:—

(i) First Field Dressing is carried by every man.

(ii) Each section carries a J Pack.

(iii) Extra medical equipment and dressings are carried by medical orderlies.

4. **When a man gets hit beside you.—**

(*a*) CALM YOURSELF.

(*b*) STOP HIS BLEEDING.

(*c*) KEEP HIM WARM.

(*d*) REASSURE HIM (words of comfort are an important first aid measure).

5. **Wounds.**—At the time of injury pain is seldom felt. The sensation is very like a blow that you may get when boxing.

6. **When to give a man a drink.**—Give any wounded man a drink of anything you have—but DO NOT give a drink to a man with a wound in the belly, or to a man who cannot swallow. You will kill him if you do. Remember—no drink to these two men. But you can moisten their lips.

7. **Stop Bleeding.**—Bleeding of a slight or severe degree accompanies all wounds. A man can bleed to death very quickly. SO ACT PROMPTLY. Remember bleeding can be stopped by the firm pressure of a dressing accurately applied on or into a wound. The dressing acts as a splint and helps to immobilize the injured part. After the dressing has been applied have faith and do not remove it to see if the bleeding has stopped.

8. **Shock.**—Shock lowers vitality; it kills more men than bullets. It is increased by fear, cold and pain. Restore, by encouragement the peace of mind of the wounded man. Reassure him by the quiet and methodical way you go about giving first aid. All movement of the wounded must be gentle and reduced to a minimum. Pain is allayed by immobilization. If pain is severe morphia should be given. Avoid an overdose. Do NOT repeat until the end of four hours. If morphia is given to a man to be evacuated inform somebody of the fact. If possible give hot sweet drinks—tea or soups.

9. **Abdominal Wounds.**—All cases should be treated as of first urgency. The object is to get the wounded man quickly and comfortably to surgical aid. *Don't give this man anything to drink.*

10. **Chest Wounds.**—The small perforating wound requires little direct attention save the application of a dressing. If the wounded man coughs up blood explain to him that it must be expected. Reassurance and calmness are essential for his peace of mind. The larger wounds are of the valve type and suck in air, they require immediate First Aid. The man finds it difficult to breathe. Seal the wounds off with elastoplast or the firm application of a dressing into the wound itself. Bind the dressing firmly to the chest. Transport the patient in the position most comfortable to himself.

11. **The Jaws and Face.**—The impact of the blow may cause a temporary loss of vision. The first sign is usually a trickle of blood on the face or in the mouth. The patient may faint. A patient with a severe jaw wound should be laid stomach down on the stretcher with his head projecting beyond the canvas and the forehead supported by a bandage sling between the handle bars. This prevents the man swallowing blood and saliva and his tongue falling back. Keep the foot of the stretcher higher than the head to ensure drainage.

12. **Broken Bones.**—To allay pain and shock and to prevent the splintered bones damaging blood vessels, nerves and muscles, the bones together with their surrounding tissues and muscles must be immobilized by splinting. Support the broken limb with a well padded splint. Place the limb in its most natural position and you can't go wrong. Don't let the limb flap around or the sharp ends of the splintered bones will cut the vessels, nerves and muscles to pieces. A broken arm should be bound firmly but not too tightly to the chest. After splinting the broken lower limb bind it to the other, foot to foot, knee to knee and thigh to thigh.

13. **Injury to Spine.**—In fractures and dislocations the affected part of the spine should be kept braced well back by ensuring that the stomach and chest are stuck out. The injured man with these reservations can be transported either lying on his back or abdomen.

14. **Burns and Scalds.**—If a limb has been hurt elevate and immobilize it. Keep the part affected exposed to the air, i.e. do not apply a dressing. The affected part may be dusted with Penicillin powder. Allay pain if necessary by frequent drinks to which salt has been added.

15. **Phosphorus Burns.**—Hold under water—pick out the pieces of phosphorus. Keep the wound wet.

16. **Artificial Respiration.**—For the apparently electrocuted or drowned. In the former case first free the victim from the current without electrocuting yourself and then ensure that after this he is earthed. In the case of the apparently drowned after removing the man from the water he should be laid down with the head lower than the feet.

THE IMMEDIATE APPLICATION OF ARTIFICIAL RESPIRATION IS VITAL. THERE IS NOT A SPLIT SECOND TO WASTE:—

(*a*) Turn the man onto his belly.

(*b*) Head turned to one side resting on his folded wrists.

(*c*) See that there is no obstruction in the mouth—False teeth or weeds.

(*d*) Kneel astride the man's head.

(*e*) Place your hands on the back of the man's chest, fingers splayed out.

(*f*) Keep your arms rigid and let your weight fall on the man's chest and at the same time squeeze.

(*g*) Recover and grasp the man's arms near his arm pits—brace both his arms back and lift his trunk.

(*h*) Do this to the time of your own respirations.

(*j*) CONTINUE THIS IF NECESSARY FOR AN HOUR. The operation is tedious. A team of two or three operators will be needed.

17. **Snake Bite.**—This rarely causes death in Malaya.

(*a*) *Look at the bite:*—

(i) Multiple small punctures are non-poisonous.

(ii) Two fang marks are due to a poisonous snake.

(*b*) *Treatment:*—

(i) Apply a tourniquet to stop the flow of the blood in the vein. (The tourniquet is the most dangerous of surgical appliances. It MUST be released every 30 minutes).

(ii) Incise the punctures and the swollen areas to a depth of one-quarter inch to get free bleeding.

(iii) Suck out the venom.

(iv) Apply a dressing.

18. **Poisonous Trees.**—Poisonous trees secrete an irritating oil which produces a severe rash. The affected areas should be washed with a strong soap solution and a coating of soap left over the area.

Section 2.—FIRST AID TO HEALTH

1. **Malaria.**—Malaria is prevalent everywhere in Malaya outside the large towns. In operational camps you should carry out the following precautions:—

(*a*) Take one tablet of Paludrine each day at a fixed time.

(*b*) Avoid unnecessary exposure of the body between 1800 hours and 0600 hours by wearing slacks, long sleeve shirts, etc.

(*c*) Use 'mosquito repellent' on exposed skin, hands, face, after 1800 hours.

(*d*) Use head and hand nets impregnated with mosquito repellent; they are particularly useful on night patrols. These are contained in your Anti-Malaria Wallets.

Paludrine must be taken for 28 days after leaving a malaria zone, e.g. on leave in Singapore or Penang, etc. This is most important. Stopping for even one day may lead to an acute attack. *(l).

Dysentery and other Intestinal Diseases

2. **Food.**—If you eat only clean food and drink clean water, you will avoid these diseases. Make every effort to ensure that food is kept clean during carriage and during its preparation. Food or drink should not be purchased from villages or unlicensed vendors. The most dangerous items are cold drinks and ice cream. The local custom is to use human excreta as manure for growing vegetables and fruit. These foods must not be eaten.

3. **Clean Water.**—In the jungle, water is generally obtained from streams. Village wells are polluted and should be avoided. All drinking water must be purified before use. This is done by Water Sterilizing Tablets contained in small Individual Outfits.

(*a*) The water bottle is filled with water, as clean as is obtainable.

(*b*) A white tablet from the Individual Outfit is added and the bottle shaken.

(*c*) After half an hour the water is fit to drink.

(*d*) A blue tablet added at this time (not before) will remove the taste of chlorine.

(*e*) Cloudy water cannot be sterilized. So strain it through cloth or a bag-water filter ('Millbank Bag'). Purification should then be carried out as detailed above. Boiling (and if desired, making tea) will purify any water.

Men who drink water straight from streams may escape disease but not for long.

4. **Jaundice** (Weil's Disease).—The germ which causes this disease is found in streams infested by rats and rodents. The slimy banks of streams are particularly dangerous, especially with bare feet. The centre of a swift running stream is less likely to be infected.

5. **Scrub Typhus.**—This is caused by the bite of a very small mite insect. It is prevented by smearing 'mite repellent' on clothing. Mite repellent is available in all units. Use it. When applying it, pay particular attention to socks, lower ends of slacks, fly openings, waist, cuffs and neck opening. Mite repellent remains in clothing after washing but should be reapplied each fortnight.

6. **Skin Diseases.**—The hot sweaty climate leads to many skin diseases, for example, ringworm of the foot and body and jungle sores. These diseases are more common in persons recently arrived in this country because they have not learned the importance of frequent washing of the body. Two showers (at least) daily are recommended. Even if showers are not available the person who wants to keep clean can always do so. Powder for foot and body should be used after washing. Clean clothing is also most important. Socks should be changed twice daily.

7. **Leeches.**—Leeches are common in the jungle. They may be quite small and snail like. They again access to the body through the lower ends of slacks, lace holes in boots or any opening in the clothing and then attach themselves firmly to the skin where they engorge themselves with blood. They are painless and cause little harm but their bites may later result in ulceration.

(*a*) Do NOT pull leeches off. Touch them with a lighted cigarette.

(*b*) Mosquito repellent (mentioned in connection with malaria, i.e., DMP) if freshly smeared on clothing, socks, slacks, fly area and boots is effective in keeping them away.

8. **Venereal Disease.**—Remember that all local women concerned may be infected. Prophylactic Centres are organised in all units and in the larger towns. Sheaths and prophylactic packets are available from these centres and should be used as necessary. Counterfoil chits are available for all users and should be obtained and retained. In actual fact persons who use Prophylactic Centres do not get Venereal Disease.

Section 3.—SUMMARY

Visible First Aid Equipment

1. **For Wounds.**—FIRST FIELD DRESSING carried by all ranks on operations.

2. **For Malaria.**—PALUDRINE suppresses malaria. A tablet a day taken at a fixed hour. This routine is continued for 28 days after leaving a malarious area whether on posting or on leave.

Invisible First Aid Equipment

1. To assure your good health the following immunisations are provided:—

(*a*) Small-pox. Vaccination every two years.

(*b*) Enteric Fever. Annual TAB inoculations.

(*c*) Tetanus. Inoculation every year.

2. **Don't.—**

(*a*) Eat locally grown salads. They are polluted.

(*b*) Drink minerals or fruit drinks prepared in villages. Ice used for these is usually made from polluted water.

Appendix A

ADVICE TO DOG HANDLERS

1. As a trained dog handler you are responsible for the continued health and working efficiency of your dog. You must show zeal, enthusiasm and devotion to duty.

2. **DONT's**

(*a*) Don't allow anyone to handle or become friendly with your dog. It is NOT a pet and has a job to do like yourself.

(*b*) Don't throw sticks or other articles for your dog to retrieve.

(*c*) Don't allow your dog to go chasing poultry or game.

(*d*) Don't allow your dog to sleep in your own bivouac.

(*e*) Don't overdo your obedience work or your dog will loose its initiative.

3. **DO's**

(*a*) Do praise your dog for a command successfully obeyed or for a job well done.

(*b*) Do insist on commands given being carried out.

(*c*) Do allow your dog to relax and play when off duty.

(*d*) Do ensure that kennel management is the best.

(*e*) Do give your dog regular training.

O.C. R.H.C. SQUADRON,
11th HUSSARS. P.A.O.

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